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INTRODUCTION

"The root difficulty is thatjudicial review is a counter-majoritarian
force in our system."' With the unforgettable epithet, "countermajoritarian," Alexander Bickel set the terms for debate about judicial review-terms that have yet to be redefined. His 1962 masterpiece, The Least Dangerous Branch, is rightly counted as the most important work of constitutional scholarship written in the last halfcentury,2 not only for its explicit argument in favor of judicial restraint, but above all for the underlying and largely implicit conception ofjudicial review upon which the argument rests. The Least Dangerous Branch argues that the democratic, majoritarian cast of
legislation is a sufficient reason for judicial restraint. Its underlying
conception is that judicial review is exemplified, if not comprised, by
the practice of invalidating the statutes that legislatures enact. In
Bickel's words: 'Judicial review ... is the power to apply and construe
the Constitution, in matters of the greatest moment, against the
wishes of a legislative majority, which is, in turn, powerless to affect
the judicial decision."3 My aim is to demolish this conception.

IALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962).
2 See SOTIRIOs A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 148 (1993)
("[T]here is no disagreement about [Bickel's] influence on the constitutional debate ....Many writers credit Bickel with inaugurating that debate as the specific quest
for a way to reconcile a nondeferential judiciary to majoritarianism within a broadly
relativist or conventionalist view of morality and consistently with the American Legal
Realist critique of legal formalism.").
3 BICKEL, supra note 1, at 20.
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Bickel's conception of judicial review has served as a deep point
of consensus for the multiple debates about judicial restraint that The
Least DangerousBranch helped animate. These include, most saliently,
the debate about interpretive method focused upon Griswold v. Connecticut4 and Roe v. Wade.5 This debate has gone under different
names, first as the debate about "interpretivism,"6 more recently as
the debate about "originalism," 7 as the disputed issue has been refined-but never to produce consensus, only further strife. The issue,
roughly, is this: Do some aspects ofjustice, such as "privacy," furnish
sufficient grounds for a reviewing court to invalidate a statute, when
the court's decision is only weakly supported by the text of the Constitution?" More concretely: Were Griswold and Roe legitimately or illegitimately decided?9 The Least Dangerous Branch, in an obvious way,
has played an important role in this debate. Bickel's Countermajoritarian Difficulty has served as a leading argument against the
"privacy" jurisprudence, advanced by its two most famous scholarly
critics, John Hart Ely and Robert Bork. ° What I am about to suggest

4 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5 410 U.S. 113 (1973); seeJed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV.
737, 744-52 (1989) (describing "privacy" jurisprudence initiated by Griswold and carried forward in Roe).
6 SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1-41 (1980) (distinguishing
between interpretivism and non-interpretivism); MICHAELJ. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 9-36 (1982) (same); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unutritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 703-10 (1975) (same).
See Daniel A. Farber, The OriginalismDebate: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 49 OHIO
ST.
LJ. 1085, 1085-86 (1989) (noting shift in terminology for describing contending sides
in debate, from "interpretivism" vs. "non-interpretivism" to "originalism" vs. "nonoriginalism"); BARBER, supra note 2, at 157-58 (same).
See infra text accompanying notes 61-71 (describing this debate). It bears emphasis that this debate about interpretive method is only the most prominent of the
multiple scholarly debates about judicial restraint. A cross-cutting debate is whether
courts, whatever the proper interpretive method, should invalidate statutes that are
not "clearly" unconstitutional. See infra Part II.B (discussing "minimalism").
9 "[M]ore than any other constitutional decision of recent times,
the Abortion
Cases-Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton-rekindled the debate about the legitimacy of
what I am now calling non-interpretive review." PERRY, supranote 6, at 144 (footnotes
omitted). I should emphasize that Roe and Grisold figure centrally in this scholarly
debate with respect to the interpretive method employed in those cases, not the results that the Court reached. See id. at 144-45 (drawing this distinction). One might
be a non-interpretivist or non-originalist and still believe that, all things considered,
abortion is morally wrong.
10 See ELY, supra note 6, at 4-9, 101-03 (containing Ely's central statement
of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty); ROBERT H. BORi, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-41,
153-55, 251-59 (1990) (containing Bork's central statement of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty); infra notes 84-85 (discussing Bork's and Ely's reliance on the Counter-
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is something less obvious: that even the defenders of the broad interpretive method upon which Griswold and Roe are based-scholars
such as Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, Thomas Grey and Laurence
Tribe," to name only a few-have implicitly accepted the conception
of judicial review underlying the Countermajoritarian Difficulty and
relied upon by Ely and Bork. These champions of a broader approach to constitutional interpretation have accepted, without needing to, Bickel's legislature-centered conception ofjudicial review. In
this sense, The Least Dangerous Branch has not just fueled and figured
in the subsequent scholarly debate about interpretive method. It has
defined that debate-implicitly so, again, because its conception ofjudicial review is never really defended, and hardly even disclosed, by
Bickel or by the subsequent proponents of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty.
Judicial review is not the practice of invalidating statutes. Nor is it
a practice exemplified by the invalidation of statutes. Rather, judicial
review is, at a minimum, the practice of invalidating (state and federal) statutes, rules, orders and official actions on direct constitutional grounds. 2 It includes all of the following: (a) excluding from
a trial the fruits of a search by the street-level operative of a lawenforcement agency, on the grounds that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment; 3 (b) reversing the conviction of a protester for a
"breach of the peace," on the grounds that her activities were protected by the First Amendment; 14 (c) overturning an otherwise valid
administrative, order entered by a labor board, which directs a church
majoritarian Difficulty). For Bork's and Ely's attacks on the "privacy" jurisprudence,
see BORK, supra, at 95-100, 110-26, 257-59; ELY, supra note 6, at 43-72; John Hart Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920 (1973); cf. ELY,
supra note 6, at 221 n.4 (distinguishing Griswold from Roe, as defensible in terms of a
less open-ended approach to constitutional interpretation).
See sources cited supra note 6, infra notes
62, 65.
12 See infra note 131 (elaborating
on this definition).
Is See generally WILLIAM W. GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK.
A
CHRONOLOGICAL SURVEY OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 21-102 (1995). It is revealing
to note (following Professor Greenhalgh's tabulation) that the overwhelming majority
of these cases are described as challenges to an arrest, or a search, or some other particular action by a law enforcement officer, rather than to a general regulatory or
statutory policy.
14 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-11 (1940).
Although the statute
underlying a conviction might be invalidated too, see, e.g., Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451, 467 (1987) (facially invalidating overbroad statute); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 361 (1983) (facially invalidating vague statute), my point here is that reversing the
conviction of someone who has engaged in protected speech properly counts as an
instance ofjudicial review independent of the court's invalidation, or not, of a statute.
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to engage in collective bargaining with its employees, because the Religion Clauses entitle the school to an exemption from the collectivebargaining statute;' (d) striking down some agency's rules for adjudicating individual claims, as violating procedural due process; ' and
(e) invalidating a statute that abridges the right to abortion.' 7 Judicial
review includes, as an instance, the invalidation of statutes-where to
"invalidate" a statute means to issue a legally authoritative determination that the statute lacks legal force -- but it also includes the invalidation of agency rules, agency orders and simple actions such as
street-level searches or the treatment of prisoners. Now, by some
miracle of statutory interpretation that works its magic because every
rule, order or action ultimately derives from a statute that gives it legal life,' 9 it might be the case that the practice of invalidating statutes
can be taken as a proper synecdoche for the whole practice ofjudicial
review. But unless this is the case-and this Article will demonstrate
that it is not-the debate about judicial restraint that scholars have
conducted with such vigor since The Least DangerousBranch has been
radically incomplete.
I am hardly the first to point out the error in conflating judicial
review (even confined to the federal system) with the review of statutes. Charles Black made this point, elegantly and cogently, almost
three decades ago:
The political and legal problems of Marbuiy v. Madison exist in only one
kind of confrontation-the confrontation of Congress and the Court.
In many cases passing on the constitutionality of federal actions, what is
actually involved is a confrontation between the Court and some official
to whose judgment on constitutionality none of the piously repeated
rules of deference and restraint have anything like the application they
to Congress.
might be thought to have
Others, since, have concurred. 2' But Black's insight has not received

15See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,507 (1979).
16See Brock v. Roadway Express Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 268 (1987); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692-97 (1979).
17 Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992).
Insofar as Casey
simply invalidates a statutory provision, and not an entire act, it does not count as a
true statutory invalidation. See infra note 104 (discussing the concept of statutory
"invalidation" and associated individuation criteria).
18See infra note 104 (specifying whatjudicial "invalidation" of statutes involves).
19 See ELY, supra note 6, at 4 n.* (implicitly suggesting
this possibility).

-0CHARLES

L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

77 (1969).
21 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue andJudicialReview, 91 MICH.
L. REv. 577, 634-
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anything like the emphasis and scholarly response it deserves. It has
not figured centrally in the debates about "interpretivism" and
"originalism." The insight opens up the possibility that arguments for
judicial restraint, effective with respect to the judicial practice of invalidating statutes, might have little or no force with respect to the
practice of invalidating agency rules, orders and actions, and thus that
the proper contours ofjudicial review in an administrative state might
be quite different than a legislature-centered conception would lead
us to believe.
Consider the most important extant argument for judicial restraint: the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. What does the argument
say? What did Bickel mean by it, and what do Bork and Ely mean
when they hurl it against Roe? Formally, it says this: (1) Some statutes
should be taken to bear the "Plebiscitary Feature," defined as follows-a statute bears the "Plebiscitary Feature" if it would be chosen,
over the status quo and some range of alternatives, in a hypothetical
plebiscite, perhaps idealized; and (2) it is intrinsically unfair and, all
things considered, wrong for a court to invalidate a statute that bears
the Plebiscitary Feature, at least on grounds such as "privacy" that are
only weakly supported by the text of the Constitution. This formalization of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is defended below.2 If you
dispute it, draw some other formalization and see whether it avoids
the problem identified here. The problem is this: Even if the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, thus formalized, holds true, it furnishes no
basis for restraint in any other aspect of the broad practice ofjudicial
review, except for that part comprised or exemplified by the practice
of invalidating statutes.23
Compare these two cases. In the first case, Congress passes a statute proscribing abortions (say, in hospitals receiving federal funds)
except when the woman's life is endangered. In the second case, a
health agency, operating under a statute that authorizes the agency to
35 (1993) ("[T]he vast majority ofjudicial overruling of governmental activity is concerned not with statutes or actions of the legislature, or even the chief executive, but
with the work of administrative officials, from the loftiest cabinet officer to the lowest
administrative actor. The actions range from administrative policymaking to application of administrative rules. In these cases making the countermajoritarian difficulty
stick is extremely difficult." (footnotes omitted)); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and
Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 94

MIcH. L. REV. 245, 246 n.7 (1995) (arguing that "[a] court's relative majoritarian deficit is surely larger" when overturning statutes rather than decisions by individual officeholders).
See infra Part I.B.1.

23

By "exemplified," here, I mean via a Simple Extension. See infra Part II.
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issue "reasonable rules to assure the health of patients" in these hospitals, enacts a rule proscribing abortions except when the woman's
life is endangered.24 (This latter statute is what I will call a "valuesstatute,"25 because it authorizes the agency to pursue a basic, openended value, here "health.") Assume the Countermajoritarian Difficulty holds true. If so, the no-abortion statute in the first case bears
the Plebiscitary Feature, and no court should invalidate it. But is it
true that the no-abortion rule, in the second case, also bears the Plebiscitary Feature? Why would that be true? Because the rule maximizes
health, and in that sense is a valid interpretation of the health statute,
which itself bears the Plebiscitary Feature? But surely any interpretive
link between the health statute and the agency's no-abortion rule is
too weak to support the claim that the no-abortion rule would be chosen (over some range of alternatives) in a hypothetical plebiscite,
simply because the health statute would. This seems intuitively correct; this Article will defend the intuition at some length.
Thus the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, without more, simply
fails to answer the question whether a court can legitimately invalidate an agency decision such as the no-abortion rule on the grounds
of "privacy"; it fails to explain why a broad practice of review
grounded in Roe or Criswold would be wrong across most of the range
of its application. Although there might still be good arguments for a
general posture of restraint, based for example on the majoritarian
cast of the Presidency2 (which oversees the health agency) or on some
other institutional feature of the administrative state, Bork, Ely and
other proponents of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty have never
made these kinds of arguments.
This might be a real defect for restraintist theory, even in a world
different from the one in which we live. Even on a statutory model of
governance, where legislatures enact nicely determinate statutes, and
every rule, order or action ties back to one of these, judicial review
might still not be exemplified by the practice of reviewing statutes.
Let us bracket the question for now. For what, above all, makes the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty and similar restraintist theories radically incomplete is the rise of administrative,as contrasted with statutory, governance. One of the great ironies of the legislature-centered
debate about judicial review, fueled by The Least Dangerous Branch, is
24

Cf.Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (rejecting a challenge to agency regula-

tions prohibiting grantees from engaging in abortion-related speech).
See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
26 See infra text accompanying notes 327-34.
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that this debate has occurred with such vigor, not before, but after, the
historical and jurisprudential changes of the New Deal-Roosevelt's
proliferation of administrative agencies, and the "switches in time" of
1937 through which the Court finally recognized the administrative
state.27 The Least Dangerous Branch adopted and made canonical a
conception of judicial review that, by 1962, was already two decades
too old. Administrative governance in the United States has meant
many different things-a regulatory state, federal power, adversarial
legalism, the Plebiscitary Presidency, state paternalism, iron triangles 8-- but one of the many things it has meant is formal administrative discretion. The disappearance of the nondelegation doctrine,
never enforced since the New Deal,2 means that Congress, without
constraint, may explicitly delegate formal lawmaking power to agencies, or may simply promulgate statutes that are indeterminate in one
or more senses of that word. Further, there appear to be good reasons in political economy why a legislature might sometimes, if not
always, accord agencies formal discretion-for instance, to control
outcomes but deflect blame, or to avoid a contested issue disputed by
27

See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-80 (1991) (analyzing

the New Deal as a "constitutional moment" involving radical constitutional changes);
Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court
and ConstitutionalTransformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994) (providing a detailed
jurisprudential analysis of the Court's New Deal decisions culminating in the "switches
in time"); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995) (history of these decisions). Gary Lawson starkly (and pessimistically) summarizes the constitutional features of the post-New Deal administrative state, wrought by the "switches in time," in
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
28 The literature on all this, of course, is huge.
Three good places to start
are: Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669 (1975) (the still-classic overview from the perspective of an administrative
lawyer); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT (1989) (a tremendously useful summary of the empirical work on agencies
in the case-study tradition); and DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II (1989) (an
equally useful summary of much of the relevant rational-choice scholarship).
For a general history and critique of the demise of the nondelegation doctrine,
see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993). By "never enforced," I mean as a grounds
to invalidate statutes, or to construe statutes narrowly merely by virtue of statutory indeterminacy. The Court has invoked the nondelegation doctrine, under the rubric of
statutory interpretation, as a way to invalidate certain kinds of agency decisions, e.g.,
decisions violating constitutional criteria. See infra note 214 (discussing how the Court
invokes the nondelegation doctrine in interpreting statutes).
soFor my purposes, it suffices that statutes are indeterminate in the weak sense of
being contestable, rather than in the stronger sense of lacking objective or knowable
meaning. See infra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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32
3
two organized groups. ' And Congress, in fact, routinely does this.
Formal administrative discretion attenuates the interpretive link
between a statute and the rules, orders or actions taken under it. This
point is obvious-indeed entailed by the very concept of "discretion"
as I mean it here-and has fueled recent calls (thus far unsuccessful)
for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine. 3s My point is equally obvious, but less well known: administrative discretion eviscerates legislature-centered theories ofjudicial restraint. To be sure, the formal
discretion of agencies and their operatives may be a sham; it may well
be that agencies are captured by interest groups, or dominated by
congressional committees, or ruled by the Presidency. 4 But a theory
premised upon the special democratic properties of legislatures will
not tell us that. Restraintist scholars have, above all, claimed that the
formal output of legislatures-statutes---have special democratic legitimacy. s5 However tempted we might be to "reinterpret" this as
some kind of claim about the democratizing structure of the administrative state, we should read these scholars for their intentions and
recognize the statutory model of governance that they have presupposed. The formal discretion of administrative agencies creates a
profound normative problem for restraintist constitutional theory, as
the theory now stands, whatever political scientists theorizing in a
positive mode (or others) might believe about the real power that
formal discretion imports. Indeed, on certain positive theories (such
as a theory that posits the dominance of agencies by legislative committees that, in turn, are beholden to organized groups rather than
electoral majorities), the real import of formal discretion may turn
out to have highly unattractive implications for a restraintist theory

31

See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.

REV. 1, 37-62 (1982) (providing a positive theory of delegation along these lines).
32 See infra note 140 (describing Congress's use of "values statutes" that epitomize
delegation of power to administrative agencies).
See infra note 213 (citing prominent works in the debate about reviving nondelegation doctrine).
See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: AdministrativeArrangements and the PoliticalControl of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,

431-45 (1989) (discussing mechanisms whereby the President, Congress and interest
groups influence agencies, short of formal, substantive legislation); Terry M. Moe &
Scott A. Wilson, Presidentsand the Politics of Structure LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1994, at 1, 3-4 (describing agencies as enmeshed in struggles for influence between
legislators and interest groups on the one side and the President on the other).
See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (describing the legislature-centered
focus of arguments forjudicial restraint).
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premised on the majoritarian cast of lawmaking.
We need to see. In short, we need a theory of judicial restraint
for the administrative state. By "judicial restraint" I mean roughly
this: a practice of limiting the occasions for judicial review, grounded
in some deficit of the reviewing court, relative to an epistemically perfect court that neither caused nor constituted any wrong (democratic
or otherwise) by the act of judicial review. For example, someone
who argues that a reviewing court has full authority to invalidate a
statute, rule, order or action violating moral rights, but that, despite
the woman's moral right to "privacy," anti-abortion laws infringing
upon that right are justified by the fetus's overriding right to life, is
not an advocate of restraint. A restraintist argument, whether democratic or epistemic, is fundamentally different from an analytic argument about the meaning of constitutional criteria. To be sure, the
implication of this analytic argument, balancing the moral rights of
woman and fetus, is to limit the occasions for judicial review (in striking down anti-abortion laws)-but the argument has nothing whatsoever to do with judicial capacities and limitations. It would hold
equally true if courts were epistemically and democratically perfect.
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, by contrast, concerns precisely
the alleged democratic deficit of reviewing courts. It is a restraintist,
not an analytic argument. The question asked here is how this sort of
argument-an argument about judicial review, as such-can possibly
be extended into the administrative state.
Part I of this Article lays the conceptual foundations for a theory
of judicial restraint in the administrative state. It attempts to explicate, in a rigorous way, certain concepts that would figure crucially in
any such theory-in particular, the foundational concept of judicial
restraint. It shows how arguments for restraint are directed against a
particular target against the broad view that (a court's best understanding of) "justice" provides a sufficient basis for judicial review.
Part I also introduces the notion of a "legislature-centered restraintist
argument": an argument that points, centrally, to features of egislatures as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating statutes. And,
36

See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Con-

gress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132,
136-48 (1988) (arguing that the legislative committee system is designed to maximize
the reelectoral chances of legislators, who in turn are responsive to organized groups
within their districts).
37 See generally Lawrence G. Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced
ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978) (drawing this sort of distinction).
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finally, it gives a clear analysis of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty.
This is the legislature-centered argument that has been by far the
most famous and influential,- yet that, despite this fame and influence, has been too often misconstrued and misunderstood, both with
respect to its "plebiscitary" conception of statutes, and with respect to
the democratic rather than epistemic or analytic construal of what I
call a statute's "Plebiscitary Feature."
Part II shows why legislature-centered arguments do not extend
into the administrative state. More precisely, this Part shows why legislature-centered arguments lack what I will call a "Simple Extension."
A Simple Extension of some legislature-centered argument purports
to show that courts have grounds for restraint in reviewing rules, orders and actions merely by virtue of their interpretive pedigree-the
fact that every rule, order or action, to be proper, must derive from
and be a proper interpretation of some underlying statute. So, for
example, we might conjecture that rules, orders and actions bear
Plebiscitary Features if statutes do (as the Countermajoritarian Difficulty supposes); or, more weakly, that it is unfair to invalidate unjust
rules, orders or actions, whether or not they bear Plebiscitary Features, because they are proper interpretations of statutes that do bear
such features. Part II of the Article shows, in detail, why any extension argument of this kind must fail. It focuses first on the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, because of its importance in past and current
debates about judicial restraint; but the broader claim defended here
is that the Simple Extension of any legislature-centered argument,
democratic or epistemic, will be unsuccessful. Further, although the
failure of Simple Extensions is accentuated by broad delegations of
power to administrative agencies, this failure is not solely attributable
to the demise of the nondelegation doctrine. Part II demonstrates
that no plausible nondelegation doctrine would make sufficiently
tight the interpretive link between statutes and administrative rules,
order or actions so as to require judicial restraint just by virtue of that
link. Finally, this Part demonstrates that existing Supreme Court
doctrine, in highly significant and hitherto unnoticed ways, confirms
the claims here advanced. The possibility of differentialrestraint-that
courts might have broader grounds to invalidate rules, orders and actions, as opposed to statutes-is not just this author's theoretical construct. That possibility turns out to be black letter law.
See Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: ElectiveJudiciaties and the Rule of
Larv, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 712 n.66 (1995) (citing sources that characterize the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty as a central problem of modern constitutional theory).
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So the question that this Article poses-"Do courts have grounds
for judicial restraint in the administrative state?"-has a partly negative answer. Are there grounds for restraint that bear upon the judicial practice of reviewing rules, orders and actions, as distinct from
the special practice of reviewing statutes? No: at least not just because of interpretive pedigree. But this negative claim, defended in
Part II, does not amount to a wholly negative answer to our question.
It might still be the case that the various features of the institutions
that make up the administrative state-that odd amalgam of agencies,
the Presidency, legislative committees, and interest groups, to name
its key components-provide reviewing courts sufficient grounds for
restraint, in particular contexts. We should consider the possibility of
a "Plebiscitary Presidency," one whose effective oversight of agencies
might confer the Plebiscitary Feature on (some) rules, orders or even
actions, independent of their statutory pedigree. We should also consider the possibility that agencies might have an epistemic advantage
over courts on certain constitutional issues by virtue of the epistemic
constraints that the very process of adjudication brings. One of the
unfortunate consequences of the scholarly preoccupation with legislatures has been a concomitant obsession with the democratic grounds
for judicial restraint. But arguments for restraint, properly understood, might be epistemic rather than democratic. A democratic argument for restraint with respect to some constitutional criterion C
(some aspect of justice) claims that judicial review violates some intrinsic democratic value D, which overrides C. By contrast, and more
simply, an epistemic argument claims that courts are epistemically
imperfect in determining what C requires.
Part III excavates a significant epistemic argument that has remained largely hidden in the scholarly literature, but that, I suggest,
deserves at least as much attention as the Countermajoritarian Difficulty or any other democratic argument, with respect to whether
courts should refrain from invalidating administrative rules, orders or
actions. Call this the synoptic argument: To the extent that the constitutional legitimacy of a rule or general practice may depend upon
the overall improvement in the important value (for example, health,
safety, basic welfare or environmental preservation) that the rule or
practice secures, as balanced against the overall infringement on constitutional rights that it works, the very orientation of courts to particular parties and cases will amount to a real epistemic handicap.
Our scholarly debates must be doubly widened: we must enlarge our
focus from legislatures to agencies and, simultaneously, from the
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purported democratic deficits of courts to their possible epistemic
limitations.
I. FOUNDATIONS

What do we mean by 'Judicial restraint"? What is the particular
conception of "unrestrained judging" that arguments for restraint
particularly seek to limit? How might the features of governmental
institutions, such as the epistemic capacities of courts, the special
democratic cast of legislatures, or the less democratic cast of administrative agencies, play a role in restraintist arguments? And how, in
particular, do those features figure in the most famous and important
argument of this sort, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?
A decent theory ofjudicial restraint-for the administrative state,
or for that matter any other governmental regime-ought to be clear
about these essential matters. All too often, they are left obscure or
confused, even by the scholarly literature on constitutional law.9' The
central claim of this Article-the substantive claim defended in Part
II-is that legislature-centered restraintist arguments, paradigmatically the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, fail to advance good reasons
for limiting the practice of judicial review in an administrative state.
But first, what precisely are the form, content and purpose of a restraintist argument, especially this paradigmatic one? This Part attempts to clarify the problem of restraint and to explicate the Coun-

termajoritarian Difficulty, thus laying a foundation for a theory of
restraint in the administrative state.
A. JudicialRestraint and the Target ofJustice
Arguments forjudicial restraint seek to limit, in some way, the occasions for judicial review-the occasions on which courts invalidate
statutes, rules, orders or actions. 40 Bift how? Some arguments for limiting these occasions are simply arguments about the content of those
normative criteria that bear on judicial review. For example, to say
39 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 118-21 (discussing
the conflation of
democratic arguments for restraint with subjectivism); infra text accompanying notes
53-59 (distinguishing between the modest concept ofjudicial restraint and the more
robust claim that a statute might be "unconstitutional" without being subject to judicial invalidation).
40This crucial distinction between judicial invalidation of statutes and judicial invalidation of administrative rules, orders and actions is fleshed out below. See infra
note 104.
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that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment,4 1 that
the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless searches of factories in
"closely regulated" industries (where the owners' expectation of privacy is diminished) ,4 that reducing the value of property does not,
without more, run afoul of the Takings Clause, 3 or that the Due
Process Clause furnishes no procedural rights to those who are
merely applying for government benefits, 44 is to say that the occasions
for judicial review in these areas ought to be limited (relative to the
possible worlds in which courts invalidate anti-obscenity laws, always
require search warrants, hold value-reductions to be "takings," and
require hearings even for would-be beneficiaries). Thus these restrictive interpretations (restrictive, relative to those possible worlds) of
the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Takings Clause and Due
Process Clause, are indeed arguments for "judicial restraint" in a
broad sense. The normative criteria set out in the Bill of Rights provide some or all of the criteria against which courts engaged in constitutional review should measure statutes, rules, orders or actions. A
reviewing court ought not strike down a statute, rule, order or action
that it takes to satisfy these criteria; so an argument to show that some
statute, rule, order or action satisfies the criteria is, in a broad sense, a
restraintist argument. This broad conception of 'Judicial restraint"
would, however, place the whole content of constitutional law under
the rubric of that term. Why waste a useful term in this way? 'Judicial
restraint," usefully, seems to have something special to do with courts;,
it seems to pick out courts' flaws and deficits as a special set of reasons
for restricting review. The broad conception of 'Judicial restraint"
misses this point.
Lawrence Sager, in an important and well-known article, has confronted this problem. He writes:
In applying the provisions of the Constitution to the challenged behavior of state or federal officials, the federal courts have modeled analytical structures; I will call these models or structures of analysis constructs.
These resemble conceptions of the various constitutional concepts from
which they derive. But the important difference between a true constitutional conception and the judicially formulated construct is that the

judicial construct may be truncated for reasons which are based not
upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon various concerns

SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973).
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
43 SeePenn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of NewYork, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
See Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986).
41

42
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of the Court about its institutional role.4 '

Sager continues:
What I want to distinguish between here are reasons for limiting ajudicial construct of a constitutional concept which are based upon questions of propriety or capacity 4and those which are. based upon an under6
standing of the concept itself.
Sager valuably points out that the limited "institutional role" of courts
defines a special set of reasons for courts to refrain from invalidating
statutes, rules, orders or actions, distinct from reasons that are "based
upon an understanding of the constitutional concept itself." Sager
calls the first kind of reasons "institutional" and the second kind
"analytic."47
To get a sense of this distinction, consider again the federal law (a
statute or a rule) hypothesized in the Introduction-a law that prohibits abortions except where the woman's life is endangered-and
imagine that the law is challenged in court as violating the Due Process Clause. The following would then be an "analytic" argument for
the court to uphold the law: "Although the anti-abortion law infringes upon the woman's moral right to privacy-a moral right that
is protected by the Due Process Clause-this infringement is, on balance, justified by the fetus' overriding moral right to life." This is an
"analytic," and not an "institutional," argument to limitjudicial review
because the argument simply elaborates what it takes to be the moral
considerations bearing upon the constitutional question at hand.
The claim is simply that the anti-abortion law is, on balance, morally,
and therefore constitutionally, justified. No special limit on the
"institutional role" of courts is claimed. To see this, imagine that
courts of constitutional review have the broadest possible
"institutional role": they are epistemically perfect in determining
what morality requires; they work no democratic wrong in overriding
the legislature's choices; the remedies they order are perfectly effective; and these courts are licensed to strike down, on constitutional
grounds, any law that violates moral rights. The argument for upholding the anti-abortion law based upon the moral rights of woman
and fetus is an "analytic" argument because it is not vitiated by these
45 Sager, supra note 37, at 1214.

Id. at 1217-18.

47 See id at 1218 (distinguishing between "institutional" and "analytical" reasons

for "limiting a judicial construct of a constitutional concept") (internal quotations
omitted). I have truncated Sager's "analytical" to "analytic."
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imagined, institutional facts; it could still be addressed to these perfect, imagined courts.
By contrast, each of the following arguments for upholding the
anti-abortion law counts as "institutional," not "analytic": (1) "Courts
are epistemically weak in determining what open-ended, ethical criteria such as 'privacy' require; it is legislatures and agencies, not courts,
that are theoretical authorities in this area, and so the lawmaking
body's decision to issue the anti-abortion law provides the court sufficient reason to believe that a woman's moral right to privacy does not
entitle her to an abortion" 48 ; (2) "Although courts are theoretical

authorities with respect to 'privacy,' and although the moral right to
privacy is indeed best understood to protect abortion, legislatures and
agencies are more democratic than courts, and in this instance the
intrinsic democratic wrong constituted by judicial review is sufficient
to require that the court uphold the anti-abortion law"49; and (3) "In
the long run, given the remedial limitations of courts and the pedagogic effects of according primary responsibility for protecting moral
rights to legislatures and agencies, limiting judicial review in this area
will actually lead to fewer violations of the right to privacy. ' Each of
these three arguments counts as "institutional," by Sager's definition,
because each identifies some deficit in the reviewing court-an epistemic, democratic or remedial deficit-as grounds to uphold the antiabortion law. None of the three would hold true if courts were epistemically, democratically and remedially perfect in the way that I
imagined above.
I suggest that "institutional" reasons, as Sager calls them, simply
are reasons for judicial restraint. The concept of judicial restraint invites us to focus on the particular epistemic, democratic or remedial
capacities of reviewing courts, as opposed to review-limiting considerations that have nothing particularly to do with courts. This is the
dichotomy that Sager elaborates and makes more precise with his
48

On the concept of a "theoretical authority," see generally Heidi M. Hurd, Chal-

lengingAuthority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615-16, 1667-77 (1991). An argument to limit
judicial review based upon the theoretical authority of legislatures or agencies would
be an example of what I will call an "epistemic" argument for judicial restraint. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26.
49 See infra text accompanying notes 107-17 (discussing "democratic"
arguments
for judicial restraint).
See generally GERALD N.

ROSENBERG,

THE HOLLOW

HOPE

336 (1991)

(questioning the efficacy of judicial remedies); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 146, 375 n.42 (1993) (relying on Rosenberg to argue for judicial restraint).
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"analytic"/" institutional" distinction 5'
Unlike Sager, however, I will eschew the term "institutional," and

refer to "institutional" reasons simply as reasons for judicial restraint. 52 In addition, I will decouple the concept ofjudicial restraint
31Indeed, Sager uses the term "judicial restraint" in just this way. See, e.g., Sager,
supra note 37, at 1224 ("[T]he distinction between the scope of the norms of the Constitution and the scope of their judicial enforcement is inherent in the doctrine ofjudicial restraint and played a central role in the early formulation and defense of that
doctrine [byJames Bradley Thayer]."); id. at 1227 ("[T] he idea of the scope of constitutional norms extending beyond the scope of their judicial enforcement is intrinsic
[to the judicial restraint thesis].").
32 The term "institutional" is confusing because the features of government institutions might be relevant, analytically, to what the Constitution requires of a statute,
rule, order or action. This is obviously true when a statute, etc., is challenged as violating, for example, Articles I, II or III of the Constitution, which concern the very institutional structure of our government. But it is also true for that portion of the Constitution that has proved of primary interest to theorists of restraint, and that is of
primary interest in this Article: the Bill of Rights. The ethical criteria that lie behind
the Bill of Rights, and bear upon constitutionality, are not necessarily institutioninvariant. We should not assume that what justice, or moral rights, requires of a statute, rule, order or action is independent of the features of government institutions.
Consider the typical defense of the right to free speech, which relies not merely on the
role of self-expression in individual well-being, but even more on the role of political
speech in exposing and thereby correcting legislative bias or error. See, e.g., JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 179, 253-54 (1986) (arguing that free speech rights
are primarily grounded upon public benefits of speech); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 46 (1982) ("The special concern for freedom to

discuss public issues and freedom to criticize governmental officials is a form of the
argument from truth, because the necessity for rational thinking and the possibility of
error in governmental policy are both large and serious."). See generally RAZ, supra, at
178-80, 247 (generally denying that the content of a moral right is exhausted by the
interest of the rights-holder). Or consider the possibility that procedural rights might
have differential force depending on the institutional context; although current doctrine does not say this, it might plausibly be argued that the Constitution requires
agencies to engage in fuller, more deliberative, lawmaking procedures than legislatures, given the special democratic cast of legislatures. Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983) (denying that "the arbitraryand-capricious standard [of the Administrative Procedure Act] requires no more than
the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the
Due Process Clause").
Thus, we might have an advocate of limiting review who argues that a statute or
rule restricting some kind of speech should be upheld and denies that legislators possess the deficit by reference to which the free speech advocate criticizes the statute or
rule. Similarly, the advocate of limiting review might describe the democratic process
by which some statute was enacted in order to show that its enactment satisfied procedural due process. Such arguments for limiting review, albeit relying on the features
of legislatures, would be squarely "analytic," not "institutional."
Nor can one even say that the institutional features of courts will lack analytic significance. Assume that courts have the following epistemic defect in adjudicating certain controversial constitutional rights (say, rights to privacy): they are easily disrupted
by popular turmoil. I suggest that this epistemic deficit could provide either a reason
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from a further claim that I take Sager to advance. This further claim
concerns the proper application of the predicate, "unconstitutional."
The claim is this: a statute, rule, order or action might be properly
described as "unconstitutional" without this description entailing that
the statute, rule, order or action is properly invalidated by reviewing
courts. To be clear, let us call this further claim the Revisionist Construal of "constitutionality"-revisionist, because it overturns the traditional view that the concept "unconstitutional" entails judicial invalidation. 5
For example, someone who adopts the Revisionist

forjudicial restraint, or an analytic reason to limit review, depending on the case. Case
1 (restraint):The legislature passes Law 1 limiting rights to privacy. By virtue of the
courts' epistemic deficit, it is the legislature, not the courts, that is a theoretical
authority with respect to privacy, and so the reviewing court should uphold the law.
Case 2 (analytic): The legislature passes Law 2 limiting disruptive speech in or near
courtrooms where courts adjudicate privacy rights. By virtue of the courts' epistemic
deficit, and the importance of securing an impartial forum to adjudicate privacy rights,
this infringement on speech rights is justified, and so the reviewing court should uphold the law.
53 The Revisionist Construal is, seemingly, adopted
by those scholars who write
about the "underenforcement" of the Constitution and, at the same time, claim that
legislators have an obligation to enforce constitutional criteria upon themselves. See
Sager, supra note 37, at 1213 ("My concern here is with those situations in which the
Court, because of institutional concerns, has failed to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries.... [I] want to argue that we should treat
these 'underenforced' constitutional norms as valid to their conceptual limits, and
understand the contours of federal judicial doctrine regarding these norms to mark
only the boundaries of the federal courts' role of enforcement."); see also id. at 1220-27
(further articulating and defending the "underenforcement" thesis); id. at 1228-63
(developing the implications of the thesis). Other prominent advocates of this view
include SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 350 ("Most of these recommendations are aimed

at legislative and executive officials, not at the judiciary.... [T]he identification of
constitutional law with the decisions of the Supreme Court is a damaging and ahistorical mistake."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-17 (2d ed.

1988) ("The United States Constitution addresses its commands not only to federal
judges but to all public authorities."); and Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator'sGuide
to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587-89 (1975) [hereinafter The Con-

scientious Legislator's Guide] (discussing the obligations of legislators to determine the
constitutionality of proposed legislation).
See generally PAUL BREST & SANFORD
LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS

xxxi (3d ed. 1992) (casebook intended to challenge the assumption that "the Constitution is only what the Supreme Court has said it is").
But note that the term "underenforcement" is itself ambiguous. It might mean
simply that the moral criteria lying behind the Bill of Rights are not fully enforced
(leaving open whether a statute nonjusticiably violating those criteria is properly described as "unconstitutional"). Or, more robustly, it might mean the Revisionist Construal. Sager and others scholars in the "underenforcement" tradition apparently intend "underenforcement" to have this more robust meaning. See, e.g., Sager, supra
note 37, at 1227 n.48 ("If the Supreme Court were to decide... [that] it would not
declare certain legislative enactments unconstitutional, such a decision should not
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Construal can, without contradiction, assert that statutes which have a
serious disparate impact on racial minorities are, in fact, unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, but that reviewing courts
should nonetheless decline to enforce the "disparate impact" component of equal protection, given the epistemic and remedial difficulties
that a court-enforced "disparate impact" doctrine would bring. A Or,
she can assert that each person has a constitutional right to governmental provision of those minimum resources required to secure her
basic welfare, but that given courts' remedial and epistemic deficits,
this constitutional right should not be judicially enforceable 7s5 By
contrast, on the Traditional Construal, to describe a statute, rule, order or action as "unconstitutional" means that the statute, etc., is
properly invalidated by reviewing courts; and to invoke a
"constitutional right" means that the rights-holder is entitled to judi5 '
cial relief.

The Revisionist Construal may ultimately be correct, but its failure
to draw a clean break betveen unconstitutionality and moral wrong is
problematic, 57 and for purposes of this Article, it is quite unnecessary.

end legislative discourse about the constitutionality of the enactment."); Lawrence G.
Sager,Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U.
L. REV. 410, 428 (1993) [hereinafter Sager,Justice in Plain Clothes] (referring to a legislative option that violates an unenforced norm but that the judiciary would nevertheless uphold, as an "unconstitutional option"); see also Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator's
Guide,supra, at 589 ("Decisions not striking down laws do not always mean that laws are
constitutional ... for a court's failure to invalidate may only reflect its institutional
limitations."); SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 152 ("The reasoning of Katzenbach can be
understood as a recognition that for institutional reasons, the Court will sometimes
uphold certain practices even if those practices could justifiably be found unconstitutional by an institution not facing the limits that the judiciary does.").
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that the "disparate
impact" of some law or legal practice on a minority group is insufficient to warrant its
invalidation by reviewing courts under the equal protection component of the Fifth
Amendment); SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 151-52, 155-57 (arguing that a "disparate
impact" constraint is an underenforced component of the Equal Protection Clause).
See infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text (literature on constitutional welfare rights).
See RAZ, supra note 52, at 255-62 (1986) (defending the view that constitutional
rights are moral rights given special institutional treatment). As Raz explains, "[t]he
most visible fact about constitutional rights is that they are subjected to special institutional treatment. Matters which affect them are taken away from the exclusive control
of ordinary legislative and administrative processes and subjected to the jurisdiction of
the courts (or of special constitutional courts)." Id. at 257.
57 If it is true that a legislator is generally required to legislate
in accordance with
her best understanding of morality, see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 17, identifying
some aspect of morality as constitutional but unenforceable does not seem to say anything of significance for either legislators or courts. Sager himself clearly recognizes
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The concept of judicial restraint (or, to use Sager's language, the
concept of "institutional" reasons to limit review) does not presuppose
the Revisionist Construal. All it presupposes is the weaker claim that
there are objective, normative criteria lying behind the practice ofjudicial review-call these "criteria bearing on constitutionality"-by
virtue of which courts justifiably invalidate statutes, etc., absent judicial deficits, but that are not necessarily fully enforced by courts, given
the deficits courts actually have. This is a weaker claim because it is
one to which both the proponent of the Traditional Construal and the
proponent of the Revisionist Construal can assent. The traditionalist
will say that a statute, etc., which violates the criteria but is not properly invalidated by reviewing courts is not, all things considered,
"unconstitutional," while the revisionist will say that it is." For example, the traditionalist will say that a statute with a disparate racial impact is not, all things considered, unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause, given the epistemic, remedial or democratic limitations of courts. The revisionist, by contrast, will say that a statute
with a disparate racial impact is unconstitutional, but unenforceably
so, given the epistemic, remedial or democratic limitations of courts.
The crucial point for our purposes is that both sides in the debate will
be able to distinguish between "analytic" considerations that concern
this problem:
Suppose a legislator must choose between two legislative options, anticipates
that the judiciary would uphold each option as constitutionally valid, but believes that the appropriate reading of the Constitution (as opposed to thejudiciary's likely reading) condemns one option. Surely, she will see herself as
bound to avoid the unconstitutional option. But what if the legislator believes, in contrast, that while both options are constitutional, one option is
unjust? Without more, we can assume that she again will see herself as
bound, this time to avoid the unjust course of action.
Sager,Justicein Plain Clothes, supra note 53, at 428. Consider, again, statutes that have a

disparate impact on minority groups or fail to provide for the needs of the poor. What
is the practical significance, for the practices of courts, legislators, other institutions
and citizens, of the statement that such statutes are not only unjust but
(unenforceably) unconstitutiona Sager may well have a good response to the problem, see id. at 428 (explaining "why underenforcement matters"), but in any event the
Revisionist Construal is unnecessarily controversial for a project, such as this one, that
simply needs the less controversial concept ofjudicial restraint.
More specifically, the Traditional Construal asserts it to be a necessary condition
for describing a statute, rule, order or action as unconstitutional that it be properly
invalidated by reviewing courts. This may not be a sufficient condition, at least for
rules, orders or actions, by virtue of the complex ways in which constitutional criteria
figure in the interpretation of statutes. For example, a reviewing court might invalidate a rule, order or action violating constitutional criteria by saying that the rule, etc.,
is not authorized under the governing statute, given the "serious constitutional
doubts" that the rule, etc., raises. See infra Parts II.A.2., II.D.
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the best understanding of the criteria bearing on constitutionality,
and the separate, special category that Sager calls "institutional" reasons and that I call "reasons forjudicial restraint." '9
The definition of judicial restraint that I will employ, and that
remains neutral in the debate over the Revisionist Construal, runs as
follows:
JudicialRestraint
An argument for 'Judicial restraint" identifies some deficit of
the reviewing court (relative to an epistemically perfect court
that neither caused nor constituted any wrong by the act of
judicial review), just insofar as this deficit provides a reason
for limiting review without changing the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of the statutes, rules, orders or actions under review (as compared to the status quo or to alternative statutes, rules, orders or actions) as evaluated by the
criteria bearing on constitutionalityf
By "criteria bearing on constitutionality," I mean criteria by virtue of
which reviewing courts properly invalidate statutes, etc., as unconstitutional, absent epistemic, democratic or other deficits; or equivaam indebted to Michael Moore for valuable discussions on this point.
The caveat, "as compared to the status quo or to alternative statutes... " is absolutely crucial. As we shall see, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is a restraintist argument that points to a feature of courts-their undemocratic cast-as grounds for
concluding that the very act ofjudicial review is itself unjust. But the crucial point is
that this undemocratic feature bears upon the injustice of the court's decision to invalidate the statute, not the injustice of the statute itself, relative to the status quo or relevant alternative statutes. What the Countermajoritarian Difficulty says is this: a statute
violates some aspect C ofjustice, relative to the status quo or relevant alternatives, but
judicial invalidation of the statute violates a democratic value D that outweighs C. The
undemocratic cast of courts that gives rise to the violation of D does not change how
the statute fares in terms of C, relative to the status quo or relevant alternative statutes.
See infra Part I.B.2.
In speaking of how the statute, etc., fares under constitutional criteria justice,
etc.) as compared to the status quo or to relevant alternative statutes, I mean to include both the possibility that (a) these criteria concern the state of affairs that consists
in the statute's being in force, compared to the alternative state of affairs comprised by
the status quo or alternative statutes; and (b) these criteria concern the legislature's
action in enacting the statute, compared to inaction or relevant alternative legislative
actions. I take no position here on whether political justice, or the other criteria bearing on constitutionality, concern political states of affairs, governmental actions, or
both. Cf Dennis McKerlie, Equality, 106 ETHIcS 274, 275 (1996) (distinguishing between "teleological" and "deontological" views of equality; teleological views see inequality as a property of outcomes, while deontological views see inequality as a property of actions-the property of unfair treatment). "Without changing" means that
the judicial deficit does not change whether the statute, etc., violates the criteria, all
things considered. See infra note 340.
59 1
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lently, criteria that an epistemically, democratically, and otherwise
perfect reviewing court would enforce.
In particular, this Article focuses on two kinds of restraintist arguments. One is an epistemic argument, which says that courts (given
their epistemic deficits) should take the lawmaking body's enactment
of the statute, etc., as sufficient reason to believe that some criteria
bearing on constitutionality are satisfied. The other is a democratic argument, which says that courts (even if epistemically perfect) produce
a democratic wrong by the very act of invalidating the statute, etc.

Arguments for judicial restraint, thus defined, take as their target
one or another conception of the criteria bearing upon constitutionality. Suppose someone proposes a set of criteria; the advocate of restraint would then try to show why, assuming the proposal is true, judicial deficits nonetheless exist such that a reviewing court ought not
invalidate every statute, rule, order or action that it takes to violate the
proposed criteria. In theory, the proposal might be arbitrarily broad.
It might include all normative criteria-not just originalist criteria or
certain high-priority moral criteria, say, but also moral criteria of any
kind, or even nonmoral (e.g., aesthetic) criteria. But, in fact, no
American constitutional scholar seems to want to propose that.
Rather, throughout this Article, I assume a singular target of arguments for judicial restraint-call it the "target of justice." An argument for judicial restraint, directed against this singular target, seeks
to show why a reviewing court ought not invalidate a statute, rule, order or action merely because it takes the statute, rule, order or action
to be unjust.

My use of the term "justice" may be a bit unsettling. Constitutional theorists typically argue about "basic rights" and "fundamental
values," and about "interpretivism" and "originalism," not about
"justice.""' However, whatever the special language that constitutional
scholars have employed in the past and continue to use, it is at least
roughly accurate to say that the status ofjustice as a proper basis for
judicial review has been the leading problem in constitutional theory
since Bickel. The high-profile debate about the proper interpretive
method for judicial review, between scholars (such as Ronald

61

But see Sager,Justice in Plain Clothes, supra note 53, at 435 (arguing that the crite-

ria of "justice"are partly unenforced constitutional criteria).
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Michael Perryf Thomas Grey ' and Laurence Tribe,' to

name only a few) who advocate broader methods and scholars (such
as Raoul Berger,' Robert Bork 7 and John Hart Ely ) who oppose
these broader methods and instead advocate restrictive versions of
"originalism"
or the method
known
as "representationreinforcement," is at least roughly a debate about whether the requirements of justice furnish sufficient grounds for courts to invalidate statutes. ' The scholars in the first group contend that ajudge is
warranted in invalidating a statute that she takes to be unjust, or at
least a statute that she takes to violate certain aspects ofjustice, such
as "privacy," even though the text of the Bill of Rights supports this

Q!See RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS

SERIOUSLY (1977).

See PERRY, supra note 6.
64 See Grey, supra
note 6.
See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
rA See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
63

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
67

See BORK, supra note 10.

See ELY, supra note
6.
The debate about which method for interpreting the Constitution
reviewing
courts should employ has generated a voluminous scholarly literature. For a useful
summary, with bibliography, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTrVES 1-193 (1993); see also Inter-

pretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium, ConstitutionalAdjudication
and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); Symposium, JudicialReview Versus
Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). Well-known scholarly contributions that might
be classed, along with Dworkin's, Perry's, Grey's and Tribe's, as defenses of relatively
broad judicial methods of constitutional interpretation include: BICKEL, supra note 1;
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the

OriginalUnderstanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Richard H. Fallon,Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Owen
M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979); Michael S. Moore, A
NaturalLaw Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); and Harry Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication,
83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); see also infra note 85 (discussing Bickel's special position, as an
advocate of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty who also believed courts should employ
a broad method of constitutional interpretation, at least as a default matter). Prominent defenders of a narrower judicial approach, along with Bork, Berger and Ely, in-

clude: Joseph D. Grano,JudicialReview and a Written Constitution in a DemocraticSociety,
28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
TransformingMoralConvictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501 (1989) (reviewing MICHAELJ.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)); Henry P. Monaghan, OurPerfect Consti-

tution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976); and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The LesserEvi 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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decision relatively weakly, if at all. 70 The scholars in the second group
make a point of denying this contention.7
What do I mean by 'justice?" John Rawls, our leading theorist of
justice, proposes that (political) justice involves two lexically ordered
principles, the Basic Liberties Principle and the Difference Principle,
which he asserts would be chosen by rational social contractors behind a "veil of ignorance."7 But Rawls also explains that this particular proposal represents only one version of the general concept ofjustice:
I view these principles as exemplifying the content of a liberal political
conception of justice. The content of such a conception is given by
three main features: first, a specification of certain basic rights, liberties
and opportunities (of a kind familiar from constitutional democratic regimes); second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities, especially with respect to claims of the general
good and of perfectionist values; and third, measures assuring to all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their liberties
and opportunities.

Political "justice," as a general concept, simply means a set of moral
criteria that mark out (what are taken to be) particularly significant
aspects of individual well-being,7 4 and that are, therefore, given parI say "relatively weakly" to cover the view that the constitutionalized aspects
of
justice do not figure in constitutional adjudication wholly independent of the text of
the Constitution, see Grey, supra note 6 (arguing for unwritten constitutional principles), but rather find textual support in the open-ended language of the Bill of Rights
or the Ninth Amendment, or in the overall structure of the Bill of Rights. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (locating the right to privacy in penumbra
of specific guarantees of Bill of Rights); DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 132-37 (arguing
that broad clauses in the Bill of Rights, such as due process or equal protection, express moral concepts such that the Supreme Court should develop its own best understanding of these concepts, rather than relying upon the particular conceptions held
by the Framers); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR
70

POLITICS? 54-82 (1994).

See infra note 85 (discussing Bork's and Ely's views).
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS,
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM]. For Rawls's more recent formulation of the two principles ofjustice, see RAWLS,
LIBERALISM, supra, at 291.
73 RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 72, at 6; see also RAWLS, JUSTICE,
supra note 72, at
3-4 ("Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of
society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others.... [In ajust society
the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are
not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.").
74 This leaves open the possibility that these
aspects of individual well-being are, to
some extent, instrumentally rather than intrinsically important. See RAZ, supra note 52,
71

72

1997]

BEYOND THE COUNTERMAJORITARANDIFFICULTY

783

ticular priority, relative to other criteria ("the general good"), in ranking governmental actions or political states of affairs. Constitutional
scholars who advocate broad methods of judicial review need not
agree with Rawls that his two principles best specify the high-priority
criteria included under the rubric of 'justice." Nor need they agree
with Rawls's particular test for significance, the veil of ignorance.
However, these scholars do characteristically agree that statutes which
violate certain high-priority moral criteria are properly invalidated by
courts, just because these criteria take high priority. 75 That is the
standard defense of the Court's decisions in the "privacy" cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticutor Roe v. Wade, which in large part inflamed

the scholarly debate about interpretive method described here."' The
standard explanation for why a statute that unjustifiably infringes
upon "privacy" is not only wrong, but also unconstitutional, is that
privacy is (in some way) a particularly important interest."
To be sure, it is certainly possible to support the Court's decisions
in Roe and Griswold while denying that all aspects of justice are included within the set of criteria bearing on constitutionality. 'Justice
has both negative and positive aspects," one might claim. "The right
announced in Roe and Griswold is a negative right-a right against
governmental actions that violate a person's privacy-and it is merely
at 245-63 (arguing that individual rights are often partly grounded in collective interests and not solely in the interests of the rights-holder).
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 132-37, 147-49; id. at 133 ("The Constitution,
and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups
against certain decisions that a majority of citizens might want to make, even when
that majority acts in what it takes to be the general or common interest."); PERRY, supra
note 6, at 91-145; RICHARDS, supra note 69, at 228-47; Brest, supra note 69, at 227
("[C]onstitutional adjudication should enforce those, but only those, values which are
fundamental to our society."); Fiss, supra note 69, at 5-17; id. at 11 (arguing that constitutional courts should give meaning to the "public values" that "are central to our constitutional order"); Grey, supra note 6, at 706-10 (arguing that constitutional adjudication is properly based on society's basic values, rather than merely the text of the
Constitution); Moore, supra note 69, at 393-96 (suggesting that constitutional courts
properly invalidate statutes that violate real, higher values set forth by the Bill of
Rights). But cf Wellington, supranote 69, at 279-80 (denying moral priority of constitutional criteria). By "justbecause," I do not mean that these scholars necessarily take
a statute's violating high-priority moral criteria to be sufficient grounds for a court to
invalidate the statute, wholly apart from the text of the Bill of Rights. See supranote 70
(discussing the possibility that justice figures in constitutional adjudication with weak
textual warrant). Rather, the claim might be that the open-ended language of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Ninth Amendment warrants these criteria figuring in
constitutional adjudication,just because of their moral priority.
76Seesupra note 9 (discussing the importance ofRoeand Griwvoldto this debate).
77 See Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 752-82 (analyzing and criticizing this standard
explanation).
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this kind of right, rather than positive rights to governmental assistance, that reviewing courts (however perfect) ought to protect." Yet
there also exists a significant and well-known cadre of constitutional
scholars who claim, quite clearly, that the positive, moral right to governmental provision of the minimum resources or services needed to
secure one's basic welfare-albeit not necessarily enforced by reviewing courts-takes constitutional status. As Erwin Chemerinsky puts
it: "Included among the affirmative duties that should be found in
the Constitution is the right to basic subsistence: food, shelter, and
medical care."78 Others who have advanced similar claims include
Frank Michelman, Cass Sunstein and Lawrence Sager himself.,
Given these claims, it would be, I think, entirely within the range
of competent constitutional theorizing for a constitutional theorist to
assert the following:
The Target ofJustice

A statute, rule, order, or action that is unjust, in any way, violates the criteria bearing on constitutionality. If reviewing
courts were epistemically, democratically, remedially and otherwise perfect, they would invalidate unjust statutes, rules, orders or actions as unconstitutional. And to the extent actual
courts properly decline to invalidate statutes, etc., they take to,
be unjust, that is only because of their deficits. 0
By contrast, I know of no American constitutional scholar who thinks
that a merely inefficient statute, or one that tends to produce ugliness
in the world, is constitutionally problematic (even unenforceably
so)."' Thus, the target ofjustice is the broadest plausible target for re78Erwin Chemerinsky, Making the Casefor a ConstitutionalRight to Minimum Entitlements, 44 MERCER L. REV. 525, 527 (1993). Indeed, Chemerinsky goes further and tentatively suggests: "It is the judicial role to declare and enforce such rights." Id.
79 See infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text (literature on constitutional
welfare rights).
80 See Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes, supra note 53, at 428-35 (arguing
that requirements ofjustice are constitutional requirements, but are unenforced).
81 Why not? Why not count efficiency among the criteria bearing on constitutionality on the theory that if courts were epistemically, democratically, remedially and
otherwise perfect, they would indeed properly invalidate merely inefficient laws? This
line of thinking suggests that, to count among the criteria bearing on constitutionality,
some part of morality must not simply be counterfactually enforced by reviewing courts,
but must additionally ground some actual legal practice (e.g., its judicial enforcement
against rules, orders or actions, but not statutes) beyond the background role in lawmaking that morality always has. See id. (proposing a further role of this sort for underenforced criteria of justice). If this point is wrong, and counterfactual enforcement suffices, then we might have yet broader plausible targets against which to test

restraintist arguments.
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straintist arguments. It is likewise the most generous of the plausible
targets. Imagine that a given argument for judicial restraint, whether
democratic, epistemic or other, fails to succeed against the target of
justice. The argument fails to show why a reviewing court should refrain from enforcing any aspect of justice. Then a fortiori, the argument will fail to succeed against a narrower view of the criteria bearing on constitutionality-say, the view that includes only some aspects
ofjustice among these criteria.
The general question posed in this Article-"What are the
grounds for judicial restraint in the administrative state?"-will thus
be given a singular and crisper form: "What are the restraintist
grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating rules, orders and actions that they take to be unjust?" The focus, here, on restraintist arguments is justified because-as I have tried to show-such arguments comprise a distinct and well-defined subset of the much larger
set of arguments to limit judicial review. Identifying the grounds for
judicial restraint with respect to administrative rules, orders and actions is one discrete step toward the larger goal of specifying the
proper contours ofjudicial review in the administrative stafe. A complete answer to the larger question-"What kinds of agency decisions
should be invalidated under the First Amendment, the Takings
Clause, procedural due process, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
rest of the Constitution?"--presupposes both an analytic theory specifying the content of the true criteria bearing on constitutionality, and
a theory of judicial restraint. I start here with a theory of restraint,
not an analytic theory, because of the vastness of the analytic task.
And, in turn, a crisp way to show that particular arguments for judicial
restraint are failures is to show that they fail even against the generous
target ofjustice. This is the strategy that this Article takes.
B. The CountermajoritarianDifficulty
One particular argument for judicial restraint has been, far and
away, the most famous and influential in modern scholarship about
judicial review. This argument is the Countermajoritarian Difficulty.8 2
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force
in our system ....[W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional
a legislative act.., it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
82

See generally Croley, supra note 38, at 712 n.66 (citing sources that characterize

the Countermajoritarian Difficulty as a central problem of modem constitutional theory).
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people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is
what actually happens.... [I]t is the reason the charge can be made
that judicial review is undemocratic.8

Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely and Robert Bork-likely the three
most important restraintist scholars in the last half-century-all rely
on this kind of claim about the majoritarian cast of legislative bodies84
in arguing for the (otherwise quite different) narrowed approaches to
judicial review that they defend.85
83 BICKEL, supranote

1, at 16-17. See generally id. at 16-23 (discussing the majoritarian cast of legislatures).
84 See id. at 16-17 (Bickel's central statement of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty); BORK, supra note 10, at 139-41, 153-55, 251-59 (Bork's central statement of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty); ELY, siupra note 6, at 4-9, 101-03 (Ely's central statement of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty).
85 In Bork's case, the narrowed approach he defends-narrowed, relative
to the
limiting-point view that courts ought to invalidate unjust statutes-is restrictive originalism. I say "restrictive" because there might be more capacious versions of originalism that would make a statute's injustice a sufficient condition for its invalidity-via
the claim that the original meaning of the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments was to
proscribe injustice. See PERRY, supra note 70, at 54-82 (describing capacious originalism). Bork says something like this: A court legitimately invalidates a statute only if
(1) there is some textual provision in the Constitution such that (2) the statute violates the "original meaning" of the provision, i.e., the provision's meaning as given by
the semantic rules extant at the time of its framing; and finally, (3) this original meaning must be sufficiently determinate. See BORK, supra note 10, at 143-85 (defending
originalism); id. at 165-66 (rejecting capacious originalism).
John Hart Ely, by contrast, is not a restrictive originalist, because Ely, in Democracy
and Distrust,identifies one very special aspect ofjustice-the value of democratic process-that furnishes a court sufficient grounds to invalidate a statute despite the absence of strong originalist grounds for doing so. The general function of constitutional courts, Ely thinks, is just to elaborate this very special value, not only with
respect to matters such as voting rights or free speech, but also by invalidating discriminatory statutes that reflect the wrongful exclusion of outsiders from politicsthus the approach to judicial review that Ely calls a "representation-reinforcing" approach. See ELY, supra note 6, at 73-104 (defending a "representation reinforcing" approach); id. at 11-41 (rejecting "clause-bound" interpretivism). Nonetheless, Ely still
counts as a leading critic of broad interpretive methods because a central aim of Democracy and Distrustis to show why this very special aspect of justice, democratic process, is the only aspect that courts should enforce without a restrictive originalist warrant. See id. at 43-72 (criticizing broader theories ofjudicial interpretation).
Bickel adopts a restraintist posture different from Bork's, and different again from
Ely's. Indeed, Bickel's posture is highly idiosyncratic. Unlike Bork and Ely, Bickel insists quite emphatically that justice-what he calls "enduring values" or "principle"-amounts to a proper standard by which reviewing courts properly test statutes, quite
apart from the text or original meaning of the Constitution. See BICKEL, supra note 1,
at 23-28, 65-72, 235-43 (defending his view of the Court as an institution whose core
function is to articulate and apply fundamental principles). Yet Bickel also claims that
a court should not simply strike down an unjust statute. The famous and idiosyncratic
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The Countermajoritarian Difficulty is a legislature-centered argument for restraint-as all general arguments for judicial restraint
have been."' It points, centrally, to the special case in which statutes

are reviewed by constitutional courts, and purports to show why, given
certain features of legislatures, this judicial practice should be limited." In Part II, I will take the Countermajoritarian Difficulty as the

exemplar for the entire class of legislature-centered arguments, and
show how the argument-successful or not in the special case of statutes-fails to extend into the administrative state. But in order to do
so, it is important to clarify exactly what the Countermajoritarian Dif-

ficulty says. Despite (or perhaps because of) the fame and influence

suggestion of The Least Dangerous Branch is that, instead, a court should
(intermittently) employ the procedural devices grouped by Bickel under the heading
of the "Passive Virtues" so as to delay a definitive invalidation of an unjust statute and,
instead, prompt the democratic branches to comprehend and reconsider the injustice
they had wrought. See id. at 111-98 (generally describing and defending the Court's
use of Passive Virtues); id. at 244-73 (describing and defending the Court's use of Passive Virtues in Brown v. Board of Education); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy ofPrudenc, 94 YALE LJ. 1567 (1985) (demonstrating the centrality of
"prudence" in Bickel's political philosophy).
86 Important arguments for judicial restraint that are agency-centered,
or at least
give significant attention to agencies rather than making legislatures the modal case,
have arisen in the various substantive literatures covering one or another part of the
Bill of Rights. See, e.g., 1 KENNETH CULP DAvis, ADMINISTRATWE LAW TREATISE ch. 4

(2d ed. 1978) (raising the possibility of judicial restraint with respect to the Fourth
Amendment); JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIvE STATE 199-205

(1985) (arguing forjudicial restraint with respect to procedural due process); see generally infra text accompanying notes 336-89 (describing the epistemic cast of these and
related arguments). But these agency-centered arguments have been substantive
rather than transsubstantive. They have not, yet, been synthesized into a general
agency-centered theory of restraint, covering a range of substantive constitutional doctrines, and these arguments have not appeared in the scholarly literature focusing on
judicial review and restraint that Bickel animated.
87 Again, by describing an argument for restraint, such
as the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, as "legislature-centered," I do not mean that its advocates wholly ignore the
invalidation of agency rules, orders or actions, as opposed to statutes. See BICKEL, supra
note 1, at 16-17 (discussing the effects "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive"); BORK, supra note 10, at
160 (referring to the "power of courts to invalidate statutes and executive actions in
the name of the Constitution"); ELY, supra note 6, at 4 (referring to "a court invalidat[ing] an act of the political branches on constitutional grounds"). Rather, I mean
that the invalidation of statutes is taken as the modal case, and that no serious attention is given to the problem of reviewing administrative rules, orders or actions rather
than statutes. As Ely puts the point in-discussing his own work: "[T]his book is written
against the paradigm ofjudicial review of a decision ultimately traceable to legislative
action." Id. at 4 n.*. Ely and Bickel both recognize the problem of extending their
claims beyond the modal case of statutes, but only briefly discuss it. See BICKEL, supra
note 1, at 19-20; ELY, supra note 6, at 4 n.*, 45 n.9.
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of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, the exact substance of the argument remains unclear.
I construe it this way:
The CountermajoritarianDifficulty
Statutes should be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature; and,
by virtue of this Plebiscitary Feature, it is wrong (unfair) for
courts to invalidate statutes on the mere grounds of justice.
To say that a statute bears the Plebiscitary Feature means that
the statute would be chosen, by a majority of the citizenry, in
a hypothetical plebiscite.
Further, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is most readily understood as a democratic argument for judicial restraint. It points to the
majoritarian, or what I call "plebiscitary," cast of the legislative process
as embodying an intrinsic procedural value that is infringed when a
court invalidates a statute (because courts are not democratic bodies),
and that is sufficiently strong to override the constitutional aspect of
justice (e.g., "privacy") at stake. In short, the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty identifies the Plebiscitary Feature that statutes should be
taken to bear as a democratic, restraintist reason sufficiently forceful for
courts to refrain from invalidating statutes on certain grounds, even
though they are (or may be) at least prima facie unconstitutional.
1. The Plebiscitary Feature
In general, a legislature-centered restraintist argument need not
rely upon the fact that legislators are elected while (federal) judges
are not. It might identify some other difference between legislatures
and courts, besides their electoral status, thatjustifies limiting judicial
review. 8 And, in theory, a legislature-centered argument that does
rely upon the legislators' electoral status need not further claim that
restraint flows from the particular responsiveness of legislators to the
judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes of a majority of the
citizenry. Instead, the claim might be that legislators, qua elected, are
simply epistemically or remedially well-placed to decide certain moral
issues. 9 The Countermajoritarian Difficulty is simply one kind of legislature-centered argument for restraint-albeit a particularly important and distinctive one. What distinguishes it, I suggest, is: (1) a fo-
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See infra text accompanying notes 336-39.
See infra note 335 (discussing the epistemic views of Robin West, John Agresto

and Carlos Nino).
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cus on the election of legislators;" (2) a claim that legislators are properly responsive, at least intermittently, to the judgments, preferences,
beliefs or other attitudes of the citizenry;9 ' and (3) a claim that proper
responsiveness of this kind entails responsiveness to the judgments,
preferences, beliefs or other attitudes of a majority of the citizenry,

where citizen judgments, etc., differ.9 2 An economical way to express
all this is through the conceit of the "Plebiscitary Feature": the proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty claims, distinctly, that
statutes should be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature; that is, they
would be chosen by a majority of the citizens in some kind of hypothetical plebiscite. 3
goSee, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19 ("[N]othing can finally depreciate the
central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions,
born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system.Judicial
review works counter to this characteristic."); ELY, supra note 6, at 4 (quoting, with approval, this passage from Bickel); BORK, supra note 10, at 4-5 ("The Constitution preserves our liberties by providing that all of those given the authority to make policy are
directly accountable to the people through regular elections.").

See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 18 (referring to the "process of reflecting the
will of a popular majority in the legislature"); id. at 19 (referring to the electoral process as a means of "making institutions of government responsive to the needs and
wishes of the governed"); ELY, supra note 6, at 102-103 (referring to the
"unacceptability of the claim that appointed and life-tenured judges are better reflectors of conventional values than elected representatives" and asserting that "[ifn a
representative democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected representatives, and if in fact most of us disapprove we can vote them out of office."); BORK,
supra note 10, at 259 ("There is no way to decide... [policy] questions other than by
reference to some system of moral or ethical principles about which people can and
do disagree. Because we disagree, we put such issues to a vote and, where the Constitution does not speak, the majority morality prevails."); id. at 252 (referring to nonoriginalist judicial review as judges' "impos[ing] their moral philosophy upon a citizen that disagrees").
- See ELY, supra note 6, at 7 ("Our constitutional development
over the past century has.., substantially strengthened the original commitment to control by a majority of the governed. Neither has there existed among theorists or among Americans
generally any serious challenge to the general notion of majoritarian control....
[M]ajoritarian democracy is ...the core of our entire system ....
"); id. ("[W]hatever
the explanation, and granting the qualifications, rule in accord with the consent of a
majority of those governed is the core of the American governmental system.");
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19 ("[Despite the role of organized groups in the political
process), it remains true nevertheless that only those minorities rule which can command the votes of a majority of individuals in the legislature who can command the
votes of a majority of individuals in the electorate."); BORK, supra note 10, at 139 ("The
first principle [of our political system] is self-government, which means that in wide
areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities.").
93 The concept of a hypothetical plebiscite is not meant to appeal to notions
of hypothetical consent, contract, etc., common in political theorizing. Rather, it is meant

790

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 145: 759

This claim is not equivalent to a preference for direct democracy
over indirect democracy. I do not mean to suggest that the proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty wishes to replace Congress
with some kind of standing national plebiscite. Bickel, Bork and Ely
do not articulate such a wish, 4 nor need they. It is entirely possible,
indeed plausible, to believe that (a) it is wrong for courts to invalidate
(as unjust) a statute that warrants a claim about the right kind of hypothetical plebiscite, but not that (b) it is wrong for courts to invalidate (as unjust) an actual plebiscite-for one might be of the view
that plebiscites are fair procedures for resolving disputes aboutjustice
only if they meet certain conditions, yet deny that actual plebiscites
meet those conditions. In particular, the advocate of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty might idealize citizen judgments, in some way,
and express these ideals as restrictions on the hypothetical plebiscite.
She might stipulate that voters in her hypothetical plebiscite be reasonable, not just rational; or that they be adequately informed about
the requirements ofjustice. Rawls's veil of ignorance is only the most
famous example of this kind of idealization. 95 Imagine a system of
representative democracy in which legislators decline to respond to
the downright irrational or stupid judgments of their constituents, or
simply to capture the supposed responsiveness of statutes to voter preferences: although an actual plebiscite has not occurred, an appropriately responsive
statute is, equivalently, one that would be approved in a plebiscite of the right kind. See
infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17 ("Representative democracies-that is to say, all
working democracies-function by electing certain men for certain periods of time,
then passing judgment periodically on their conduct of public office.... What we
mean by democracy, therefore, is much more sophisticated and complex than the
making of decisions in town meeting by a show of hands."); ELY, supra noie 6, at 4 ("It
is true that the United States is not run town meeting style.... But most of the important policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by people accountable to them)."); BORK, supra note 10, at 253 (referring to "representative democracy"
as "the basic institution of our Republic").
95 See, e.g., RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 72, at
47-88, 133-72 (arguing that the
content of liberal political conception of justice reflects only "reasonable" disagreements between citizens holding different comprehensive moral views); ACKERMAN,
supra note 27, at 266-94 (asserting that special moments of "higher lawmaking" have
democratic legitimacy only because citizens are sufficiently deliberate and impartial in
their judgments); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 12 (1991)
(arguing for a "deliberative" form of plebiscitary democracy); Paul Weithman, Contractualist Liberalism and DeliberativeDemocracy, 24 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 314, 317-18 (1995)
(noting that theorists of "deliberative democracy" aspire to the refinement of citizens'
judgments: "[Citizens] should come to believe that the interests with the greatest
claim to satisfaction by political means are interests in the common good and in the
free and equal status of all."). It should be emphasized that neither Rawls nor deliberative democrats adopt a plebiscitary theory. See infra note 109.
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even sometimes to reasonable and informed judgments (say, if the
underlying issues are technical, or do not involve fundamental values,
or are not deeply contested), but in some instances do respond to the
reasonable and informed judgments of a majority of the citizenry. A
proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty might assert that
courts should exercise restraint in the process of reviewing statutes
just because legislators are selectively responsive in this appropriate
way.
In short, some versions of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
build restrictions into the hypothetical plebiscite that they posit, such
that only statutes warranting claims about that kind of hypothetical
plebiscite are seen to bear the proper Plebiscitary Feature. These restrictive versions of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty readily coexist
with a preference for indirect over direct democracy. The claim
would be that actual plebiscites do not meet the restriction, and that
the very office of legislator is both to respond to and yet to foster the
idealizationrJ' of citizen judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes in the wvay that the restriction requires. But even these versions
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty distill the central claim advanced by Bickel, Ely and Bork-that statutes have a majoritarian cast,
at least sometimes-into a claim about some kind of hypothetical
plebiscite. To assert that a statute S reflects the actual or somehow
idealized judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes held by a
majority of the citizenry is precisely to say that S would be chosen in a
plebiscite where citizens were constrained to vote based upon those
kinds ofjudgments, etc. Further, even in the more restrictive versions
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, where statutes sometimes warrant claims about hypothetical plebiscites that actual plebiscites do
not always warrant, it is still the capacity of indirect-democratic institutions to mimic hypothetical plebiscites that essentially distinguishes
96 "Foster the idealization" is meant to be deliberately ambiguous. Perhaps
legislators respond to citizen judgments, etc., if and only if legislators take these to be sufficiently reasonable and informed; or perhaps legislators respond to citizen judgments,
etc., if and only if these are held with sufficient intensity and consistency (regardless of
whether legislators take them to be reasonable and informed), on the grounds that
such judgments, etc., are more likely to be reasonable and informed, and that in any

event legislators do not have the epistemic capacity to "screen" citizen judgments, etc.,
beyond screening them for intensity. So my point is not that, if one believes in a restricted hypothetical plebiscite, one must further attribute a "screening" role to legislators. My point is simply the following: All one needs to reconcile (1) a plebiscitary
theory with (2) a preference for indirect over direct democracy is some kind of further
claim that (3) legislators should not always reach their decisions by reference to what
they take to be citizens' actual views.
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them from courts. The fact that legislatures, but not courts, are responsive to the judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes
(albeit idealized) of a majority of the citizenry is still crucial in justifying judicial restraint; otherwise, we are dealing with a different kind
of legislature-centered argument altogether.9 7 For these reasons, I
think it is fair to characterize even the more restrictive versions of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty as claiming that statutes should, at
least sometimes, be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature of some
kind.
It certainly is open to the proponent of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty to claim that only some statutes bear Plebiscitary Features.
The claim might be that the legislative process only intermittently reflects the kind of citizen judgments, etc., that our plebiscitary theory
demands-for example, when the public is sufficiently engaged to
overcome its normal apathy 8 or when legislation is sufficiently salient
to prompt legislative attention to what legislators take to be citizen
judgments, etc."" I do not mean to deny the possibility of a restraintist
who posits an intermittently majoritarian legislature.'00 And this restraintist might deal with her intermittent Plebiscitary Feature in two
ways: (a) she might argue that courts should identify, and exercise
restraint with respect to, only those statutes that truly bear Plebiscitary
97 See Friedman, supra note 21, at 630 ("Those enamored
of the countermajoritarian difficulty might [argue) that what is important is that courts overturn the will of
representativebranches.... But once one disclaims reliance on the argument that legislatures actually represent majority will, or that courts actually override it, the countermajoritarian difficulty loses its force.... [C]ountermajoritarian theory rests explicitly
on the notion that the other branches of government 'represent' majority will in a way
the judiciary does not, which in turn rests on the assumption that there is a majority

will."); see alsoJeremy Waldron, Legislation, Authority, and Voting, 84 GEO. LJ. 2185,

2204 (1996) (defending the majority-vote procedure for enacting legislation: "Although our topic is legislation, it will be easier to explain the points I want to
make about respect in terms of majority decision in a direct democracy, rather than
majority decision in a representative legislature. I assume that in the latter context a
representative's claim to respect is in large measure a function of his constituents'
claims to respect; ignoring him, or slighting or discounting his views, is a way of ignoring, slighting, or discounting them. So let us deal direct.").
98 See ACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 266-94.
See, e.g., Gary J. Miller, Formal Theoy and the Presidency, in RESEARCHING
THE
PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 289, 289-90 (George C. Edwards III
et al. eds., 1993) (discussing a theory of episodic legislative responsiveness to voter
preferences, grounded in issue salience and presidential entrepreneurship).
100See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17 (noting that representative democracy "operates
under public scrutiny and criticism-but not at all times or in all parts.... [and that]
[d]ecisions that have been submitted to the electoral process in some fashion are not
continually resubmitted, and they are certainly not continually unmade").
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Features,' °' or (b) she might argue that courts lack the epistemic capacity to do that, and thus that every statute should be taken (by
courts) to bear the Plebiscitary Feature. The latter formulation of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty clearly is more robust, and thus is my
focus here. Because courts will have no reason for restraint in reviewing rules, orders or actions by virtue of their statutory pedigree, even
if every statute should be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature, then
afortioricourts will have no reason for restraint in reviewing rules, orders or actions by virtue of their statutory pedigree, where courts are
epistemically well-placed to pick and choose among statutes.
Note that a fully fleshed-out version of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty would have to explain what alternatives are placed against
the statute in the hypothetical plebiscite. Voters do not choose the
winning outcome simpliciter; at least under a simple majority-vote procedure; the winning outcome has rather been paired with one or
more rejected alternatives, typically including the status quo ante.
On a super-strong version of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
which stipulates that an enacted statute would be chosen over some
very large range of possible alternatives in a hypothetical plebiscite,
the problem identified in the Introduction and fleshed out below in
Part II, may well disappear. Take the health statute and no-abortion
rule discussed in the Introduction. The statute authorizes the agency
to "issue reasonable rules to assure the health of patients." A moderate version of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty says that voters in a
hypothetical plebiscite would choose the health statute over the status
quo, and perhaps some range of circulating alternatives (say, all proposed amendments to the health statute that were presented to Congress for a vote, and rejected). A super-strong version might insist
that voters in a hypothetical plebiscite would choose the health statute, not only over the status quo and the circulating alternatives, but
also over this alternative as well: "The agency is empowered to issue

1l See id. at 111-98 (detailing Passive Virtues, whereby courts can refrain from in-

validating statutes that have majoritarian support); cf.ACKERMAN, supranote 27, at 28890 (arguing that, on rare occasions, transformative statutes function as informal constitutional amendments, such that in light of the sustained popular support for the
principles that these statutes embody, the Supreme Court performs a doctrinal "switch
in time," and upholds the statutes rather than invalidating them).
10 See generay MUELLER, supra note 28, at 58-95 (summarizing public-choice literature that shows the susceptibility of majority-vote procedures to "cycling," and, relatedly, the importance of agenda-setting power, by virtue of the diversity of voter preferences in ranking any given alternative against others); WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM (1982) (same).
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reasonable rules to assure the health of patients, except a no-abortion
rule." Thus the no-abortion rule, under this super-strong version, directly bears the Plebiscitary Feature, quite independent of the statutory pedigree of the no-abortion rule or the institutional structure of
the administrative state.
The super-strong version, however, seems quite ad hoc. Unless
the alternative of excepting the no-abortion rule was on the legislature's or the nation's agenda at the time the health statute was enacted, why are we warranted in concluding that the health statute
would be chosen over that alternative in a hypothetical plebiscite?,°s I
assume that, at best, a moderate version of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty holds true. Further, let us make the status quo ante (rather
than the status quo ante plus some range of circulating alternatives)
the only alternative covered by the Plebiscitary Feature; this simplifies
exposition but does not change the argument at all. A statute bears
the Plebiscitary Feature, on this simplified construal, if it would be
chosen over the status quo in a hypothetical plebiscite. Relatedly,
then, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty says that judges ought not
"invalidate" the statute in the sense of depriving it of legal force, i.e.,
restoring the status quo. (If circulating alternatives were included,
then the Countermajoritarian Difficulty would preclude judges from
restoring the status quo
or replacing the statute with one of the circu04
lating alternatives.)
103One response might be that we are warranted in reaching that conclusion if the

legislature ought to have considered the alternative under applicable norms of conscientious legislation. This possibility is considered below. See infra text accompanying
notes 188-97. But, at this stage, we should not assume a particular (strong) account of
what the norms of conscientious legislation require by stipulating that statutes bear
Plebiscitary Features against all alternatives.
104 In short, I am adopting a "facial" rather than an "as-applied" version of what it
means to "invalidate a statute" within the'Countermajoritarian Difficulty. Further, the
individuation principle I am adopting is that a single statute equals a text separately
enacted by Congress, i.e., a single entry in the Statutes at Large. A court "facially" invalidates a (single) statute when it holds that the statute is entirely unconstitutionalnot properly applicable in any instance. A court invalidates a statute "as applied" when
it holds that some instance of the statute is constitutionally improper. See generally Michael C. Doff, FacialChallengesto State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235 (1994)
(discussing the "facial"/"as-applied" distinction). Note that the facial, but not the asapplied version, requires a theory of individuating statutes. Under the as-applied version, all one has to say is that some instance of the entire corpus of unrepealed texts
has been held to be constitutionally improper; while on the "facial" version, one needs
to decide whether a single statute equals a single prescriptive sentence, a single provision, a single entry in the Statutes at Large, or the entire corpus of unrepealed texts. See
generallyJOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70-92, 140-47 (2d ed. 1980)
(discussing the problem of individuating laws); Joseph Raz, Legal Principlesand the Lim-
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What objections might be advanced against my construal of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty? It might, of course, be objected that
statutes do not really bear Plebiscitary Features-that legislators are
really responsive to organized minorities, or that Arrow's Theorem
renders the whole notion of majority rule misconceived, and so on.
But I am not endorsing the Countermajoritarian Difficulty in this Article. I am simply making the generous assumption that it works in
the case of statutes, and then formalizing the argument so as to see
whether, even on this assumption, it can be extended to administrative
rules, orders or actions.
Another objection might be that there are good grounds, quite
independent of the majoritarian cast of legislatures, for courts to refrain from invalidating statutes. Again, this is correct: I focus on the
its of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 825-29 (1972) (same). I am individuating statutes textually, not semantically, so as to leave open the possibility that a legislature might enact
seriatim two semantically identical but separate "statutes," only one of which is invalidated by the courts. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 62-64 (1991)
(noting the view that rules should be individuated by their semantic content, not by
the sentences that express this content).
So my conception of "invalidating a statute" is, in these ways, a relatively narrow
one. But that conception fits the notion of legislative choice underlying the Countermajoritarian Difficulty and other legislature-centered theories. The notion is that,
when the legislature chooses option 1 (enacting some text T) over option 0 (for simplicity, the status quo), option 1 has some special property-the Plebiscitary Featurerelative to option 0. We are warranted in predicting that a hypothetical plebiscite of
appropriately idealized citizens would choose option 1 over 0. If this is true, and if the
warranted prediction does indeed give courts some reason for restraint, then that is
reason for courts not to pick option 0 over i-which is what a "facial" invalidation of T
involves. By contrast, "as-applied" invalidation means partially repealing T (to exclude
the instances held invalid by the court). In short, it means that the court chooses
some option 2 (partially repealed T) over 1. Similarly, if T includes multiple provisions or sentences, "facially" invalidating some part of T means, again, choosing some
option 2 over 1. But perhaps our hypothetical plebiscite would reach the same result!
See generally sources cited supra note 102 (describing the importance of the "cycling"
problem to majority-vote procedures: the fact that a majority votes for 1 over 0 does
not imply that it would vote for 1 over 2, 3, 4 and so forth). The legislature's enactment of 1 over 0 does not warrant our predicting that the hypothetical plebiscite
would choose 1 over 2, and thus provides the court no reason for restraint in requiring
2 over 1-or at least not in the same way that it provides the court reason for restraint
in requiring 0 over 1.
Now, it might be objected that we can extrapolate from the legislature's choice,
and, for example, derive the Plebiscitary Feature for the choice of 1 over 2. Indeed,
this is precisely the question we will consider in Part II. But it is important to leave the
question open for a substantive debate; the question ought not be settled by fiat, at the
definitional stage, by defining "invalidating a statute" to include "as-applied" invalidation or "facial" invalidation of parts of a single enacted text.
IO See Friedman, supra note 21, at 628-53 (presenting criticisms of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty).

796

UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LA WREV1EW

[Vol. 145: 759

Countermajoritarian Difficulty as an exemplar, not as the only possible kind of legislature-centered argument. This particular argument
describes statutes as responsive, or sometimes responsive, to the
judgments, etc., of a majority of the citizenry. Such a description, I
claim, is equivalent to describing statutes as bearing, or sometimes
bearing, the Plebiscitary Feature.' 6
2. Democratic, Epistemic and Analytic Arguments
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty is not an analytic argument
about the content of constitutional criteria. Nor is it an epistemic, restraintist argument. Rather, the best interpretation of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty is that it is a democratic argument for judicial
0 7
restraint.

The argument, thus construed, starts from the premise that it is
intrinsically proper for the lawmaking process to amalgamate in a fair
way the (perhaps idealized) judgments, preferences, beliefs or other
attitudes of the citizenry, quite apart from the goodness or rightness
of the outcomes of that process (statutes) in some other respect.' 8
106

It is, of course, open to the majoritarian theorist to make a yet more modest

claim: not that statutes bear Plebiscitary Features, but that legislators do. "The elected
legislator, as compared to his opponent, has been elected by a majority of the votersand that is all I mean by describing the legislature as majoritarian," the theorist might
say. But this kind of majoritarian theory is not, yet, a theory of judicial restraint.
Courts review statutes, not legislators, and the theorist must tell us why courts should
limit their practice of doing that.
Imagine that the theorist draws some kind of link (democratic, epistemic or
other), between the plebiscitary cast of legislators, and the statutes they enact, short of
actually conferring the Plebiscitary Feature on statutes. We then, indeed, have a different kind of legislature-centered argument for restraint than the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, as I construe it. But my arguments against the Simple Extension of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty are meant to apply generally to all legislature-centered
arguments. See infra Part II.B. Nor is it the case that the theorist can a prioi extend
her argument to administrative agencies by treating the entire administrative state as a
single institution headed by an elected official, the President. For who knows a priori
whether the democratic or epistemic link from Plebiscitary Presidents to agency rules,
etc., is the same as the link from plebiscitary legislators to statutes? See infra text accompanying notes 327-34.
1 7 For a seminal discussion of the different possible interpretations of
arguments
to limit judicial review, particularly those that appeal to the democratic cast of legislatures, see DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 131-49.
108 This premise (which I mean not to defend, but simply to
excavate) might in
turn be supported in various ways. One way might be this: a citizen's participation in
politics, including lawmaking, is an aspect of her autonomy (her self-governance),
which in turn partially constitutes or indeed lays the foundation for her good life.
Such a notion is regularly advanced in the literature on procedural due process, to
explain why individual participation in adjudication might be valued even if its positive
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This argument offers the further premise that, where judgments,
preferences, beliefs or other attitudes differ, a majority-vote procedure is the fairest way to resolve such differences. Just how these
premises are specified, and justified, might vary. For example, one
might offer a quasi-Rawlsian story, ' which goes like this:
Justice is objective but highly contestable. Reasonable citizens
disagree about what the values of justice require. At least
where there is a sufficient degree of reasonable disagreement
about sufficiently important values, including the values of
justice, it is wrong to impose a particular understanding of
those values, even if that understanding is objectively correct,
absent a fair procedure. A fair procedure for resolving reasonable disagreements, including reasonable disagreements
aboutjustice, is to decide the issue by the right kind of majority vote among those concerned. Majority vote is a fair procedure because of May's theorem."0 "Right kind" means, inter
effect on the outcome of adjudication is nil. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Formal and
AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, in DUE PROcESS: NoMos XVIII 126, 127 (J.

Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1977) ("[Participatory procedures] seem
responsive to demands for revelation and participation. They attach value to the individual's being told why the agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having a part in
the decision.");Jerry L. Mashaw, AdministrativeDue Process: The Quest for a Dignitary The-

ory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 886 (1981) ("The unifying thread in this literature [on procedural due process] is the perception that the effects of process on participants, notjust
the rationality of substantive results, must be considered in judging the legitimacy of
public decisionmaking."); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Proc-

esses-A Pleafor "ProcessValues", 60 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 4 (1974) ("My principal thesis in
this Essay is that a legal process can be good, as a process, in two possible ways, not just
one: It can be good not only as a means to good results, but also as a means of implementing or serving process values such as participatory governance, procedural rationality, and humaneness.").
Another way to support the premise might be to advert to notions of consent and
the role of consent in establishing legitimacy. See Hurd, supra note 48, at 1657-63
(describing and criticizing consent-based theories). Yet a third way might be to claim
that giving a citizen's judgment weight in a governmental decision is a way of respecting her.
SeeWaldron, supra note 97, at 2204-06.
109
Jeremy Waldron, in an important recent article, presents a defense of
majoritarianism along these lines-one that contemplates citizen disagreement even about
justice itself, and that sees majority vote as a fair procedure for resolving these disagreements. See Waldron, supra note 97, at 2197-214. This defense is quasi-Rawlsian
because it draws upon Rawls's idea of respecting disagreement; but only quasi-Rawlsian
because Rawls, himself, does not defend disagreement about justice. Rather, Rawls
posits a single conception of justice that results from disagreement about morality
more broadly. See id. at 2201-02 (describing and criticizing Rawls's views). Similarly,
Waldron suggests, proponents of "deliberative democracy" downplay voting because
they fail to take adequate account of citizen disagreement. See id. at 2188-89.
110See MUELLER, supra note 28, at 96-100 (presenting and offering a proof of May's
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alia, that the participants must in fact hold reasonable conceptions of justice and be motivated to vote by these conceptions."
This is only one account of why it is intrinsically proper for citizens's judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes (here, judgments aboutjustice) to have a role in politics, and what sort of majority-vote procedure (here, an idealized one) is intrinsically fair for
reconciling these attitudes. Other accounts, quite different in their
details, might well be offered. The general idea behind such accounts, however, is that a fair majority-vote procedure employed to
reconcile citizen judgments, etc., in this way realizes some intrinsic
value (call it "plebiscitary fairness"), which is attached to a statute
bearing the Plebiscitary Feature. Thus, the Feature is not merely instrumental to a statute's efficiency, utility or justice, or to its goodness
or rightness in some other respect.
References to the intrinsic fairness of majority-vote rules, and
conversely to the unfairness worked by judicial review, are replete in
the literature on the Countermajoritarian Difficulty." 2 "[C]oherent,
stable-and morally supportable-government is possible only on the
basis of consent, and.., the secret of consent is the sense of common
venture fostered by institutions that reflect and represent us and that
we can call to account."" 3 Judicial restraint is therefore warranted,
according to the democratic construal, because the very act ofjudicial
review violates the intrinsic value of plebiscitary fairness. This is true

theorem); see also Waldron, supra note 97, at 2211-12 (suggesting that majority vote is
the only procedure that accords equal respect to persons in "circumstances of politics").
I Cf RAWLs, LIBERALIsM, supra note 72, at 47-88 (asserting that the content of
political justice is specified with reference to different, but "reasonable," comprehensive moral views).
112 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing
thatjudicial review "thwarts the will
of representatives of the actual people of the here and now"); id. at 18 (describing legislative action as the process of "reflecting the will of a popular majority"); ELY, supra
note 6, at 7 ("[R]ule in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is the
core of the American governmental system."); id. (describing majoritarian democracy
as either, for the moral absolutist, a "tenet of natural law" or, for the moral relativist,
"the most natural institutional reaction to the realization that there is no moral certainty"); BORK, supra note 10, at 139 ("The first principle [of our governmental system] is self-government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled
to rule, if they wish, simply because they are majorities."); id. at 153 ("The orthodoxy
of our civil religion, which the Constitution has aptly been called, holds that we govern
ourselves democratically, except on those occasions ... when the Constitution places a
topic beyond the reach of majorities.").
11 BICKEL, supra note 1, at 20.
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even if courts are epistemically perfect, and even if the statute violates
the constitutional criterion (aspect ofjustice) at stake.
Let us abstract the democratic construal of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty as follows:
The CountermajoritarianDifficulty (DemocraticConstrual)
A statute may violate a criterion C bearing on constitutionality-some aspect ofjustice, such as "privacy"--relative to some
alternative (the status quo) that does not. The statute is at
least prima facie unconstitutional, insofar as it violates C." 4 It
is also the case, however, that judicial review (invalidating the
statute and returning society to the status quo, by virtue of C)
violates the intrinsic democratic value D of plebiscitary fairness. Plebiscitary fairness is weightier than C, and so judicial
restraint is required even if courts are epistemically perfect
with respect to what C (and D) require."
Alexander Bickel, the author and first defender of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, intended, quite clearly, to advance a democratic
argument of this kind-not an epistemic argument, and not an analytic one."6 And although later proponents, such as Robert Bork and
On the Revisionist Construal of "unconstitutional," the statute is unconstitutional. On the Traditional Construal, the statute is prima facie unconstitutional, by
virtue of violating some criterion bearing on constitutionality, but not all-thingsconsidered unconstitutional because of democratic value D's overriding weight. See
supra text accompanying notes 53-59 (discussing Revisionist and Traditional Construals).
1 It may be possible to defend a mixed democratic view, such that courts which
are not epistemically perfect, but are epistemically better placed than legislatures to
determine what C requires, ought to uphold statutes bearing Plebiscitary Features.
(Perhaps democracy becomes important because no institutions are epistemically perfect, and citizens know that no institutions are perfect.) Even on this mixed view,
however, the contibution that the Plebiscitary Feature makes is democratic, not epistemic. The fact that the statute bears the Feature does not provide the court sufficient
reason to believe that it satisfies C; rather, invalidating the statute is still wrong because
it infringes upon D. (As I argue below, it is implausible to think that the Plebiscitary
Feature makes an epistemic contribution. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26.)
The central point, both in the mixed case and in the pure case of deference by epistemically perfect courts, is that an institution better placed to determine what justice
requires nonetheless upholds what it takes to be an unjust statute by virtue of some
overriding democratic value.
116As noted, Bickel thought that justice (what he called "principle" or "enduring
values") furnished a proper standard for constitutional adjudication, quite apart from
the Constitution's text or the Framers's original meaning or intentions. See BICKEL,
supra note 1, at 23-29, 65-72, 235-43. He urged courts to refrain from invalidating
"unprincipled" statutes that had sufficient majoritarian support-relying upon the
various procedural devices, lying halfway between invalidation and affirmance on the
114

merits, that Bickel termed the Passive Virtues-even though courts were, in his view,
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epistemically well-placed to determine what "principle" required, and even though such
statutes remained unprincipled, indeed perhaps unconstitutional. See id. at 111-98
(generally describing the Passive Virtues). Why? Because invalidation would be undemocratic, despite the statute's injustice, indeed uficonstitutionality. Thus Bickel's
summary of the Passive Virtues:
UJudicial review brings principle to bear on the operations of government.
By "principle" is meant general propositions, as Holmes called them ...; organizing ideas of universal validity in the given universe of a culture and a
place, ideas that are often grounded in ethical and moral presuppositions....
Exercising a function of this description, however imprecise, in a society
dedicated both to the morality of government by consent and to moral selfgovernment, the Supreme Court touches and should touch many aspects of
American public life. But it would be intolerable for the Court finally to govern all that it touches, for that would turn us into a Platonic kingdom contrary
The means [to resolve this problem
to the morality of self-government ....
are] "the passive virtues."
Id. at 199-200. See generally id. at 111-98 (describing the Passive Virtues more fully).
Quite clearly, Bickel rejected an epistemic account of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. Again and again, The Least Dangerous Branch asserts that "the Court is the institution best fitted to give us a rule of principle," id. at 261, and that "the elected institutions are ill fitted, or not so well fitted as the courts, to perform [this] task." Id. at 27;
see also id. at 26, 65-72, 82, 95, 156, 199-200 (discussing the advantages of courts, relative to elected bodies, in reaching "principled" decisions). Majority rule is not an epistemic tool. Indeed it is precisely the responsiveness of legislatures to the preferences
of a majority of the electorate that, for Bickel, undermines their epistemic capacity. As
Bickel explained:
Men in all walks of public life are able occasionally to perceive this
[principled] aspect of public questions. Sometimes they are also able to base
their decisions on it; that is one of the things we like to call acting on principle. Often they do not do so, however, particularly when they sit in legislative
assemblies. There, when the pressure for immediate results is strong enough
and emotions ride high enough, men will ordinarily prefer to act on expediency rather than take the long view.... [T]he creative establishment and renewal of a coherent body of principled rules-that is what our legislatures
have proven themselves ill equipped to give us.
Id. at 24-25.
As for the analytic claim that a statute with sufficient majoritarian support is
thereby rendered "principled" and constitutional: again, this clearly is not what The
Least Dangerous Branch intends. An analytic construal of the Passive Virtues would be
weird: "An otherwise unprincipled statute that has majority support is not unprincipled, solely because it has majority support; and so the Court should exercise the Passive Virtues with respect to that statute." If the statute is not unprincipled, why not
simply uphold it The Passive Virtues, for Bickel, were rather just a means by which
courts could avoid the unfortunate alternative of upholding and thereby legitimating
unprincipled statutes, while also avoiding the undemocratic alternative of invalidating
them. See id. at 69 ("The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court
wields a threefold power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle.
It may validate, or, in Charles L. Black's better word, 'legitimate' legislation as consistent with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do neither, and therein lies the secret
of its ability to maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency."); see
also id.at 200 (same).
Consider Bickel's most famous and controversial example of the Passive Vir-
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John Ely, do not articulate any such intention, and almost surely
would not avow one, ' 7 , suggest that the democratic construal is by far
the most charitable and plausible interpretation of what these authors
mean when they invoke the majoritarian cast of statutes.
What else might they be saying? Imagine that a reviewing court
prepares to invalidate a statute as violative of some aspect C ofjustice,
say "privacy"; the proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
points to the statute's Plebiscitary Feature as sufficient reason for the
court to refrain from invalidation. What kind of significance, if not
democratic significance, might the Plebiscitary Feature have? Consider the following three alternatives: (1) the reference to the Plebiscitary Feature might be mere verbiage; (2) the Plebiscitary Feature
might have analytic significance; or (3) the Plebiscitary Feature might
have epistemic significance.
As for the first alternative, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is,
indeed, sometimes mixed together with arguments for limiting judicial review that are wholly independent of the majoritarian cast of legislation (in my terms, wholly independent of a statute's "Plebiscitary
Feature"). For example, both Ely and Bork advance a metaethical,
analytic argument against decisions such as Roe and Griswold, to the
effect that supposed aspects of justice, such as "privacy," are purely
subjective. In effect, they say this: "C is not a constitutional criterion
and furnishes no basis for judicial review, because it has no objective
content. Statements of the form 'this is unjust' no more than an-

tues: the sequence of decisions by the Court in Brown v. Board of EducationI (holding
school segregation unconstitutional) and II (denying an immediate remedy). Bickel
thought that both decisions were correct; he thought that (1) school segregation was
.unprincipled" and therefore unconstitutional; but also that (2) because segregation
had the support of a majority of Southerners, an immediate remedy would have been
undemocratic. See id. at 250-51; see also id. at 244-72 (full discussion of this example).
This is restraintist, not analytic praise for the Brown decisions. If Bickel had held the
odious analytic view that the support of a majority of Southerners rendered segregation just and constitutional, he would have had to believe that Brown Iwas wrongly decided.
,1 Consider, for example, what the democratic argument says in the context of
the Court's "privacy" jurisprudence: "Privacy is indeed an objective value of justice,
that is part of the criteria bearing on constitutionality; and a statute that violates privacy is indeed unconstitutional, or at least prima facie unconstitutional; but the statute
nonetheless ought not be invalidated if it bears the Plebiscitary Feature." Certainly
Bork and Ely do not admit that privacy is an objective value ofjustice that takes constitutional status. See BORg, supra note 10, at 95-100, 110-26, 257-59 (criticizing the
Court's privacy jurisprudence); Ely, supra note 10, at 920 (same); cf. ELY, supra note 6,
at 221 n.4 (distinguishing Griswold from Roe, as defensible in terms of a less openended approach to constitutional interpretation).
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nounce the subjective preferences of the speaker, and of course, statutes, rules, orders or actions are not unconstitutional simply because
they violate someone's subjective preferences .. 1 If such claims about
the subjectivity ofjustice are true, however, then further claims about
the Plebiscitary Feature of statutes are superfluous. Imagine that C is
indeed subjective and, further, that some governmental decision challenged as violating C-for example, an administrative rule or order
issued by an unelected bureaucrat-turns out not to bear the Plebiscitary Feature. Nonetheless, the reviewing court is surely not licensed
to invalidate the administrative rule or order as violating C."9 The
subjectivity of C is sufficient reason for C not to figure in judicial review, whether or not the decisions under review are majoritarian.
The Countermajoritarian Difficulty does not build upon the
metaethical argument about the subjectivity of justice, or other argu118
Consider this excerpt from The Tempting
of America:
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom from regulation and a majority asserting its freedom to regulate requires a choice between the gratifications (or moral positions) of the two groups. When the Constitution has not
spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale, other than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the competing claims....
We may put aside the objection, which seems to me itself dispositive, that

the judge has no authority to impose upon society even a correct moral hierarchy of gratifications. I wish to make the additional point that, in today's
situation, for the reasons given by [Alasdair] Maclntyre, there is no objectively
"correct" hierarchy to which thejudge can appeal.
BORK, supra note 10, at 257-58 (emphasis added). Or consider this one from Ely's Democracy and Distrust
The view that the judge, in enforcing the Constitution, should use his or her
own values to measure the judgment of the political branches is a methodology that is seldom endorsed in so many words. As we proceed through the
various methodologies that are, however, I think we shall sense in many cases
that although the judge or commentator in question may be talking in terms
of some "objective," nonpersonal method of identification, what he is really
likely to be "discovering," whether or not he is fully aware of it, are his own
values.
ELY, supra note 6, at 44 (footnote omitted); see also Frederick Schauer, The Calculus of
Distrust, 77 VA. L. REV. 653, 657-68 (1991) (noting subjectivist strain in Ely); BARBER,
supra note 2, at 2-10, 78-80, 124-29 (discussing Bork's moral skepticism).
119By referring to the objectivity of these criteria,
I mean simply that claims about
their content are truth-stating and that the truth of such claims is fixed by more than
the speaker's own beliefs; this leaves open the possibility that conventions, rather than
nature, play the truth-fixing role. SeeJules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 607-08 (1993) (distinguishing between
subjectivism, where "[tio say that something is right... is to say that it seems right to
me, no more, no less," and "minimal objectivity," where "what seems right to the majority of the community determines what is right").
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ments for limiting review that are independent of the Plebiscitary
Feature. ' " Just the opposite: the proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty must presume that his target, C, is an objective, normative
criterion included among the criteria bearing on constitutionality.,',

For if C is subjective, or for some other reason not included among
the set of constitutional criteria, then C cannot be judicially enforced
against statutes, rules, orders and actions, whether or not these have
Plebiscitary Features attached. If "privacy," for example, is really subjective, then invoking the Countermajoritarian Difficulty against decisions such as Roe and Griswold is mere verbiage.
A second possibility is that the Plebiscitary Feature is not superfluous, but rather has analytic significance. Imagine a conventionalist
view ofjustice that concedes C's objectivity and constitutional status,
but sees the Plebiscitary Feature as constitutive of what C requires.
Conventionalism, generally, is the view that objective morality, including justice, is a kind of convention, constituted (in some way) by our
common practices, understandings or beliefs. ' 2 So one might try to
120

Another view that is wholly independent of the Plebiscitary Feature, and that

turns references to the majoritarian cast of statutes into mere verbiage, is analytic
originalism: the view that, quite independent of the epistemic capacities of courts and
the democratic wrongs they might work, the only criteria by virtue of which courts
properly invalidate statutes, rules, orders or actions are the criteria set out with sufficient specificity in the text of the Constitution. See generally Farber, supra note 7
(analyzing the originalism debate). By contrast, restraintistoriginalism could be something like the following: Reviewing courts may rely upon non-originalist criteria in
reviewing governmental decisions only insofar as these do not bear Plebiscitary Features.
1 A final possibility, one I do not discuss at any length
here, is that a statute bearing the Plebiscitary Feature functions as an informal constitutional amendment: it
.repeals" C, so that C is no longer a criterion bearing on constitutionality. See generally
ACKERIAN, supra note 27, at 266-94 (presenting a theory of "transformative statutes"
functioning as informal constitutional amendments). In this way, the statute's Plebiscitary Feature might have analytic, not restraintist significance-analytic not to the
best understanding of C, but to its constitutional status. I take this to be an even more
startling and demanding reading of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty than my
democratic reading; statutes would need to bear very strong Plebiscitary Features indeed to amend the Constitution, and Ackerman takes great pains to specify the hurdles that a statute must overcome to be "transformative." See id. ("When put to the
test, most movements will fail to generate the deep and decisive support required before they can constitutionally speak in the special accents of We the People of the
United States.").
"22Conventionalists disagree with moral realists, who assert that
an action or state
of affairs can be unjust or wrong, independent of any our conventions. See Moore, supra note 69, at 286 (arguing that there is a "moral reality," or "a right answer to moral
questions," which should inform the interpretation of legal texts); DAVID 0. BRINK,
MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHics 14-36 (1989) (discussing realism
and conventionalism in ethics).
See generally BARBER, supra note 2, at 147-201
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offer a conventionalist, analytic account of the Plebiscitary Feature: "C is not independent of the Plebiscitary Feature; rather, what
fixes C's content simply is the right kind of plebiscite." But is this at
all plausible? Conventionalism comes in different flavors. A "deep
conventionalist," such as Dworkin, gives relatively more weight to
general moral concepts like privacy, speech or equality, and relatively
less weight to the specific moral conceptions that, for the deep conventionalist, such general concepts can override. A "shallow conventionalist," who might appeal to an "evolving consensus" or to
"tradition," gives more weight to specific conceptions and less to general concepts. A shallow and even a deep conventionalist might acknowledge that a proper plebiscite or a statute bearing the Plebiscitary Feature is one element in that set of practices, understandings
and beliefs which collectively constitute 'justice." At the margin,
then, a single proper plebiscite affirming some outcome might constitute that outcome as just, even though the outcome would be unjust
by virtue of the remainder of the constitutive set. But that is quite different from saying that a single proper plebiscite necessarily constitutes its outcome as just (until the next plebiscite), independent of
the rest of our understandings, practices and beliefs. That would be12a
super-shallow, and highly implausible, variant of conventionalism. 1
Although the idealized, or possibly idealized, nature of the Plebiscitary Feature might give comfort to someone who accords the Feature
analytic significance, it must be remembered that idealization cannot
be so strong as to preclude citizen disagreement. A law promulgated
by a plebiscite of reasonable, informed citizens who nonetheless disagree with one another might still violate the Difference Principle, or
privacy, or free speech.
Finally, the Plebiscitary Feature might have epistemic, rather than
democratic significance. On this construal, the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty says: "Plebiscitary legislatures are epistemically well-placed
(discussing and criticizing conventionalism in Ronald Dworkin's thought, and in lib-

eral constitutional thought generally).
123 See Heidi M. Hurd,justifiably Punishingthe
Justified,90 MICH. L. REv. 2203, 2260
n.114 (1992) (denying that the outcome of a plebiscite fixes moral facts, even for a
conventionalist). To be sure, there might be some aspects ofjustice that go to the very
process of lawmaking, and that are exhausted by the plebiscitary cast of legislatures.
Procedural due process in lawmaking might be like this. One might take the view that
justice-in-procedure demands notice, some kind of hearing, and some kind of evidentiary process for lawmaking by unelected agencies, but not for lawmaking by majoritarian legislatures. See supra note 52. But this is simply another way of saying that the
plebiscitary cast of legislatures makes them especially democratic-not that it makes
their outcomes especiallyjust for all the aspects ofjustice.
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to determine what C requires, while courts are not; thus, the legislature's enactment of this statute provides a court sufficient reason to
believe that the statute does not violate C.,,124 Note that this construal

forces us to read the standard, celebratory claims about the intrinsic
fairness of majority vote-standard among advocates of judicial restraint-as misconceived. A majority-vote rule, under the epistemic
construal, is simply a mechanism for producing statutes that are good
or right by other standards. Indeed, the epistemic construal makes

the very emphasis on the majority-vote rule, as opposed to alternate
voting rules, a puzzle. Why are plebiscites especially accurate mechanisms for determining what justice requires, rather than procedures
that employ, say, a 67% rule, or a 41% rule?'2 5 Nor is it clear what
would lend the plebiscite this supposed accuracy about justice. Our
Median Voter might simply be wrong in her judgment about what our
justice-constituting conventions, deep or even shallow, require.12 6 Of
course, if super-shallow conventionalism holds true, the Median Voter
will necessarily be right about justice. In that case, however, we are
back to an analytic, not an epistemic, construal of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty.
One might try to avoid this problem by building restrictions into
the plebiscite-by requiring the voters to be, for example, impartial,
deliberate and well informed-but these restrictions would either be
124

See infra text accompanying note 244 (an epistemic interpretation of Thayer's

view); infra text accompanying notes 336-89 (an epistemic argument for restraint, independent of elected cast of legislators); infra note 335 (citing sources that adopt an
epistemic argument that depends, in part, on the elected cast of legislators). Even if
one were to take the view that the legislator, qua elected, is epistemically better placed
on matters of constitutional law, it seems implausible that being elected by a 51% rule,
as opposed to a 48% rule, or a 75% rule, is required to give the legislator her epistemic
advantage. But see Carlos Santiago Nino, A PhilosophicalReconstruction ofJudicialReview,
14 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 822-31 (1993) (an epistemic argument for judicial restraint,
grounded in part in the majoritarian cast of legislation).
125 See MUELLER, supra note 28, at 96-100 (stating and proving May's Theorem: majority vote is the only voting rule that satisfies four conditions of decisiveness,
anonymity, neutrality, and positive responsiveness); see also id. at 52 (if the appropriateness of a voting rule depends merely on its total costs-external costs plus decisional costs-then the priority of the majority-vote rule over other voting rules is contingent on the shape of these cost curves).
126See PERRY, supra note 70, at 96-101, 106-10 (arguing that legislatures are epistemically weaker than courts on matters of constitutional law, by virtue of the legislator's elected status: constitutional knowledge requires deliberation, while the legislator has an electoral incentive to respond to her constituents' views instead of
deliberating); DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 331-62 (1966)

(Congress's constitutional competence has diminished over the course of the twentieth century as it has become increasingly responsive to the electorate).
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too strong or too weak. If the idealized voter's judgment aboutjustice
must be right, then we have eliminated the element of majority-vote
(not unanimity) characteristic of plebiscitarian theories. A properly
unanimous plebiscite is an oxymoron. Even the idealized voter must
be capable of erring about our justice-constituting conventions in a
plebiscitarian theory and, if so, it is hard to see why the proper plebiscite would be particularly well-placed epistemically to determine
what C requires. Further, even if it were true that the Plebiscitary Feature has an epistemic function nearly ensuring that statutes bearing it
do not violate C, we would need an additional explanation for why
courts are epistemically weaker than legislatures with respect to Can explanation that advocates of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty
do not standardly provide. Although Bork and Ely do conflate the
claim that (a) "It is undemocratic for courts to invalidate statutes as
unjust" with the claim that (b) 'Justice is subjective," they do not further claim that (c) "Courts are epistemically weaker than legislatures
with respect to objective justice."

In short, The Least Dangerous Branch is not only the origin of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, but also its standard version. The best
reading of what its more recent proponents, such as Bork and Ely,
might mean by the "Countermajoritarian Difficulty" is precisely what
its framer, Bickel, plainly meant: a democratic, restraintist argument
for courts to refrain from invalidating statutes, albeit statutes that are
unjust and at least prima facie unconstitutional, where judicial review
would be unfair and undemocratic. It is, quite properly, an argument
for 'Judicial restraint," yet one that must be understood as making
strong, restraintist claims about the intrinsic fairness of the legislative
process. Let us now see whether these strong claims can be extended
into the administrative state." 7
II. SIMPLE EXTENSIONS

Should constitutional reviewing courts exercise restraint in the
127 The argument below in Part II, against Simple Extensions,
does not presuppose
that the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is democratic rather than epistemic; my assertion will be that legislature-centered arguments generally fail. However, because such
arguments do indeed fail, we will need to look to institutional structure, not mere interpretive pedigree; and, for that enterprise, the democratic rather than epistemic cast
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is absolutely crucial. See infra Part III.
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administrative state? What, if any, reasons for restraint bear upon the
judicial practice of invalidating administrative rules, orders and actions-as opposed to the practice of invalidating statutes? An argument for 'Judicial restraint," again, is an argument for limiting judicial review based upon some deficit (such as an epistemic deficit or a
democratic deficit) of the reviewing court, just insofar as this deficit
does not change how the statute, rule, order or action under review
fares (relative to the status quo or relevant alternatives) under the criteria bearing on constitutionality. Such arguments are directed
against the broader conceptions ofjudicial review that, at the limiting
point, take 'Justice" as an appropriate criterion for reviewing courts to
enforce. Imagine, then, the limiting-point conception ofjudicial review in the administrative state: on this conception, a reviewing court
properly invalidates a rule, order or action, merely because it takes the
rule, order or action to be unjust. Can we identify good, restraintist
reasons to reject this conception?
Maybe not. There may well be no grounds forjudicial restraint in
the administrative state. More strongly yet, there may well be no
grounds for judicial restraint in the administrative state even if legislature-centered theories of restraint, such as the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, hold true. Such theories point to the supposed advantages
of legislatures, relative to courts (such as democratic or epistemic advantages), in order to show why courts ought not invalidate statutes
merely because they take these to be unjust. For example, as we have
seen, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is a legislature-centered restraintist argument that rests upon the intrinsic democratic value of
"plebiscitary fairness." It says that (1) statutes should be taken to bear
the Plebiscitary Feature, such that (2) it is unfair and, all things considered, wrong for a court to invalidate statutes on the mere grounds
ofjustice. Both of these propositions have been vigorously criticized
by constitutional scholars; but let us imagine that these criticisms fall
short. 28 Assume that both propositions are true. One might still ask
whether it would be unfair and, all things considered, wrong -a violation of the intrinsic value of plebiscitary fairness-for courts to invalidate unjust rules, order or actions. That is, one might still ask

128

See generally Croley, supra note 38, at 748-78 (discussing a range of possible re-

sponses to the Countermajoritarian Difficulty); Friedman, supra note 21, at 628-53
(same). These criticisms of (1) and (2) may well be correct; nothing said in this Article is meant to suggest otherwise. The criticisms will not be repeated or elaborated
upon here, because they already have been made so well as part of the well-worn debate aboutjudicial invalidation of statutes.
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whether the restraintist reasons identified by the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty or any other legislature-centered restraintist theory also
provide grounds for restraint in the administrative state. No one has
seriously analyzed this question. I claim that the answer may well be
"No. "12

This question urgently requires an answer. The practice of invalidating statutes is only one special part of the general practice of
judicial review. This is true at the Supreme Court level, and even
more at the level of the lower federal courts. Courts commonly, indeed, normally, exercise the power of judicial review-which means,
at a minimum, the power to invalidate (state and federal) 3 0 statutes,
rules, orders and actions on direct constitutional grounds'3'-without
129 Again, I must emphasize that I am not the
first to raise this point. See sources
cited supra notes 20-21 (recognizing the error in conflating judicial review with the
review of statutes). I do think it fair to say, however, that the problem of extending
legislature-centered arguments into the administrative state-or indeed developing
general, agency-centered arguments that have no analogues for legislatures-has not
been given the full-blown scholarly scrutiny that this Article attempts to provide.
130 The focus of this Article is federal. The arguments against
Simple Extensions,
developed in this Part, apply equally against Simple Extensions from state statutes to
state rules, orders and actions. Clearly, however, a full inquiry into the actual democratic, epistemic, or further features of agencies relevant to judicial review of agency
decisions-the inquiry sketched out in Part III-should separately consider state as
well as federal agencies.
131"Order," here, includes a judicial order. See infra note 132 (discussing
an empirical study by Seth Kreimer that finds that challenges to judicial orders comprise a
significant portion of the constitutional claims raised in the lower federal courts). By
"direct constitutional grounds," I mean to exclude the universal, and derivative, constitutional challenge lurking behind every statutory challenge: that agency action
which is illegal under the governing statute, at least where a governing statute is constitutionally required, see infra note 133, is itself unconstitutional. See Dalton v. Specter, 114 S. Ct. 1719, 1726-28 (1994) (holding, for purposes of the principle that presidential decisions are reviewable for constitutionality, that a claim that the President
has acted in excess of statutory authority is not a constitutional claim). "Invalidation"
includes the partial or "as-applied" invalidation of rules and statutes, as well as "facial"
invalidation, but the focus of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, as I have construed it,
is on "facial" invalidation. See supra note 104.
Further-and this is crucial-invalidating administrative rules, orders or actions
on direct constitutional grounds encompasses more than ajudicial holding that, "This
rule, etc., is unconstitutional." It also encompasses judicial invalidation of rules, orders and actions as poor interpretations of their governing statutes, just insofar as the
Court invokes constitutional criteria in interpreting the statutes. See infra Part II.A.2
(discussing the pervasive role of the Avoidance Canon in the judicial interpretation of
statutes). In particular, I count judicial invalidation of a rule, order or action under
the rubric of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine, as an instance ofjudicial
review. See infra Part II.D. To insist thatjudicial review in the administrative state does
not encompass application of the Avoidance Canon, in particular its "serious constitutional doubts" component, is to make a serious semantic and conceptual mistake-
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invalidating statutes." 2 If the Countermajoritarian Difficulty or other
one that risks excluding, by definitional fiat, the very possibility of differential restraint. See infra text accompanying notes 323-25 (developing this point).
I say that judicial review includes, "at a minimum," the power to invalidate statutes,
rules, orders and actions on direct constitutional grounds, because judicial review
might also be taken to include the power to uphold (and therefore legitimate) statutes,
rules, orders and actions. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that judicial articulation of principle encompasses both "strik[ing] down legislation as inconsistent
with principle" and "validat[ing] or, in Charles L. Black's better word, 'legitimat[ing]'
legislation as consistent with principle"). It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider what reasons for restraint, if any, bear upon judicial review in this broader sense.
I thank Seth Kreimer for pressing me to recognize this point, and apologize for not yet
being able to answer it.
- My colleague Seth Kreimer recently completed an extremely valuable empirical
study of constitutional claims raised in the Supreme Court and the federal trial courts.
Professor Kreimer found:
At the Supreme Court level, the challenged decision maker is most often
the legislature, and least often an individual executive official. Legislative actions are at issue in two out of five cases decided by the Supreme Court; decisions by individual bureaucrats appear only half as often. The frequency of
cases roughly mirrors the breadth of effect and dramatic import of the challenged decision: the legislative decision is the most deserving of the Supreme
Court's limited resources, and the least likely to be controlled by subconstitutional decision rules.
In the trial court's caseload the order is reversed. Challenges to legislative
action are by far the least prevalent type of constitutional review, while challenges to actions by street level bureaucrats generate almost half of the constitutional claims. In the district court sample, only [7.6% of the claims] challenge legislative action. In contrast, decisions by individual officials and
police officers, which accounted for barely a fifth of Supreme Court cases
(18%) spawn 45% of the cases before the trial courts. Individual civilian officials account for [28% of the cases], police officers for [17.5%]. This reversal
is not solely an application of the proposition that law application is a far
more frequent activity than legislation. Although both judges and administrative agencies apply law, decisions by both judges and administrative agencies account for the same proportion of cases in the Supreme Court and District Court dockets. Judges made the challenged decisions in a third of the
cases and challenges to administrative agency action comprise about one case
in six.
Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark MatterofJudicialReview: A ConstitutionalCensus of the
1990s, WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. (forthcoming Summer 1997) (manuscript at 40-41,
on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review and author).
Nicholas Zeppos has performed an important empirical study of the Supreme
Court's constitutional caseload, which demonstrates, dramatically, the extent to which
the Supreme Court relies upon constitutional criteria in interpreting statutes rather
than invalidating statutes. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political Decisionmakers
and the PreferredScope ofJudicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 296, 309-12, 335-45 (1993).
Zeppos studied 55 years of Supreme Court cases, up through the 1991-92 Term, and,
strikingly, found that: "In this time period, the Court invalidated 69 acts of Congress.
Significantly, however, on 86 occasions the Court invoked a constitutional value to interpret a statute narrowly." Id. at 309 (footnotes omitted). In particular, as we shall
see, importing constitutional criteria into the interpretation of statutes provides an

810

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 145: 759

legislature-centered theories do not reach beyond the practice of reviewing statutes, then the importance of such theories, even if true,
will be quite limited. Bork, Ely, Bickel and other advocates of restraint will at best have identified restraintist reasons (plebiscitary
fairness, or whatever) that properly constrain reviewing courts only in
the special case of statutory review.
There are two possible strategies for demonstrating that courts
should exercise restraint in the administrative state. The first possible
strategy-the simple one-is to show that legislature-centered reasons
for restraint also bear upon the judicial practice of reviewing rules,
orders and actions merely by virtue of the statutory pedigree of these
rules, orders and actions. Each and every rule, order or action that
an administrative agency issues or takes is issued or taken pursuant to
an underlying statute. Each and every one, to be legally proper, must
be a proper interpretation of that underlying statute. 31 3 So the following sort of argument, which I will call the "Simple Extension," might
be offered:
The Simple Extension of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty

Assume the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is true. Then the
following is also true: If an administrative rule, order or action is a good interpretation of a statute that is properly taken
to bear the Plebiscitary Feature, then it is unfair and, all
things considered, wrong for a court to invalidate the rule,
order or action on the mere grounds ofjustice.
Such an argument tries to show why courts have reason to exercise restraint in reviewing rules, orders and actions, quite independent of the
particular, institutional structure of the administrative state-

important mechanism for judicial invalidation of agency rules, orders and actions. See
infra Parts II.A.2, II.D. (discussing the Avoidance Canon and the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine).
My definition ofjudicial "invalidation" of a statute is narrow: it includes facial but
not as-applied invalidation. See supra note 104. What Kreimer and Zeppos show is that
statutory invalidation (of any kind) comprises only a minority ofjudicial review cases,
even at the Supreme Court level. In turn, I would conjecture, "facial" invalidation is
only a relatively small fraction of total statutory invalidation. See Dorf, supra note 104,
at 236-39 (showing that facial invalidation is highly disfavored under the Court's announced doctrine, and arguing that it is only appropriate if there exists a constitutional or statutory restriction on severability).
133It could be argued that this claim needs to be qualified for special cases.
Cf.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-89 (1981) (upholding presidential suspension of American claims against Iran pending in American courts, absent direct
statutory authority). Because, I claim, the statutory pedigree of rules, etc., does not
require restraint, the argument need not be addressed here.
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independent of the epistemic or democratic capacities of particular
agencies; 3 4 the intensity of presidential oversight;'-" the intervention
of legislative committees;"' and so forth. I have called it a "Simple
Extension" because it claims that the restraintist reason identified in
some legislature-centered theory can be extended to the entire, broad
range of judicial review simply because of the interpretive link between every rule, order and action and the underlying statute.' 7
This Part demonstrates that the simple strategy is a failure. Section A analyzes, at length, the Simple Extension of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty and rejects it. Again, I focus on the Countermajoritarian Difficulty because of its importance and fame in the
literature on judicial review, and because of the clarity that an analytic
focus brings. My claim, however, is that the Countermajoritarian Difficulty (in lacking a Simple Extension) exemplifies the broader class
of legislature-centered theories. Thus Section B shows why the analysis offered in Section A is equally applicable to other legislaturecentered theories, such as epistemic theories or democratic theories
that rely upon democratic values other than plebiscitary fairness. Section B shows that these theories, too, lack a Simple Extension.
Section C examines a set of arguments that are closely related to
the Simple Extension-arguments to the effect that the reversibility of
agency decisions by Congress generates a reason for judicial restraint-and shows how such arguments rest upon a basic misconception about the nature of judicial review in the administrative state.
Finally, Section D turns to existing legal doctrine concerning the
proper scope of judicial review of rules, orders and actions and explains how this doctrine, in interesting and hitherto-unnoticed ways,
confirms the analyses offered in Sections A, B and C.
I should emphasize that this Part takes us only halfivay homenot all the way. As I have argued, there are two possible strategies for
134 See generallyWILSON,

supra note 28, at 72-110 (describing the influence of interest groups and of internal agency "culture" on agency decisionmaking).
Seesources cited infra notes 327-34.
1
See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT (1990) (an empirical study of congressional oversight over
agencies); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic
Autonomy in a Model ofMulti-InstitutionalPolic -Making,12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 12223 (1996) (summarizing rational-choice literature on congressional control and citing
sources).
1s7 See ELY, supra note 6, at 4 n.* (implicitly proposing a Simple
Extension of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty and claiming that it would hold true if the nondelega-

tion doctrine were revived).
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showing why courts should exercise restraint in the administrative
state. The first is to develop a Simple Extension of some legislaturecentered argument for restraint: to show why restraint follows from
the statutory pedigree of rules, orders and actions, quite independent
of the democratic, epistemic or other features of the various institutions that make up the administrative state. The second strategy is to
attend to those institutional features and show how, at least in some
cases, such features do indeed furnish good, restraintist grounds for
limiting review. For example, it might be claimed that some administrative rules, orders or actions do in fact bear Plebiscitary Featuresnot by virtue of the Simple Extension of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, but rather by virtue of (a) the plebiscitary cast of the Presidency, plus (b) the President's capacity to oversee the decisions of (at
least some) agencies. '3 Or, the claim might be that the expert staff,
the decisional processes, the formal structure, the informal culture or
some other feature or features of certain agencies lends them an epistemic advantage-relative to courts-with respect to certain constitutional questions, and thus that courts have epistemic grounds for restraint on these39questions, in reviewing the rules, orders or actions of
these agencies.
This Part rules out the first, simple strategy, not the second,
harder one. I do not give a conclusively negative answer to the question, "Do courts have grounds for restraint in the administrative
state?" Rather, I show what shape a positive answer to that question
will need to take. A theory ofjudicial restraint for the administrative
state must take on the difficult task of analyzing its institutional structure. Such a theory will need to tell us what agencies are like, democratically or epistemically, and how this bears on the judicial practice
of reviewing administrative rules, orders or actions. That is the scholarly task that, until now, our (legislature-centered) debates about judicial review have ignored. Hard as it is, it is a task that cannot be
avoided if we are to know whether courts should exercise restraint beyond the special case of invalidating statutes. The failure of the Simple Extension does not foreclose, but rather compels, this task-a task
that, in Part III, I begin to undertake. The statutory pedigree of every
rule, order or action is indeed an institutional truth (of sorts) about
the administrative state; but it is much too thin a truth to justify, without much more, a practice ofjudicial restraint.
13s See infra text accompanying notes 327-34.
139

See infra text accompanying notes 336-89.
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A. The Simple Extension of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty

The Simple Extension of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is
false.

We cannot move, via the interpretive process, from the as-

sumed truth of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to the truth of the
further claim that it is unfair and, all things considered, wrong for
courts to invalidate rules, orders and actions that are good interpretations of statutes bearing the Plebiscitary Feature. In particular, as this
Section will show, the Simple Extension is false in a regime of "valuesstatutes," even on a generous version of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty in which all statutes warrant claims about the outcomes of
highly idealized plebiscites. A "values-statute," as I shall use that term,
is a statute that sets forth some value such as "health," "safety,"
"competition," "communication," "education," "justcompensation" or
"equality"-some basic aspect of individual well-being or of a just,
democratic republic-pursuant to which the agency is authorized to
issue rules, promulgate orders, or take actions. Values-statutes epitomize the formal delegation that is characteristic of the administrative
state. 40 By the term "administrative state," again, I mean to signal not
140See,

e.g., RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Rote of Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory in AdministrativeLaw, 64 TEX.L. REV. 469, 475 (1985) [hereinafter Pierce, Constitutionaland
Political Theory] (describing Congress's broad delegations of power to administrative
agencies, including statutes that authorize agencies to take action pursuant to stated
"decisional goals," and noting that "[Many recently enacted statutes contain only lists
of decisional factors or goals to guide agency actions"); 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 68 (1994) (same);

David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,83 MICH.
L. REV. 1223, 1253 (1985) (distinguishing between "rules statutes" which "state rules
demarcating permissible from impermissible conduct," and "goals statutes" which
"state goals, which usually conflict, and delegate the job of reconciling any such conflicts to others who are entrusted with promulgating the rules of conduct necessary to
achieve those goals"); RichardJ. Pierce,Jr., PoliticalAccountabilityand DelegatedPower A
Response to ProfessorLowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 401 (1987) [hereinafter Pierce, Politicial Accountability and Delegated Power] (estimating that "goals statutes" as defined by
Schoenbrod, or equally indeterminate rules statutes, comprise 99% of all present congressional delegations to agencies); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the AdministrativeState; 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 411-18 (1989) (describing and defending "goaloriented legislation"); Richard B. Stewart, Beyond DelegationDoctrine,36 AM. U. L. REV.
323, 327 (1987) (agreeing with Professor Pierce that the "Schoenbrod test would invalidate most of the federal regulatory statutes now on the books"). William Eskridge
nicely describes the importance, and distinctive nature, of what I am calling "valuesstatutes" when he says: "[S]tatutes are frequently written as directives not to the citizenry but to the bureaucracy.... The content of the statute then consists of creating
or identifying the agency, structuring its decision making, and suggesting the overall
goals or guidelines for the agency's ongoing implementation of the statutory scheme."
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 2 (1994).

David

Schoenbrod has become a prominent defender of the nondelegation doctrine, which

814

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 145:759

just the existence of administrative agencies, but, more particularly,
"
the absence of any significant nondelegation constraints 41
on Con-

gress's conferral of authority upon them; where, in turn, a nondelegation constraint is a constraint upon the "indeterminacy" of statutes
(defined in the modest sense elaborated below). Let us hold in abeyance the objection that values-statutes are themselves unconstitutional
because they would violate a properly revived nondelegation doctrine.
The focus here on values-statutes is doublyjustified: first, because the
nondelegation doctrine has not yet been revived, and second, because this focus on the extreme case will show most crisply the weaknesses in the Simple Extension, which reach much more broadly to
rules-statutes
that no plausible nondelegation doctrine would pre42
clude.

The Simple Extension claims that it is "unfair" for courts to invalidate rules, orders or actions that are good interpretations of statutes bearing the Plebiscitary Feature. Note two different possible versions of this claim, one stronger and one weaker. The stronger
version is that such rules, orders or actions bear the Plebiscitary Feature themselves-they warrant claims about the outcomes of hypothetical plebiscites-and so the intrinsic unfairness in their invalidation is just the unfairness intrinsic to judicial invalidation of statutes.
The weaker version is that, although rules, orders or actions that are
good interpretations of statutes bearing the Plebiscitary Feature do
not, necessarily, bear the Feature themselves, it is still intrinsically unfair, in some way, for courts to invalidate them, say, because the interpretive process is the fairest process for elaborating a statute that has
been enacted through the fairest possible process for making law.
(he proposes) ought to be built around precisely the distinction between permissible
rules-statutes and impermissible values-statutes. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 29, at
180-91; Schoenbrod, supra, at 1249-74; David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 740, 826-28 (1983); David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be: The ConstitutionalPurposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 358-66 (1987). I use the term "values-statute"
rather than "goals-statute" so as to avoid the utilitarian flavor of "goal."
141 See infra note 214 and accompanying
text (discussing the demise of the non-

deleation doctrine).

_ By a "rules-statute," I mean a statute that directly changes the legal
position of
some citizens and that merely authorizes the agency to interpret, enforce and adjudicate these statutory rules rather than further stating some background value as a separate basis for agency rules, orders or actions.
143See EsKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 13-14 ("Theories of statutory interpretation in
the United States have in this century emphasized the original meaning of statutes,
and debates have focused on identifying the best evidence of that original meaning.... This 'archaeological' ... focus of traditional approaches to statutory interpre-
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This weaker version of the Simple Extension might initially seem
more attractive precisely because it is weaker; one need not make the
strong showing that proper rules, orders or actions would be the outcome of a hypothetical plebiscite.
Yet the attraction is chimerical. Imagine that invalidating proper
rules, orders or actions is unfair, but in some different sense than invalidating the underlying statute would be. The advocate of restraint
would then argue that this alternate unfairness amounts to a reason
for limiting the enforceable criteria for judicial review of rules, orders
or actions just as the primary unfairness involved in the Countermajoritarian Difficulty amounts to a reason for limiting the enforceable
criteria for judicial review of statutes. But why should these two reasons, alternate and primary, be equally potent and thus equally limiting? The restrictive originalist, for example, points to the Plebiscitary
Feature of statutes as a reason for constricting the enforceable criteria
for judicial review of statutes from Justice plus the Positive Constitution to only the Positive Constitution. 44 The primary sense of fairness
outweighs Justice, but is outweighed by positive, higher law. The alternate sense might not be precisely this weighty. It might not be
strong enough to exclude Justice (or some aspects of Justice) as legitimate grounds upon which courts may invalidate rules, orders or
actions. So we would still end up with a disjunction between the practice of reviewing rules, orders and actions, and the practice of reviewing statutes-perhaps, in the former case, with no judicial restraint at
all.
First, then, we should determine whether the stronger version of
the Simple Extension is true-whether rules, orders or actions that
arise as proper interpretations of statutes bearing the Plebiscitary Feature also bear the Feature, i.e., whether they warrant the claim that
they would be chosen over the status quo in hypothetical plebiscites.
This Section will show why the strong version of the Simple Extension
is false and, in so doing, will show why any weaker version must also
be false.
The hypothetical plebiscites about which statutes, and perhaps
rules, orders or actions as well, warrant claims, according to the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, might be more or less restricted. How
tation is inspired in large part by anxiety that non-elected officials feel when they
make policy decisions in a democracy.... [These] theories promise that statutory interpretation in concrete cases can be analytically connected with decisions that have
been made by a majority-based coalition in the legislature .. ").
144 See supra note 85 (discussing Bork's restrictive
originalism).
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the participants' judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes
should be idealized, if at all, depends on the underlying democratic
theory that accords intrinsic value to a proper plebiscite. For example, Rawls asserts as a basic axiom and requirement of citizenship that
citizens be "ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that
others will likewise do so."'14

This "reasonable" point of view, Rawls

explains, lies between mere rationality (where the citizen is moved
only by her own good) and pure impartiality (where the general good
suffices to move her).4

The quasi-Rawlsian democratic theory

14

sketched out above 1 sees majority vote as a fair procedure for resolving the disagreements about these "fair terms of cooperation" that
might arise even between "reasonable" citizens. On this theory, a
statute bears the Plebiscitary Feature only if it warrants a claim about
a hypothetical plebiscite in which citizens take the special, intermediate point of view that Rawls calls "reasonable." 48 Or consider Ackerman's denial that a statute has any special legitimacy if merely supported by the hasty, distracted judgments of citizens who are
ordinarily intent on leading their own private lives outside the sphere
of politics. Ackerman insists that citizens must transcend rational
apathy and reach deliberate, "considered" judgments, before Congress can claim to speak for "We the People":
[M]ost private citizens have no trouble recognizing that most of their
voting decisions do not measure up to their own standardsof deliberateness;

and that, if they took the trouble to think about the issues more carefully, their judgments might well be different from the relatively superfiRAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 72,
id. at 50; see also id. at 17 n.18
the idea of reciprocity, between the idea
tage).
147 See supra text accompanying notes
148"Deliberative democrats" typically
145

146 See

at 49.
(stating that justice as fairness is perched on
of impartiality and the idea of mutual advan108-17.
propose an even less self-interested perspec-

tive. See Paul J. Weithman, ContractualistLiberalism and DeliberativeDemocracy, 24 PHIL

& PUB. AFF. 314, 317 (1995) (noting that deliberative democracy requires
that: "Deliberation and debate about legislation and policy should be debate about
what policy best promotes the common or the public good. Democratic politics
should not take the form of competition among groups each of which advocates legislation on the basis of its particular economic, social or sectional interests."). For a recent contribution to this literature, see AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY& DISAGREEMENT (1996). Again, I am relying on the Rawlsians and deliberative democrats as exemplars of how citizen judgments are idealized. These theorists, however, are not majoritarians; rather, they emphasize consensus among idealized citizens, at least within the domain of the theory (for Rawlsians, the domain of
justice). See supra note 109.
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149

Under a quasi-Ackermanian theory, it would be unfair for a court to
invalidate the outcome of a proper majority vote among citizens, but
only if the voters had adequately deliberated before forming their respective judgments. While the quasi-Rawlsian theory idealizes citizens's judgments along one dimension (point of view), the quasiAckermanian theory does so along another (degree of deliberation).
A third dimension concerns information'5--a proper plebiscite
might require well-informed citizens-and there might be yet further
dimensions of restriction.
It seems apparent that, as our democratic theory places increasing
restrictions on the hypothetical plebiscites that figure in the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, by idealizing citizen judgments along one
or more of these dimensions-and thereby limiting the range of citizen disagreement-the Simple Extension becomes increasingly plausible. Consider the following case. A flag-burning statute states that
"No person shall burn a flag of the United States." A war protester
burns a flag to protest the war, and an administrative order is entered
directing her to pay a civil fine.' 5' Given a suitably restricted hypothetical plebiscite, it seems, the order bears the Plebiscitary Feature if
the statute does. Where the participants in our hypothetical plebiscite need simply be rational, not reasonable (in Rawls's sense of the
distinction, with rationality keyed to the participant's own plans, projects and interests, and reasonableness to some conception of what is
fair), the Median Voter in the plebiscite would be free to vote for the
statute but against the order-say, because the war protester is a
friend of hers, or because she plans to engage in war protest herself.
But assuming that the Median Voter's judgments are sufficiently idealized, then the Simple Extension does seem to hold true in this application. This result follows because, first, the statutory prescription is
determinate in this application-no one reasonably disagrees that the
war protester's particular action is an instance of flag burning-and

ACKERMAN, supranote 27, at 241-42 (footnote omitted).
15oCf Connie S. Rosati, Persons, Perspectives,and Full InformationAccounts of the Goo,
349

105 ETHIcS 296, 296-99 (1995) (discussing informed-preference accounts of individual
well-being); David Sobel, Full Information Accounts of Well-Being, 104 ETHICS 784, 790-93
(1994) (same).
1
Cf Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (overturning a state prosecution
for flag burning under a statute that prohibited desecration of the flag); United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (overturning a federal prosecution for flag burning under a statute that prohibited mutilation of the flag).
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second, the aspect of justice at stake in this instance, free speech,
seems to be an aspect of justice that the Median Voter reasonably
should have determined to override. That is, she should not have
voted for the statute unless she believed that the prescription was, all
things considered, justified in this very type of application (one including all the morally relevant features of the war protester's particular act of flag burning): the type of application where the flag burner
52
is speaking rather than, for example, merely disposing of flags.
Let us imagine, then, that a highly idealized Countermajoritarian
Difficulty holds true. It is not so idealized as to preclude some range
of disagreement among citizens (for otherwise a plebiscite would be
unnecessary), but still stringent in demanding impartiality, deliberation, informedness and other positive, consensus-creating attributes
that a democratic theory might value. Nonetheless, as we shall now
see, the Simple Extension is generally false, particularly in a regime of
values-statues. Even if the highly idealized Median Voter would vote
for a given values-statute, she might not vote for a rule, order or action that is properly issued or taken pursuant to that statute.
1. Values-statutes and the Strong Version of the Simple Extension
By virtue of what flaws does the Simple Extension fail to hold true
in a regime of values-statutes? An exemplary case to illustrate the
flaws is Skinner v. Railway LaborExecutives' Ass'n.'-5 In Skinner, the Supreme Court upheld, over Fourth Amendment challenge, a rule
promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA"), requiring railroads to perform drug and alcohol testing of railway workers
after railroad accidents.54 The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,
pursuant to which the agency promulgated this rule (the "drugtesting rule") is an exemplary values-statute. The relevant provision
of the Act authorizes the FRA to "'prescribe, as necessary, appropriate
rules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad
safety.'"'55 Assume that the drug-testing rule in fact violates the best
152

See infra text accompanying notes 188-97 (discussing theories of conscientious

legislation).
153 489 U.S. 602
(1989).
13 See id. at 633-34.
15"
Id. at 606 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1970)). The Act and this provision were
repealed, as part of a general codification of the transportation laws without substantive change. See Revision of Title 49, Transportation, United States Code, Pub. L. No.
103-272, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat. 745) 818. The provision currently authorizing
the promulgation of railroad safety rules is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20103(a) (1994)
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analytic understanding of the basic value ("security") '5' embodied in
the Fourth Amendment,' 75 but is otherwise a good interpretation of
the Safety Act. That is, assume that the rule is justified in terms of
"safety," the prime statutory value, because it effects a net reduction
in the rate of human death or injury relative to the status quo; and
that, in addition, the railroad's costs of complying with the rule are
less than the rule's benefits, i.e., safety is not overridden by any other
(nonconstitutional) values. Finally, assume that a generous version of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty holds true; the Safety Act bears the
Plebiscitary Feature, such that an idealized Median Voter would vote
in favor of the Act. This is not a vacuous statement. It implies that
the Median Voter would support federal rather than state authority,
would judge the FRA to be a sufficiently expert institution, and would
give a negative rather than a neutral or even positive valuation to
safety risks in railroading (by contrast with, say, safety risks in hang
gliding). But the statement, if not vacuous, is certainly thin. It certainly does not imply that the idealized Median Voter would support
the drug-testing rule.""
What defeats the Simple Extension in Skinner, to begin with, is the
problem of indeterminacy-by which I mean not the absence of objectively correct interpretations of legal standards, or the unknowability of these correct interpretations, but, more modestly, the possibility
of disagreement among interpreters about the proper interpretation
of (even) objective and knowable standards. This is the modest sense
of "indeterminacy" conceded, indeed assumed, by Dworkin when he

("The Secretary of Transportation, as necessary, shall prescribe regulations and issue
orders for every area of railroad safety...."). Because my discussion of the Safety Act
is meant to be exemplary, and because the Safety Act was at issue in Skinner, I use the
present tense in my discussion of the Act.
Lm "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
15 That is, assume that the Court's decision in Skinner can only be justified,
if at
all, as an exercise in judicial restraint.
138Note that if the Simple Extension does hold true here, then the democratic
theorist must count judicial invalidation of the following to be equally countermajoritarian: (a) the rule, enacted by the FRA under a wide-open Safety Act; (b) the Safety
Act itself; and (c) a drug-testing statute identical to the rule, but passed by Congress.
So, for example, the restrictive originalist who relies upon the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty and Simple Extension must argue that, although a law that violates the best
understanding of "security" is thereby unconstitutional or at least prima facie unconstitutional, a court should restrict itself to the (narrower) original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment in reviewing not only the drug-testing statute, but also the drugtesting rule.
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says that some legal problems comprise "hard cases."'59 If all interpreters were Hercules, then perhaps no cases would be "hard"; so
perhaps one should provide a relativized definition of this modest indeterminacy. A legal standard is modestly indeterminate, relative to
some interpreters (constrained to take a particular point of view, to
be more or less deliberate, to have more or less information, and so
forth) if the thus-constrained interpreters remain free under those
constraints to disagree about the interpretation of the legal standard.
For the remainder of this Section, I will use "indeterminacy" to mean
modest indeterminacy in this relativized way and assume that statutes
are, at most, only modestly indeterminate. "o If the Simple Extension
falls short on this premise, then afortioriit falls short if statutes are
more robustly indeterminate. 6
Note again that plebiscitary theories cannot (it seems) foreclose
modest indeterminacy because the very concept
of a plebiscite
pre1,
162
sumes the permissibility of some citizen disagreement.
In particular, a values-statute such as the Safety Act will be indeterminate with
respect to its prime value-here, safety-in a significant fraction of its
applications. This is particularly true where the application is a rule,
such as the drug-testing rule, that at best achieves small reductions in
the absolute number of deaths and injuries. 3 The source of the in159 See DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 81-130; see also RAWLS,
LIBERALISM, supra note 72,
at 54-58 (asserting that "burdens of judgment" produce "reasonable disagreement"
between citizens).
160See Waldron, supra note 97, at 2206 & n.63 (building a majoritarian theory
from
citizen disagreement, without claiming the absence of objective moral truth).
161 See BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE & LEGAL DETERMINACY 1 (1993) (defining
the
problem of legal indeterminacy as "whether law always (or most of the time or never)
provides unique correct answers to legal questions").
162 The fact that a statute would hypothetically be approved by
a majority of the
citizenry, and not (more robustly) that it would hypothetically be approved by unanimous vote, can give rise to some kind of reason forjudicial restraint only on the premise that citizens in this hypothetical plebiscite properly disagree about something.
Otherwise, why does the existence of a mere hypothetical majority create our restraintist reason? Now, the advocate ofjudicial restraint could, in theory, claim that statutes
should be taken to bear Unanimity Features-and thus, without contradiction, deny
the existence of even modest indeterminacy among his idealized citizens-but the advocates of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty do not claim that. I take "majoritarian"
to rule out this Unanimity Feature interpretation. A Unanimity Feature argument for
restraint would, of course, run right into an institutional problem: Why do legislatures
have any special claim to instantiate the Unanimity Feature?
16 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION 42-50 (1993) (discussing sources of uncertainty in risk assessment);
CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING ToxIc SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND
THE LAW 12-48 (1993) (discussing sources of uncertainty in the assessment of toxicity
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determinacy in this sort of case is empirical, not evaluative. Impartial,
deliberate, well-informed citizens, who agree that deaths and injuries
count as adverse "safety" events, might nonetheless dispute whether
the drug-testing rule augments or reduces these events relative to the
status quo. TM Post-accident drug testing of railroad employees might
cause employee suicides or heart attacks; it might be no less costly,
and less effective, than various safety devices that could be installed
on trains. Such are the issues that enmesh rulemakings in the area of
risk regulation.
The advocate of the Simple Extension might try to develop an account that circumvents the problem of indeterminacy through the
special kind of reasons for action that Joseph Raz calls "exclusionary
reasons." An exclusionary reason is, roughly, a reason for some action that, further, excludes other (first-order) reasons othenise bearing upon that action.'65 If an actor believes that an exclusionary reason obtains, then she has reason not to take account of the covered
(first-order) reasons in her practical deliberations.'t ' An exclusionaryreason account of the Simple Extension would run as follows: The
idealized Median Voter would exclude the first-order reasons otherwise bearing upon her vote for or against a rule, order or action(what she takes to be) the effects of the rule, order or action, how
those effects should be valued, and so forth-because the rule, etc., is
not a mere proposal, but instead has been promulgated by a lawmaking body that the Median Voter recognizes as an authority and to
which she would therefore defer. So in Skinner, for example, the Median Voter who believes that the drug-testing rule will increase rather
than reduce the rate of death and injury (relative to the status quo or

risks); LESTER B. LAVE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS

FOR POLICY 31-45 (1981) (discussing sources of uncertainty in risk assessment).
164See PETER ASCH, CONSUMER SAFETY REGULATION: PUTTING A PRICE ON LIFE AND
LIMB 70-79 (1988) (discussing common errors and anomalies in risk assessment by ordinary persons); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 101-37 (1992) (same).
10 SeeJOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-48 (1990) (discussing exclusionary reasons). Technically, the kind of account I give here is a "protected reason"
account-a protected reason is an exclusionary reason plus a first-order reason to act
in a certain way-but I will loosely use the term "exclusionary reason" because that
emphasizes how, on this account, the agency's decision excludes the Voter's own deliberation. See Michael S. Moore, Authority, Law, and Razian Reasons,62 S. CAL. L. REV.
827, 849-53 (1989) (summarizing Raz's account of exclusionary and protected reasons).
166 See Hurd, supra note 48, at 1625-27 (fleshing out Raz's claim "that an
exclusionary reason gives one a reason not to considerfurtherthe (first-order) reasons").
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to some no-more-costly alternative) would nonetheless exclude these
direct reasons from her deliberations and still vote in favor of drug
testing, because the FRA's status as a "safety" authority gives her an
exclusionary reason that she would recognize. How do we know that
the Voter would recognize that exclusionary reason? Precisely because of her (assumed) vote in favor of the Safety Act, which delegates authority to the FRA to promulgate safety rules. If the Countermajoritarian Difficulty holds true, and thus an agency's authorizing
values-statute warrants the claim that a majority of voters would vote
in favor of the statute in a hypothetical plebiscite, then even if the
value's indeterminacy precludes the inference that the same majority
would vote for a safety-enhancing rule based merely upon their firstorder reasons, we can still infer that the majority would vote for a
safety-enhancing rule based upon their exclusionary reasons. Or so
the account would go.
The exclusionary-reason account is problematic, however, in a
number of ways. 6 7 First, it presumes an exclusionary reason where
none need exist. It conflates the weaker and assumed premise that
the idealized Median Voter would vote to have an agency promulgate
rules, with the stronger premise that the idealized Median Voter
would recognize an exclusionary reason with respect to those rules.
That is hardly clear. For example, Ackerman's "economy of virtue"
account suggests that private citizens ordinarily abstain from serious
involvement in politics, not because their political judgments would
be ill-considered if they were involved, but because they have private
lives to lead.3o So it might be the case that the idealized Median
Voter: (1) votes in favor of the Safety Act because she judges that,
given her other commitments, she generally lacks the time to deliberate about safety; but (2) does not exclude her own judgment in favor
' The "economy
of the FRA's on every safety issue. 69
of virtue" account
167

For a general critique of the account of legal authority that Raz grounds in the

concept of exclusionary reasons, see Hurd, supra note 48.
168See ACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 230-322 (presenting "economy of virtue" account).
irli
It might be objected that Ackerman's idealized Median Voter would not vote in
favor of a statute delegating authority to some other body; she only enters politics to
formulate and vote based upon her own judgments. But this objection cuts the wrong
way, for, if it is true, it shows why the Safety Act does not bear the Plebiscitary Feature-which is where the Simple Extension needs to start. Whatever the details of
Ackerman's account, his basic idea that people reasonably conserve on their deliberative capital helps explain why voters, or idealized voters, might vote in favor of a delegation but not accept the agency's decision on every issue within the scope of that
delegation.
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neatly explains why a plebiscitary legislature might legitimately set up
an agency but then overrule particular agency rules that prompt citi7
zen outrage, without abolishing the agency itself1'
By contrast, the
exclusionary-reason account has real difficulty explaining this. Because that account infers the existence of an exclusionary reason covering all agency rules from the existence of reason to establish the
agency, then conversely it must infer the absence of reason to establish the agency from the absence of an exclusionary reason covering
even one rule (here, the repealed rule).
Second, even if we can infer that the idealized Median Voter
would recognize an exclusionary reason to vote in favor of the good
agency rule, such as the drug-testing rule in Skinner, it is not clear
whether the rule would thereby bear the same kind of potent Plebiscitary Feature that the Countermajoritarian Difficulty supposes statutes
bear. There might be a difference in democratic theory between voting direct reasons and voting exclusionary ones. The very point of a
proper plebiscite might be for a citizen's own deliberate, wellinformed, impartial judgment to bear upon lawmaking, not just her
judgment to ignore her own judgment-just as the very point of adjudicatory due process rights is, in part, for the participant herself to
play a role in the adjudicatory decision.'' A democratic theory that
denied this and maintained that agency rules issued under valuesstatutes, via exclusionary reasons, have just the same kind of democratic legitimacy as statutes, would thus have to deny that there is any
democratic difference between the scenario where the legislature
overturns a rule previously issued by an agency and the scenario
where an agency simply overturns its own rule. Relatedly, this kind of
theory would have to deny that there is any kind of democratic problem with delegation. If rules issued by agencies under authority delegated by plebiscitary legislatures are democratically equivalent to statutes issued directly by plebiscitary legislatures, what could the
problem be? This democratic theory would value plebiscites, and yet
would see unelected bodies (such as agencies) whose decisions may
170

See, e.g.,JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY

131-40 (1990) (describing how public outrage over the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's ignition interlock rule prompted Congress to override the
rule); KATHRyN HARRISON & GEORGE HOBERG, RISK, SCIENCE AND POLITICs: REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 77-98
(1994) (a case study of the saccharine episode, where an outraged public spurred
Congress to overturn the Food and Drug Administration's decision banning saccharine).
1 Seesources cited supra note 108.
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not directly warrant plebiscitary features as, nonetheless, fully democratic themselves.
These are some of the difficulties that an exclusionary-reason account would need to overcome. However, even if the difficulties can
be overcome, or some other account provided why the idealized Median Voter would be constrained to agree that the drug-testing rule is
safety-enhancing despite the indeterminacy of "safety," the Simple Extension remains false. Assume away this problem of indeterminacy;
assume that impartial, deliberate, well-informed citizens are not,
given those constraints, free to dispute that a truly safety-enhancing
rule such as the drug-testing rule in fact enhances safety. Even so, the
idealized Median Voter might vote for the Safety Act but against the
drug-testing rule, because she believes the rule to conflict with some
other value. Consensus among idealized citizens about the safety effects of the drug-testing rule would suffice to establish the Simple Extension only if the Safety Act accorded lexical priority to safety, but it
does not. The Act authorizes the FRA to "prescribe, as necessary, appropriaterules, regulations, orders, and standards for all areas of railroad safety." Typical for a values-statute, it qualifies its reference to
the prime value of "safety" through words such as "necessary,"
"appropriate," "reasonable" or "practicable"'7 - - words that permit
the FRA (and Median Voter) to consider (some) conflicting values.
Indeterminacy comprises only part of the reason why the Simple Extension is false in a regime of values-statutes; conflicting values comprise the other part. 7 3
The problem of conflicting values covers both nonconstitutional
and constitutional values; and these conflicting values might, in context, 74 be either incommensurable or overriding. Let us start with a
discussion of nonconstitutional overriding values (leaving the discussion of incommensurable values and constitutional values for later),
IV See Pierce,

Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 140, at 473-81

(describing how statutes standardly authorize or require agencies to consider multiple
values); see alsoExec. Order No. 12,866 § 1 (a), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprintedin 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1994) (generally enjoining agencies to consider the costs as well as the benefits
of regulation).

On value conflict in morality, see generally MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL
AND
CONFLICrING VALUES (1990) (describing the fact of plural and conflicting values in
morality). For a discussion with reference to law, see Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 852 (1994).
174 I say "in context," because the question here is how the different
values influence the Voter's and the agency's choices with respect to particular options before the
agency (here, the drug-testing rule or the status quo), not with respect to all options
on which those values might bear.
173
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for the analysis here simply duplicates and extends the analysis offered above. We are imagining that the positive safety benefits of the
rule are not, in fact, overridden by nonconstitutional values. That is,
with respect to the FRA's choice between enacting the rule and the
status quo ante, the FRA does not have an overriding nonconstitutional reason not to enact the rule. Such an overriding nonconstitutional reason might obtain, for example, if the drug-testing rule were
very expensive to implement-if implementing the rule consumed
considerable labor or material resources, the purchasing power of
which would otherwise be spread among railroad travellers, railroad
shareholders and railroad workers, and used by them to enhance
their well-being in various ways. But we are imagining that this is not
the case for the drug-testing rule. Leaving aside its Fourth Amendment difficulties, the rule's additional negative effects on the wellbeing of travellers, shareholders and workers are truly not significant
enough to override its positive, safety benefits; in short, the rule is
(nonconstitutionally) "appropriate." Even so, the idealized Median
Voter might disagree with the FRA about that. She might disagree
that monetized cost-benefit balancing'7 5 (a technique now standardly
used by federal administrative agencies to commensurate the various
values, other than constitutional values, bearing upon the rules they
enact176)

is indeed the right technique for deciding whether the drug-

17 SeeRichard Layard & Stephen Glaister, Introduction to COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 156 (Richard Layard & Stephen Glaister eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS] (offering a methodological overview of cost-benefit analysis); EDWARD M.
GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-CoST ANALYSIS 197-222 (1990) (engaging in a methodological discussion of cost-benefit analysis for social regulation); M.W. Jones-Lee, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra,at 290-319 (engaging in a methodological discussion of
cost-benefit analysis with respect to safety regulation); VISCUSI, supra note 164, at 1-74
(discussing methodology for valuing life-savings).
176 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (1994); BREYER, supra note 163, at 10-29 (defending the use of cost-benefit
analysis for risk regulation); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE
ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991) (describing the
use of cost-benefit balancing by regulatory agencies); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY
STATE 33-42 (1992) (advocating the general use of cost-benefit balancing by regulatory
agencies); Christopher M. Heimann et al., Project, The Impact of Cost-Benefit Analysis on
FederalAdministrativeLaw, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 545 (1990) (reviewing the history and the
use of cost-benefit analysis in federal administrative law); W. Kip Viscusi, The Dangers of
Unbounded Commitments to Regulate Risk, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING
BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION 135, 135-66 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996)
[hereinafter RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED] (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis for risk regulation).
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testing rule is nonconstitutionally "appropriate."' 77 Or, if she is a costbenefit balancer herself, she might vote against the rule on technical
grounds, because she (wrongly) believes that the rule's monetized social costs are greater than its monetized social benefits. An exclu-

sionary-reason account is likely even weaker here than for the initial
question of whether the rule enhances "safety," since the FRA is no
particular authority on balancing safety against other nonconstitu-

tional values.'
Incommensurability involves a different analysis. Suppose two
different values, P(rime) and C(onflicting), with P supporting one
option and C another. Moral theorists say that P and C are
"incommensurable" in this context if P neither overrides C nor does
C override P, so that there is no reason to choose one option over the
other, but neither are the two options of equal value. ' 7 If this seems a
little murky, it should. Incommensurability is still an infant subject in
moral theory and, even more, in legal scholarship about the administrative state. 80 But there is real plausibility to the claim that options
177

For critiques of cost-benefit balancing, apart from the specific issue of incom-

mensurability discussed below, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 93-99 (1996); David Copp, The Justice and
Rationale of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 23 THEORY & DECISION 65-87 (1987). For critiques
with specific reference to the use of cost-benefit analysis in regulation, see Lester B.
Lave, Benefit-Cost Analysis: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs?, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES
SAVED, supra note 176, at 104-34; Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis-An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1981, at 33. For a technical critique within welfare economics, see ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 262-72 (1984). For
a qualified defense, see Donald Hubin, The MoralJustificationof Benefit/Cost Analysis, 10
ECON. & PHIL. 169 (1994). For a general defense of the efficiency (i.e., potential Pareto) standard of which cost-benefit analysis is an application, see Richard Posner,
Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
178 The Office of Management and Budget is an authority
on value-balancing, or at
least monetized value-balancing, but because OMB does not intensively review all
agency rules, let alone agency decisions, with respect to costs and benefits, OMB's
authority cannot be generally imputed to the agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994); MCGARITY, supra note 176, at 27191 (describing OMB's role in reviewing the costs and benefits of agency rules).
1 For discussions of incommensurability in moral
theory, compare RAZ, supra
note 52, at 321-66 (arguing for the existence of incommensurability in this sense),
with Donald H. Regan, Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62
S. CAL L. REV. 995, 1056-75 (1989) (denying the existence of Razian incommensurability); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 44-64 (1993)
(discussing incommensurability); JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 75-92 (1986) (same).
180 See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 64-72 (1995) (discussing the significance of incommensurability for the
use of cost-benefit balancing in social regulation); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 834-43 (1994) (same); see also MARGARET
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for choice (the options for choice by a single person, charting her
own life, or the options for choice by a governmental agency or legislature, charting society's course) need not be ordered as better, worse
or exactly equal. Consider the drug-testing rule. If the rule enhances
safety and is costless to implement, then (leaving aside the Fourth
Amendment) there is sufficient reason to enact the rule. If the rule is
very expensive, then there is sufficient reason not to enact the rule. It
may further be the case that there is a unique intermediate level of
expense such that, at this level, the option of enacting the rule is precisely as good as the option of maintaining the status quo. But the
proponent of incommensurability says, instead, that there might be
an intermediate range of expense-levels where the two options of enacting the rule or maintaining the status quo are neither better, nor
worse, nor equally good. This is plausible, because it seems counterintuitive that a unique intermediate level of pure equality exists.
Take a level of expense that is $1 or $10 or $100 higher than the supposed unique intermediate level of pure equality: how could that
marginal $1 or $10 or $100 make the difference between it being socially indifferent
to enact the drug-testing rule, and it being socially
s
8
wrong?
If the proponent of incommensurability is correct, then there is a
further and, in a sense, deeper explanation for deviation between the
FRA's choice and the idealized Median Voter's, beyond factual or
evaluative disagreement. This explanation is deeper because it does
notjust flow from the Voter's or agency's epistemic deficits. It flows
from the true absence of reason for choice between options, an absence that even epistemically perfect Voters and administrators would
recognize. Imagine that the drug-testing rule truly enhances safety; it
is not sufficiently expensive that the status quo is a truly better option;

JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 184-205 (1996) (discussing the significance of

incommensurability for compensation practices in tort law).
181 See RAZ, supra note 52, at 328 ("[P]eople's judgments
of value are not very fine,
so that most options are surrounded by margins of incommensurability.... Imagine
that I am indifferent as between a walk in the park and a book with a glass of Scotch at
home. It is possible that though I will definitely prefer (a) the book with a glass of
port to (b) the book with Scotch, I am indifferent as between either and (c) a walk in
the park. This establishes that I regard (a) and (c) as incommensurate."). But see
TIMOTHYWILLIAMSON, VAGUENESS 8-9 (1994) (describing sorites paradoxes); id. at 3-4
(proposing an epistemic view of vagueness, exemplified by sorites paradoxes, such that
"[i]n cases of unclarity, statements remain true or false"). Sorites paradoxes are, seemingly, similar in structure to small-scale Razian incommensurability. See also Regan,

supra note 179, at 1061 (criticizing Razian incommensurability, and noting that options "can be hard to compare in practice without being incomparable in principle").
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and the rule is sufficiently expensive that the status quo is truly incommensurable. Assume, further, that the agency and the idealized
Voter recognize all of these truths. Even so, given a plausible set of
rules for how agencies and legislatures should resolve incommensurabilities, the agency and Voter might choose different outcomes. For
example, consider the plausible rule that the legislature is authorized
to choose at will between incommensurable options, while an agency
is not authorized to do so, but instead should choose the option that
is supported by its prime, statutory value (for the FRA, "safety"). This
rule builds upon the standard notion that elected bodies, such as
Congress and perhaps the Presidency, have a special role in making
,182
"value choices" -on my construal, in resolving incommensurabilities or true equalities-and that, conversely, it is illegitimate for agencies to make these choices. Given this rule, the FRA would be constrained to enact the drug-testing rule (apart from its Fourth
Amendment difficulties), while the idealized Voter who recognizes
its
83
true benefits and costs would still remain free to vote against it.

The final, least explored, and yet perhaps most important aspect
of the problem of value conflict for the Simple Extension concerns
constitutionalvalues. Imagine that all other gaps in the Simple Extension have been plugged. Idealized Median Voters agree that the
drug-testing rule reduces human deaths and injuries; they further
agree that it does so without breaching other overriding nonconstitutional values; and they do not vote against the rule merely because it
is incommensurable with the status quo (if it indeed is). Even so, the
rule is unjust. It violates an aspect of justice presumably covered by
Rawls's first principle 184 and, moreover, embodied in the Fourth
Amendment: the right to security from unreasonable government
searches and seizures.'8 5 Why, if this is true, should the idealized Me182

See, e.g., BORK, supra note 10, at 251-59 (asserting that legislatures, not courts,

properly have the role of choosing between values); ELY, supra note 6, at 48-54 (same);
Pierce, Constitutionaland Political Theory, supra note 140, at 503-23 (asserting that in an

administrative state, the Presidency, not courts, properly has the role of choosing between values).
183 How does the Voter decide which way to vote? Perhaps
the Voterjust picks. See
Regan, supra note 179, at 1063 ("It seems to me that at this point [of true incommensurability] it is perfectly appropriate to flip a coin.").
184 SeeRAWLS, LIBERALISM, supranote 72, at 291 ("[T]he equal basic
liberties in the
first principle ofjustice are specified by a list as follows: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the
freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally, the rights
and liberties covered by the rule of law.").
183U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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dian Voter vote in favor of the drug-testing rule? Why wouldn't she
reject the rule as unjust?
Before moving further, we should clarify an ambiguity in the
Simple Extension that might otherwise confuse this crucial problem
of the unjust rule. The Simple Extension, in the strong version we
are considering, states:
If an administrative rule, order or action is a good interpretation of a statute that bears the Plebiscitary Feature, the rule,
order or action also bears the Plebiscitary Feature; and it is
therefore unfair to invalidate this rule, order or action on the
mere grounds ofjustice.
One is tempted to say that the unjust drug-testing rule does not undermine the Simple Extension because the unjust rule is not a good
interpretation of the Safety Act. A good interpretation of a valuesstatute will take account of overriding values, particularly justice, and
since the drug-testing rule does not do that, the Simple Extension is
inapplicable. I think it is quite true that a good interpretation of a
values-statute will take account of overriding values, particularly aspects ofjustice (a point that is elaborated below); ' Gbut if the Simple
Extension means this by "good interpretation," it is a vacuous claim.
The Simple Extension, after all, is designed as an argument for judicial restraint-at a minimum, to show that "justice"does not comprise
sufficient grounds for judicial review. If unjust rules, orders or actions do not trigger the Simple Extension because they are "poor interpretations" of their governing statutes, the (minimum) practical
conclusion to the Simple Extension-that courts should not invalidate "good interpretations" as unjust-never comes into play. Therefore, the Simple Extension must be clarified as follows:
If a statute bears the Plebiscitary Feature, and an administrative rule, order or action is an otherwise proper interpretation
of the statute (apart from the values of justice),"' then the
186

See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
"apart from the values ofjustice," I mean apart from the values ofjustice qua

187 By

criteria bearing on constitutionality. For example, "health" may be an aspect of wellbeing mininimally protected by the Constitution, if one indeed believes that the Constitution protects welfare rights. See infra text accompanying notes 380-85. But if a
statute authorized some regulatory agency to promulgate rules to insure the "health"
of workers, for example, I would not count a court's decision invalidating that agency's
rules because the rules were insufficiently connected to the statutory "health" goal, as
an act of constitutional review. In that sort of case, "health" provides a basis for the
judicial decision quite apart from its constitutional status. Cf Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in ConstitutionalLawOrbits, 79 VA. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1993) (discussing statutes that
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rule, order or action also bears the Plebiscitary Feature; and it
would be unfair for a court to invalidate the rule, order or acdon on the mere grounds ofjustice.
This is the nonvacuous formulation of the Simple Extension, and it is
false.
The Simple Extension, thus formulated, is false because the idealized Median Voter's decision to vote in favor of the Safety Act, over
the status quo, does not involve a further judgment with respect to
the conflict between safety and that aspect of justice (security) violated by the unjust drug-testing rule. The Median Voter might reasonably and consistently vote in favor of the Act but against the safetyenhancing, cost-effective rule (otherwise a proper interpretation of
the Act) just because the rule is unjust. What makes the safety case
different from the war-protest case 'ss is the internal inconsistency of
these two hypothetical votes in the war-protest case. The war-protest
case, again, is this: an agency enters an order fining a war protester
who has burnt a flag, pursuant to a statute that prohibits "burn[ing] a
flag of the United States." Here, the Voter's decision to enact the
flag-burning statute does seem to involve a judgment covering precisely that aspect of justice-free speech-implicated by the warprotest order. It is hard to see how the properly idealized legislator
or Median Voter could conscientiously vote in favor of the flagburning statute without considering whether (and deciding in the affirmative that) the national-unity aim behind the statute justifies a
prohibition on precisely that type of action encompassing all the relevant aspects ofjustice that arise in the particular case of the war protester, viz., flag-burning-as-political speech.
I am advancing a dual suggestion here. First, the proponent of
the Simple Extension might try to defend her claim through a theory
of "conscientious legislation," which will explain why certain rules, orders or actions bear Plebiscitary Features. Second, however, no plausible theory of conscientious legislation will explain why the drugtesting rule bears the Plebiscitary Feature. The idea of conscientious
legislation, advanced by scholars such as Paul Brest and Lawrence
Sager, is that legislators have an obligation to consider the constitutional issues raised by statutes they enact.8 9
As Brest puts
"utilize the language of the Constitution itself, or, what is more typical of recent examples, the language ofjudicial gloss on the Constitution" (footnote omitted)).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
189

See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide, supra note 53, at 585-89 (1975)

(arguing that legislators are obliged to consider constitutional norms); Sager, supra
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it: "[L]egislators are obligated to determine, as best they can, the
constitutionality of proposed legislation."'90 A theory of conscientious
legislation would flesh out the contours of this (supposed) obligation.
It would specify which types of constitutional problems (for our purposes, conflicts with justice) the conscientious legislator or Median
Voter ought to have considered before enacting the statute-thus
precluding the Median Voter's hypothetical disapproval of those particular statutory instances characterized by a type of constitutional
problem (injustice) that the Median Voter ought to have considered.
Thereby, the theory of conscientious legislation would explain why
certain applications of statutes, such as the war-protest order, bear
Plebiscitary Features. The Median Voter cannot disapprove the order,
qua unjust, because she ought to have considered (and decided
against) giving decisive weight to the relevant aspect of justice
(speech) before voting in favor of the flag-burning statute. Perhaps
we might say that the legislator or Median Voter must resolve those
constitutional issues that arise in the "ordinary application" of the
statute.' 9 ' A prohibition on flag-burning "ordinarily" implicates free
speech (or so we intuit); it does not ordinarily implicate religious
freedom. So enacting the flag-burning statute involves a judgment
with respect to conflicts between national unity and free speech,
which subsumes all the morally relevant features of the order against
the war protester; but not ajudgment, say, with respect to the conflict
between national unity and religious freedom that would arise if the
flag-burning statute were applied to an iconoclast religious sect, which
burns flags so as to affirm God's supremacy and condemn the "icons,"
including symbolic flags, that epitomize human vanity.'92
Obviously, this is rough and intuitive. I neither need nor wish to
develop a specific theory of conscientious legislation that explicates
our intuitive verdict that the war-protest order bears the Plebiscitary

note 37, at 1220-28 (same).
190Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide, supra note 53, at 587.
191See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36
n.144 (1996) (discussing the importance of "prototypical cases" for human reasoning).
IP2Cf NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (construing National Labor
Relations Act to avoid constitutional question raised, under Religion Clauses, by assertion of Labor Board jurisdiction over parochial schools); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) (construing Federal Unemployment Tax Act to avoid constitutional question raised, under Religion Clauses, by
requiring parochial schools to pay unemployment compensation taxes); infra text accompanying notes 211-12 (discussing connection between applicability of Avoidance
Canon and scope of duty of conscientious legislation).
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Feature. 3 Rather, the ultimate point here is that even under seemingly plausible theories of conscientious legislation, such as the
"ordinary application" theory, the idealized legislator or Median
Voter could enact the FRA's Safety Act without considering the conflict between safety and that aspect ofjustice (security) implicated by
the drug-testing rule. The legislator or Median Voter could conscientiously direct the FRA to enhance safety without considering whether,
let alone affirmatively determining that, safety overrides the right to
security protected by the Fourth Amendment.'9 4 To explain why the
drug-testing rule must bear the Plebiscitary Feature, we would need a
considerably more rigorous theory of conscientious legislation. At
the extreme, a maximally rigorous theory of conscientious legislation
would say that the idealized legislator or Median Voter cannot conscientiously vote for a statute unless she believes that no otherwise
proper application of the statute is unjust. This extreme theory
would mean, for example, that enacting a values-statute generally directing the agency to enhance some value, such as "safety," involves
the judgment that every value-enhancing rule '9 5 also satisfies the First
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and all
other constitutional aspects of justice. This is deeply implausiblenot the least because there exists a special institution devoted to such
constitutional questions, the federal courts, which can perform the very
function of invalidating otherwise proper applications of properly enacted statutes. ' J9
These issues have been almost completely ignored by the literature on judicial restraint. They are issues that emerge only once the
traditional approach, which conflates judicial review with the review
of statutes, is rejected and judicial review instead is properly understood to extend more broadly to include the review of administrative
rules, orders and actions. The whole apparatus of the Countermajori13 If that intuitive verdict about the war-protest order is wrong,
all the worse for
the Simple Extension.
194 I suggest that the right to security is not implicated by "ordinary"
applications
of the Safety Act, even assuming we can develop a theory of conscientious legislation
that makes rigorous the notion of "ordinary." "Ordinary" railroad safety rules (rules
requiring railroads to have certain safety devices, or to take various safety precautions)
do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.
195More specifically, every value-enhancing rule that is also appropriate in
light of
relevant nonconstitutional values.
19 See Michael C. Dorf, IncidentalBurdens on FundamentalRights, 109
HARv. L. REv.
1175, 1176 (1996) (discussing government regulation "that does not, on its face, regulate protected conduct, but that has the incidental effect of burdening a right to engage in such conduct under some circumstances").
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tarian Difficulty, which theorists of judicial restraint have labored to
construct, shows only this: if the legislature's vote to enact a statute
involves some judgment J about the Constitution (for example, that
national unity overrides free speech), then it is unfair for a court to
reach and give effect to a contradictory judgment. JudgmentJ would
be the outcome of a hypothetical plebiscite and it is unfair to invalidate proper plebiscites because majority rule has intrinsic value, or so
the proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty argues. However, we also need a complementary theory, what I have called a theory of conscientious legislation, to explain which judgments about the
Constitution a statute's enactment should be taken to involve-for it
is only with respect to those judgments that the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, even if true, is relevant. If constitutional judgment K is not
involved in the statute's enactment-if a conscientious Median Voter
need not agree with K by virtue of her decision to vote in the statute's
favor-then a judicial decision that overrides K is not countermajoritarian.
This neglected possibility is illustrated, most saliently, by a valuesstatute such as the Safety Act. The judgment K that a particular
safety-enhancing rule such as the drug-testing rule comports with justice and the Constitution, despite its infringement upon the right to
security protected by the Fourth Amendment, is not a judgment that
the Median Voter must necessarily have reached, under the proper
norms of conscientious legislation, before enacting the Safety Act.
But precisely the same limitation on the Countermajoritarian Difficulty also arises under rules-statutes, indeed determinaterules-statutes,
as is demonstrated by the case of the iconoclast flag-burning church
or, less fancifully, by the following example.
RitualDrug Use Hypothetical
An anti-drug law is passed by Congress, prohibiting the use of
listed drugs, at Time T,. Marijuana is on the list. The use of
marijuana is a central ritual for a small, genuine church. The
Drug Enforcement Administration directs the church at Time
T 2 to cease using marijuana, and applies to a federal court for
enforcement of this order. The church claims
in its defense
197
that the order violates its free exercise rights.
Let us assume the idealized and conscientious Median Voter

197

Cf Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890

(1990) (rejecting Free Exercise Clause claim against application of general state drug

law to sacramental use of peyote).
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reaches the following judgment at Time T1, the time the statute is enacted: "There are good grounds for prohibiting some act-type A
(marijuana use or flag burning); because these grounds are conclusive in most instances of that act-type, the norms of conscientious legislation permit me to vote in favor of a rules-statute prohibiting A."
Yet, without inconsistency, she might still reach the following judgment at Time T 2, the time the agency's order is entered: "It is clear
that act-type A includes as an instance the particular action P (an action of sacramental marijuana use, or iconoclast flag burning) targeted by this order; yet P implicates a value of justice (religious freedom) that overrides the grounds behind my vote in favor of the rulesstatute prohibiting act-type A; and so an order against P ought not be
issued." The Median Voter might vote in favor of the general statute
prohibiting act-type A, but againstan order prohibiting P. Even if the
determinate rules-statute prohibiting A bears the Plebiscitary Feature,
the unjust order prohibiting P need not.
2. A Weak Simple Extension?
This last flaw in the strong Simple Extension of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty-that the Median Voter might herself vote against
the drug-testing rule because it violates the very aspect of justice
(security) that the strong Simple Extension seeks to render unenforceable-also dooms any weaker version of the argument. A weaker
version would say something like this: "Although an administrative
rule, order or action that properly interprets a statute (apart from the
values ofjustice) does not bear the Plebiscitary Feature, it is nonetheless unfair for a court to invalidate the rule, etc., because interpretation is the fairest process for elaborating statutes." But if the drugtesting rule is indeed unjust and, further, if the rule does not bear the
Plebiscitary Feature because the underlying statute's enactment
should not be taken to involve a judgment with respect to the aspect
of justice (security) that the rule violates, why say that the rule is a
good interpretation of the Safety Act? Why not say, instead, that the
rule is otherwise proper but ultimately illegal under the Act because it
violates an overriding constitutional value that properly figures in the
interpretation of the Act? A weaker version of the Simple Extension,
in the case of a values-statute such as the Safety Act, would have to
show either that (a) the statute must be interpreted to give lexical
priority to its prime value, over all others; or (b) nonconstitutional
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overriding values but not constitutional overriding values properly
figure in the interpretation of the statute. The first is implausible,'95
the second even more so. Thus, it is hard to see how invalidating a
rule such as the drug-testing rule could be unfair even under the
weak Simple Extension.
More generally, one would want to say that the criteria bearing on
constitutionality figure in the best interpretation of statutes. A rule,
order or action that is otherwise proper under a statute which (let us
assume) bears the Plebiscitary Feature, may well be a poor interpretation of the statute, all things considered, just because it violates the
best understanding of the criteria bearing on constitutionality. This
is not a novel idea; it is reflected in the eminent canon of statutory interpretation, that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional
difficulties. Let us call this the Avoidance Canon. The Avoidance
Canon is one of the oldest, and arguably the most important, of the
interpretive canons that the Supreme Court employs.'O' As the Court
explained in Edward.. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Buildingand
Construction Trades Council, the leading case on the Avoidance Canon:
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute
to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress. This cardinal principle has its roots in ChiefJustice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Murry v. The CharmingBetsy, and
has for so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate.200
Where the Avoidance Canon applies-where a court invalidates a
rule, order or action violating some constitutional criterion C as a
poor interpretation of the underlying statute, just in virtue of violating C-the weak version of the Simple Extension falls apart. For, in
such a case, the best interpretation of the statute (bearing the Plebi,,8 See supra note 172 (an agency elaborating a values-statute is typically authorized

to consider competing values).

199See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Larmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599 (1992)
(describing the Avoidance Canon as "[p]robably the most important of the constitutionally based canons [of statutory construction]").
200 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citations omitted). For more recent reaffirmations of
the Avoidance Canon, see, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491 (1995) ("[W]e
have rejected agency interpretations to which we would otherwise defer where they
raise serious constitutional questions."); United States v. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct.
464, 472 (1994) ("It is ... incumbent upon us to read'the statute to eliminate [serious
constitutional] doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress."). For a further discussion of the Avoidance Canon, and particularly its
"serious constitutional doubts" component, see infra Part II.D.
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scitary Feature) is not the rule, order or action; rather, it is the court's
decision to invalidate the rule, order or action. The interpretive
pedigree of the rule, order or action does not generate a reason for
restraint, even weakly (as the weak Simple Extension would claim),
since the rule, order or action (all things considered) loses its interpretive pedigree by violating C.
As a stark example of the Avoidance Canon at work, consider the
Court's decision in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop.20' Catholic Bishop involved
the National Labor Relations Act, which generally grants the Labor
Board jurisdiction over "employers. 2 The Board had asserted jurisdiction over a group of parochial schools that employed lay teachers
and had issued orders against the schools requiring them to engage
203
The Supreme
in collective bargaining with the teachers' unions.
Court held that these orders were invalid, but not because the Labor
Act was unconstitutional "as applied" in conferring jurisdiction over
religious "employers" (such as parochial schools). Rather, the Court
held them invalid because the term "employer" was best interpreted,
in accordance with the Avoidance Canon, as exempting parochial
schools:
[I]n the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to bring
teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the

Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn
call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions 4arising
out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
CatholicBishop lies at the very boundaries of the Avoidance Canon.
The opinion was controversial at the time it was decided 205 and remains controversial today2 ° because the otherwise proper interpretation of the Labor Act that the Avoidance Canon defeated was not
open to reasonable disagreement, as a matter of ordinary English: a
parochial school is still an employer, in ordinary English. This controversy, however, concerns the scope of the Avoidance Canon, and
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
M 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a), 152(2) (1994).
203 See CatholicBishop, 440 U.S. at 493-94.
204 Id. at 507.
20. See id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A statute is not 'a nose of wax to be
201

changed from that which the plain language imports .... '" (citing Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500,518 (1926))).
206 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1066 (1989) (criticizing Catholic Bishop as a case where "public values" were
wrongly invoked "to trump a clear text and supportive legislative history," and thus as
"inconsistent with legislative supremacy").
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not its soundness. As the otherwise proper interpretation becomes
indeterminate, 7 the controversy evaporates. DeBartolo's black letter
formulation seems to make indeterminacy both necessary and sufficient for the Canon's applicability: "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.""8 The Supreme
Court routinely employs the Canon to strike down otherwise proper
("otherwise acceptable") rules, orders or actions, where the underlying statutes are taken to be less determinate than in Catholic Bishop;
these cases comprise the hard core of the Avoidance Canon.'
Values-statutes lie at the very center of this hard core. If the Avoidance
Canon has any scope at all, it means that judicial invalidation of a
value-maximizing rule, order or action should count as an interpretation, not
as an "as-applied" invalidation, of the underlying values10
2

statute.

The Avoidance Canon thus supports my claim that the criteria
bearing on constitutionality figure in the best interpretation of statutes, at least where statutes are otherwise taken to be indeterminate.
More precisely, I would suggest the following: the criteria bearing on
constitutionality figure in the best interpretation of statutes where (a)
courts have no independent restraintist reason to refrain from enforcing these criteria; (b) the right theory of conscientious legislation
does not preclude their figuring thus; and (c) the right background

207

By

"indeterminate"

here,

I

intend

the

modest,

relativized sense

of

"indeterminacy" used throughout this Article, meaning the permissible disagreement
among interpreters left open by deliberative constraints that do not require omniscience, not the actual absence of truth. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
208 EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf
Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (emphasis added).
209 See generally Zeppos, supra note 132, at 309-12, 335-45 (documenting the Court's
frequent use of the Avoidance Canon).
In light of the Avoidance Canon, and particularly its "serious constitutional
doubts" component, the following comment byJohn Ely is astounding:
In interpreting a statute... a court obviously will limit itself to a determination of the purposes and prohibitions expressed by or implicit in its language.
Were a judge to announce in such a situation that he was not content with
those references and intended additionally to enforce, in the name of the
statute in question, those fundamental values he believed America had always
stood for, we would conclude that he was not doing his job, and might even

consider a call to the lunacy commission.
ELY, supra note 6, at 3. For dramatic counterexamples to Ely's claim, see Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958), discussed below at text accompanying notes 287-94.
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theory of statutory interpretation does not preclude their figuring
thus. 1 We have already discussed the problem of conscientious legislation. As for the last problem, concerning theories of statutory interpretation, let me merely note that different theories might give
constitutional criteria a more or less significant role in the interpretive process. For example, a textualist theory might permit constitutional criteria to figure in interpretation only where the ordinary English meaning of the statute's text is indeterminate (thus ruling out a
case like Catholic Bishop). By contrast, a "legal process" or "natural
law" theory might permit courts to invalidate rules, orders or actions
as poor interpretations regardless of textual determinacy.
At the
extreme, what draws the boundary between interpretation and statutory invalidation is the notion of conscientious legislation; whatever
your theory of statutory interpretation, you should not count a judicial decision entirely nullifying a statute's legal force as an interpretation rather than a facial invalidation.
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to defend either a particular theory of conscientious legislation, or a particular theory of
statutory interpretation. What I do propose is that the proper theories, whatever they are, will at least permit constitutional criteria to
figure in statutory interpretation in a case such as Skinner. Where an
agency issues a rule, order or action under a pervasively indeterminate values-statute such as the Safety Act-pervasively indeterminate
under any plausible set of deliberative constraints-and this rule, order or action violates the best understanding of the criteria bearing
211

It should be noted, further, that the Avoidance Canon is crucial to the ability of

agencies to consider constitutional issues themselves. There is a presumptive rule that
"'adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments [is] beyond the
jurisdiction of administrative agencies.'" Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S.

200, 215 (1994) (quoting Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1974)); see also
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 744 n.1 (1988) (stating this rule); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975) (same); Note, The Authority of Administrative
Agencies to Considerthe Constitutionalityof Statutes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684-93 (1977)
(analyzing this rule). If constitutional criteria simply overrode statutory outcomes,
rather than figuring in the best interpretation of statutes, an agency would be violating
this rule whenever it considered a constitutional issue, outside the special case of explicit statutory incorporation. See Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("[An] agency may be influenced by constitutional considerations in the way it interprets ... statutes [but] it does not have jurisdiction to declare statutes unconstitutional."); NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: ELECTED GOVERNMENT,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE ABORTION DEBATE 33-38 (1996) (discussing the pervasiveness of executive-branch interpretation of the Constitution).
212 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 107-206 (describing
possible theories of statutory interpretation).
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on constitutionality (such that courts have no independent reason to
refrain from enforcing these criteria), a court's invalidation of the

rule, order or action should count as an interpretation of the valuesstatute. That is what the Avoidance Canon doctrine suggests. At least
in a regime of values-statutes, the weak version of the Simple Extension will not work.

3. Reviving Nondelegation?
Would reviving the nondelegation doctrine repair the flaws in the
Simple Extension (strong or weak) identified here? 13 To that query,
we might respond, first, that we live in a constitutional world where
the nondelegation doctrine remains dead, 2 4 and it is for this world
that we need a theory ofjudicial restraint.25 If this response does not
213 Prominent works in the ongoing scholarly debate about reviving the nondelegation doctrine, besides Ely's, include: KENNETH DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
(1969); THEODOREJ. LOWl, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); SCHOENBROD, supra note
29; Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1982); Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); and Symposium, The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus of the
AdministrativeAgencies, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1987).
214 The Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since
the
New Deal. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 140, § 2.6, at 66. Instead, the Court has
upheld a variety of open-ended statutes over nondelegation challenges. See Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) ("[Since 1935] we have upheld... without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate power under broad standards." (citing cases)).
The Court has occasionally relied on the nondelegation doctrine in interpreting statutes-as per the Avoidance Canon-to invalidate certain kinds of agency decisions.
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (construing statute, in light of nondelegation doctrine, to protect Fifth Amendment right-of-travel); Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(construing statute, in light of nondelegation doctrine, to preclude OSHA from issuing a standard for benzene without finding a "significant risk" of toxicity, given the
enormous costs that eliminating all toxicity risk would involve); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974) (construing statute, in light of
nondelegation doctrine and congressional power to tax, not to authorize agency imposition of tax). But the Court has not invoked the doctrine in this way to limit indeterminacy as such; and indeed the applications in Kent and Industrial Union are quite
helpful to my thesis, for these cases exemplify how conflicting values (in Kent, constitutional values) are brought to bear on agency decisions under the rubric of statutory
interpretation. See supra Part II.A.2 (relying on the Avoidance Canon to argue against
Simple Extensions); infra Part II.D (same).
I Similarly, the New Deal Court might have been wrong to depart from the
old

Commerce Clause cases, and permit the growth of a large federal government, see
Lawson, supra note 27, at 1233-34; in the pre-New Deal world, Congress passed many
fewer statutes, and the acute version of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, posed by
judicial review of national statutes, was less important; still, constitutional scholars
since Bickel have theorized, quite rightly, about the acute version.
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persuade, however, a second, more trenchant answer can be
given: no plausible nondelegation doctrine would salvage the Simple
Extension. The flaws identified above are epitomized by a case like
Skinner,but are not restricted to that sort of case.
On this score, there is a significant and hitherto ignored footnote
in Democracy and Distrust, in which Ely briefly adverts to the problem
of extending his restraintist claims into the administrative state:
In general this book is written against the paradigm ofjudicial review
of a decision ultimately traceable to legislative action. To the extent
that a case involves the decision of a government employee who is not
effectively subject to the direction or control of elected officials, the
mantle of "democratic decision" is correspondingly less appropriate,
and at least some of this book's arguments are correspondingly attenuated.... I shall be suggesting in Chapter 5, however, that such failures
of accountability are properly regarded as constitutional defects in their
own right and thus number among the things courts should be actively
engaged in correcting.216

Ely's "suggestion" in Chapter Five is that the nondelegation doctrine
be revived:
[Bly refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic
republic....
... Courts thus should ensure not only that administrators follow
those legislative policy directions that do exist-on that proposition
2 17
there is little disagreement-but also that such directions are given.

This suggestion, together with the quoted footnote, implies both
a concession by Ely that the Simple Extension does not hold true under a regime of broadly delegated power, and a claim that it would
hold true if statutes were less open-ended.
What delegation
"attenuates," Ely implicitly asserts, is the Simple Extension. Why read
him as asserting that delegation attenuates the Simple Extension,
rather than arguments for judicial restraint independent of statutory
pedigree? Because the problem of delegation concerns the very
tightness of the interpretive connection between statutes, on the one
hand, and the rules and orders issued or actions taken under those
statutes. (By contrast, one can readily imagine institutional structures, such as a Plebiscitary Presidency with broad and effective oversight powers, whose features would generate restraintist grounds for
216

ELY, supra note 6, at 4 n.* (citation omitted).

217

Id. at 132-33.
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limiting judicial review regardless of, indeed because of, broad statutory delegations. 28 The epistemic or democratic features of agencies
that argue for restraint could be uncorrelated, or even negatively correlated, with the strength of the nondelegation doctrine.) A revived
nondelegation doctrine, Ely implicitly claims, would tighten the interpretive connection and thereby ensure that rules, orders or actions
bear the Plebiscitary Feature (or something like that) just because
statutes do. I will argue that Ely is wrong.
Let us take up Ely's suggestion and try to construct a nondelegation doctrine sufficiently strong to repair the Simple Extension. First,
of course, our revived doctrine would need to prohibit the valuesstatutes that are, now, typical features of the administrative
state: statutes that authorize agencies to define the substantive obligations and entitlements of citizens pursuant to open-ended values
such as "health," "safety," "competition" or even (in the case of the
FCC) the "public convenience, interest or necessity." 21 9 Instead, every
substantive obligation or entitlement of a citizen would need to be
traceable to some rule enacted by Congress in a statute. But this
would hardly be enough. Statutory rules, after all, can be indeterminate, too, relative to whatever plausible deliberative constraints we
impose-in particular, relative to the constraints that we impose on
voters in our hypothetical idealized plebiscite. This is the modest implication of H.L.A. Hart's famous "no vehicle may be taken into the
park" example. 0 Our revived doctrine, then, would need to preclude indeterminate rules-statutes as well as values-statutes, for otherwise idealized Median Voters might still disagree about the best understanding of the statutory rules. But this now-robust doctrine
would still be fatally incomplete. The substantive obligations or entitlements of citizens ("don't burn flags," "don't develop your wetlands," "widows but not widowers receive social security benefits") are
hardly the only source of constitutional claims. The Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and (lest we forget) the "public employee speech" component of the First Amendment (to give only the
leading examples) are also implicated by the "internal" or

218 See infra text accompanying notes 327-34 (discussing Plebiscitary Presidency).
219

See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994) (empowering the FCC to regulate radio stations "as

public convenience, interest or necessity requires").
-" See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 124-36 (2d ed. 1994) (describing "the
open texture of law"); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 13-47 (1994) (discussing
indeterminacy of textualist as well as legislative-intention and -purpose approaches to
statutory interpretation).
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"procedural" choices that agencies make. Even if our rule-statute
says, with apparent determinacy, that "No person shall burn a flag of
the United States," the statute does not tell us, for example, how the
agency should go about policing violations of the statute;2' or how it
should structure its proceedings for imposing civil penalties; or how
it should maintain internal discipline among agency employees, some
of whom may wish to speak out in favor of the cause that the flagburners support. Presumably, the agency makes these "procedural"
or "internal" choices by deciding (within constitutional constraints
and the constraints of nonconstitutional overriding values) what
choices Will minimize violations of the statutory rule; but what those
choices should be is no more determinate than it is for the choices
left open to agencies by values-statutes. 4
Our revived nondelegation doctrine would thus need to require
that a statute provide determinate guidance for every (constitutionally
significant) rule, order or action that an agency issues or takes. We
would, then, have statutes that specified, in detail, the inspection,
search and arrest protocols that agencies should employ; or the procedural rules governing all of the agency's legal interactions with individual persons that fall under the broad rubric of current procedural due process doctrine; or the criteria for taking adverse
'221
See Kreimer,

supra note 132, at 68 (empirical study of constitutional litigation in
the Supreme Court and federal district courts, finding that "[a)t the trial level, claims
of constitutional violation in published opinions involve police as actors more than
twice as often as the Supreme Court, in 75 cases, representing 17.5% of the sample").
= See id. at 44-45 (finding that "claims of administrative due process violations,
which appeared in only 3% of the nonlegislative cases in the Supreme Court, constituted the largest category of claims at the trial court level").
M" See id. at 46 (finding that "[t]he trial court's First
Amendment caseload outside
of the legislative arena is not characterized by the great confrontations between government and media. Almost half of [these First Amendment] cases involve claims by
public employees alleging retaliatoryjob actions for criticism of their employers.").
See Mashaw, supra note 213, at 96-97. Mashaw writes:
While most discussions of the nondelegation doctrine focus on the question
of substantive criteria for decision, establishing criteria is but one aspect of
policy discretion. In the formation of regulatory policy, for example, at least
the following general types of questions have to be answered: What subjects
are to be on the regulatory agenda? What are their priorities? ...What are
the priorities for the utilization of enforcement machinery with respect to
adopted policies? What are the rules and procedures by which the relevant
facts about the application of legal rules will be found? ...If violations are
found, what corrective action or remedies will be prescribed?
Id.; see also Pierce, PoliticalAccountability and Delegated Power,supra note 140, at 398-403

(describing drastic changes that a nondelegation doctrine requiring determinacy
would bring).

1997]

BEYOND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIANDIFFICULTY

843

employment actions against agency staffers. This would be silly; no
far.2
advocate of a revived nondelegation doctrine goes nearly this
Ely's proposal is typical. He writes:
[T]he nondelegation doctrine, even at its high point, never insisted
either on more detail than was feasible or that matters be settled with
more permanence than the subject matter would allow. Policy direction
is all that was ever required,
• and
226 policy direction is what is lacking in
much contemporary legislation.

Ely concludes that "[t]he problem [lies] in a propensity [of legislators] not to make politically controversial decisions-to leave them
instead to others, most often others who are not elected or effectively
controlled by those who are."227 Ely seems to be proposing that (1)
statutes may not invite or require agencies to choose between incommensurables, or otherwise fail to provide agencies with an objective and knowable standard for their decisions; and perhaps that (2)
statutes may not contain some indeterminacy merely because of Congress's cowardice. The first part of this proposal is all that traditional
nondelegation doctrine required. As the Court stated in the leading
pre-New Deal case: "If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligibleprinciple to which the person or body authorized to [make
an administrative decision] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."228 Both parts
of Ely's proposal, together, do not even seem to eliminate valuesstatutes, let alone require a determinate scheme for specifying all the
various constitutionally significant rules, orders or actions that agencies issue or take.
A super-strong nondelegation doctrine that required this sort of
global precision, or even a doctrine that required determinate rulesstatutes, would be silly for three reasons. First, there is no good
originalist warrant for such requirements. Neither the Constitution's
grant of "[a]ll legislative Powers" to Congress in Article I, Section 1,
nor any other possible textual basis for a nondelegation doctrine, can
plausibly be understood to mean (in modem or Framers' English), or

David Schoenbrod, the most vigorous scholarly proponent of a nondelegation
doctrine, would permit rules-statutes as long as the rules were "meaningful," granting
that "meaningful" rules would still need "interpretation." ScHOENBROD, supra note 29,
at 182.
226 ELY, supra note 6, at 133.
227 Id. at 134.
22
J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (emphasis
added).
2-5
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to have been intended by its Framers to mean, that Congress may enact only such statutes that have sufficient specificity to preclude any
disagreement among reasonable interpreters.M
Second, it is far from clear that a strong or even a weak nondelegation doctrine would be a good thing.2 0 Abolishing or eviscerating
federal governance overall might be a good thing. Given federal power
to govern some aspect of our common life, however, the relative superiority of congressional as opposed to administrative governance
(say, with presidential supervision) is hardly obvious and is hotly contested.
Third, and finally, determinacy is not enough. I have identified a
whole host of separate problems with the strong or weak Simple Extension of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. These include incommensurability, the limits of conscientious legislation, and the role of
constitutional criteria in shaping the best interpretation of statutes.
To repair these flaws in the Simple Extension, we would need, not
just an implausibly vigorous nondelegation doctrine, but accompanying theories of conscientious legislation, statutory interpretation, and
a response to the problem of incommensurability, so as to ensure that
unjust rules, orders or actions nonetheless bear Plebiscitary Features,
or at least count as proper interpretations, despite their injustice and
despite the possible existence of incommensurable alternatives. This
is a tall order indeed, and one that I do not think Ely could possibly
fill. Ely is doubly wrong: both in thinking that we could solve the
problem of indeterminacy through a plausible nondelegation doctrine, and in thinking that indeterminacy is the only problem in extending the Countermajoritarian Difficulty to the administrative state.
B. Other Legislature-CenteredArguments

The flaws identified here are not peculiar to the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. In general, even if a particular legislature-centered
argument truly identifies some restraintist reason sufficient to limit
See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 140, at 66 (noting that "[t]he Court probably
was mistaken from the outset in interpreting Article I's grant of power to Congress as
an implicit limit on Congress' authority to delegate legislative power. The first Congress ... delegated legislative power to the President by authorizing the grant of licenses to trade with the Indian tribes 'under such rules and regulations as the President shall prescribe.'").
23 See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 28, at 113-36 (1989) (defending
delegation);
Mashaw, supra note 213 (same); Rubin, supra note 140, at 408-26 (same); Stewart, supra
note 140; at 323.
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(some aspect of) the practice of judicial invalidation of statutes, constitutional reviewing courts will not have reason to refrain from invalidating rules, orders and actions, merely by virtue of the statutory
pedigree of these rules, orders or actions. In short, legislaturecentered restraintist arguments generally lack Simple Extensions. This
is, necessarily, a suggestion rather than an absolute pronouncement.
The feature of legislatures identified by a legislature-centered argument might, in theory, be the elected status of legislators,3' or some
232
or some combination of features; and this
non-electoral feature,
feature, or combination, might require restraint for an epistemic,
democratic, or some other kind of reason. Short of considering each
of these possible permutations, we cannot be sure that each and every
Simple Extension will fail. But there is good reason to believe that, in
general, they will.
Let us consider an example: the legislature-centered argument
put forward by James B. Thayer in his 1893 article, The Origin and
23
Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw.
This famous article is generally taken to be the origin of the modem debate about judicial review; it is from Origin and Scope that The Least DangerousBranch
and the literature that Bickel's work in turn generated, ultimately
stem.2" Thayer described and defended a plactice of restraint for
courts of constitutional review in a way that no scholar before him
had done. His claim was that, customarily, and justifiably so, courts
reviewing statutes conformed to the following "rule of administration-:2 s
[A court] can only disregard [i.e., invalidate] the Act when those
who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but
have made a very clear one,-so clear that it is not open to rational
question. That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legisla-

253 See

infra note 335.
infra text accompanying notes 336-89.
23 7 HARV. L. REV. 129
(1893).
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1983) (describing Thayer's article as "the most influential essay ever written
on American constitutional law"); Sager, supra note 37, at 1222 (describing the work as
"an important intellectual fount of the judicial restraint thesis"); see also BIcKEL, supra
note 1, at 35 (Thayer's article is "a singularly important piece of American legal schol232 See

arship"); GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 51-52 (1994)

(describing Thayer's influence on Hand); Wallace Mendelson, The Influence offames B.
Thayer upon the Work ofHolmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter,31 VAND. L. REV. 71 (1978).
Thayer, supra note 233, at 144.
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tive Acts ....
23r'

Note the legislature-centered focus here: Thayer quite clearly describes a practice that involves, at least in the first instance, the review
of statutes.237 This practice has come to be known as "minimalism."
Minimalism requires that an act of Congress not be invalidated unless

"clearly" unconstitutional.2

The merits of minimalism continue to

provoke scholarly interest, and restraintist scholars continue to de-

fend it.239 Thayer's work is not only of historical interest, as the backdrop for The Least Dangerous Branch and modem controversies about

the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. It also remains of importance in
its own right, as a canonical text for the healthy scholarly literature
addressed specifically to minimalism. 240

Why minimalism? Why, for Thayer, were courts obliged to employ a "clear error" standard in reviewing statutes? Part of the richness of Thayer's article is its ambiguity; his defense of minimalism
might be interpreted in (at least) four different ways. First, Thayer
might have meant to defend minimalism on analytic grounds. On

the analytic construal of minimalism, the proper criteria bearing on
constitutionality are essentially procedural, not substantive; a given
statute fully satisfies these criteria as long as the legislators who
promulgated the statute were sufficiently impartial, reasonable, and

so forth, even if the statute turns out to violate one or another aspect
of justice. In other words, on this construal, even an epistemically
perfect, perfectly democratic court would not invalidate as unconsti-

tutional a statute that was merely substantively unjust in some way.
At one point, Origin and Scope seems to take up the analytic view of
236

Id.

237 This

is clear throughout Thayer's article. See id. at 143-57. Thayer begins
the
article with the following question: "How did our American doctrine, which allows to
the judiciary the power to declare legislative Acts unconstitutiona4 and to treat them as
null, come about, and what is the true scope of it?" Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
It is a practice that the Court still, sometimes, purports to follow. See
Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981) (noting "[t]he customary deference accorded the
judgments of Congress"). But see United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution ....
").
239 For a recent and important discussion of minimalism
in a different sense, see
Sunstein, supra note 191.
240Some important entries in this debate include:
PERRY, supra note 70; ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1994); and One Hundred Years of JudicialReview: The Thayer Centennial
Symposium, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1993).
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minimalism. 4 Yet this would be a very odd and idiosyncratic view of
constitutional law, for it would seem to make the Bill of Rights
(beyond the Due Process Clause) superfluous or at best hortatory.
The more charitable and conventional reading of Origin and Scope is
242
restraintist, not analytic.
Statutes that fail to conform with the best
understanding of the criteria set out in the text of the Constitution,
but contestably so ("unclearly"), ought not be invalidated by courts
because of courts' limited institutional role. This idea is the thrust of
Thayer's famous comment that:
[O]ne who is a member of a legislature may vote against a measure
as being, in his judgment, unconstitutional; and, being subsequently
placed on the bench, when this measure, having been passed by the leg-

islature in spite of his opposition, comes before him judicially, may
there find it his duty, although2 43he has in no degree changed his opinion, to declare it constitutional.
The judge upholds the statute even though she takes it (unclearly) to
violate the criteria bearing on constitutionality. But why should she
exercise restraint in this way? Here, again, Thayer is ambiguous. Origin and Scope, read as presenting a restraintist rather than analytic defense of minimalism, is open to (at least) three quite different interpretations.
The first is epistemic reasonable legislators are
epistemically better placed than courts to decide what the criteria
bearing on constitutionality require, so that the legislature's decision
to enact a statute (at least one not so clearly unjust as to vitiate the
epistemic premise) provides the court sufficient reason to believe that
the statute satisfies those criteria. The epistemic praise that Thayer
seemingly heaps on legislators, at one juncture in his article, supports
the epistemic reading: "It must indeed be studiously remembered, in
judicially applying such a test as this of what a legislature may reasonably think, that virtue, sense, and competent knowledge are always
241

See Thayer, supranote 233, at 144 ("This rule [of minimalism] recognizes that,

having regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of government, much
which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not
seem so to another, that the constitution often admits of different interpretations; that
there is often a range of choice andjudgment; that in such cases the constitution does
not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range
of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.").
242 See, e.g., Sager, supra note 37, at 1222-24 (describing Thayer as
a main source for
ideas of judicial restraint and "underenforcement": Thayer's "rule of clear mistake... is not founded on the idea that only manifestly abusive legislative enactments
are unconstitutional, but rather on the idea that only such manifest error entitles a
court to displace the prior constitutional ruling of the enacting legislature").
243 Thayer, supra note 233, at 144.
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to be attributed to that body."244 Yet Thayer elsewhere seems to say
that, even if legislators lack "virtue," "sense" and "competent knowledge," courts still have good, non-epistemic grounds for minimalism:
No doubt our doctrine of constitutional law [that is-judicial review]
has had a tendency to drive out questions ofjustice and right, and to fill
the mind of legislators with thoughts of mere legality .... And moreover, even in the matter of legality, they have felt little responsibility; if we
are wrong, they say, the courts will correct it. If what I have been saying
is true, the safe and permanent road towards reform is that of impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they have of the great
range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must
leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power;
245

so that responsibilitymay be brought sharply home where it belongs.

The claim is something like this: "popular responsibility" for matters
of right and justice is undermined by nonminimalist (even epistemically perfect) judicial review and, conversely, is fostered by minimalism.
"Popular responsibility," in turn, might have either instrumental
(remedial) or intrinsic (pedagogic) significance, so we thus have the
second and third restraintist readings of Thayer. The second is remedia- nonminimalist review has the causal effect of diminishing
"popular responsibility" (that is, of diminishing the strength and
prevalence of various attitudes and dispositions among citizens, such
as a sense of justice, a concern for constitutional values, etc.). In
turn, this attitudinal change, over the long run, will cause the legislature to promulgate more unconstitutional statutes-an unwelcome development, given the remedial limitations of courts.2 4 r The third and
final reading of Thayer is pedagogic. nonminimalist review has the
causal effect of diminishing "popular responsibility," which amounts
to an intrinsic, collective harm, because the attitudes thus diminished
are intrinsically good for citizens.
I am inclined to agree with Paul Kahn in rejecting the epistemic
reading of Thayer. 24' Thayer, after all, says that courts should attribute
"virtue," "sense" and "competent knowledge" to Congress; he does

244
243

Id. at 149.
Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

246 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING

ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (questioning efficacy ofjudicial remedies).
247 See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY
85 (1992) (Thayer's "justification
for judicial deference toward Congress [is not] grounded in institutional competence.").
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not claim that legislators, in fact, have these favorable features.21 This
is a constitutional fiction, which courts properly adopt on nonepistemic grounds (either pedagogic or remedial). It is not true that
legislators have a general epistemic advantage over courts on matters
of constitutional law;249 and it is not charitable to interpret Thayer as
saying that, since he also describes legislators as "indocile, thoughtless, reckless [and] incompetent.250 Kahn further suggests that a
pedagogic account of Origin and Scope best accords with Thayer's
other writings: "Thayer [aims] at the moral development of the
larger community. The people must struggle with the practical requirements of government from the perspective of morality, not
law ... Too much court-made law will undermine popular moral
growth.","
We can, however, bracket these interpretive issues. Whatever restraintist argument Thayer meant to advance in defense of
"minimalist" judicial review-whether epistemic, remedial or pedagogic-his argument lacks a Simple Extension. Whatever grounds
courts might properly have to abide by minimalism and refrain from
invalidating all but "clearly" unconstitutional statutes, it does not follow that courts should refrain from invalidating all but "clearly" unconstitutional rues, orders and actions. As I have argued, Thayer's text
is rich in its ambiguity. It is rich, for our purposes, in plausibly
grounding three different legislature-centered arguments, each of
which is quite different from the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, but
each of which falls prey to the same weaknesses once we try to extend
the argument beyond the special practice of reviewing statutes.
Consider, first, the strong version of the Simple Extension, which
says that courts have the same sort of restraintist reason to refrain
from invalidating rules, orders and actions as they have to refrain
from invalidating statutes. For the epistemic, remedial and pedagogic
248
249

Thayer, supra note 233, at 149.
See sources cited supra note 126 (arguing that courts are better placed to en-

gage in the deliberation that constitutional knowledge requires). I say that legislators
have no general epistemic advantage over courts on matters of constitutional law because minimalism would require a general practice of restraint. Legislators might well
have an epistemic advantage on specific issues, say, synoptic ones. See infra text accompanying notes 336-89.
"And so in a court's revision of legislative acts.., it will always assume a duly
instructed body; and the question is not merely what persons may rationally do who
are such as we often see, in point of fact, in our legislative bodies, persons untaught it
may be, indocile, thoughtless, reckless, incompetent...." Thayer, supra note 233, at
149.
5 KAHN, supra note 247, at 85.
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construals of Thayer's argument, the strong version of their respective
Simple Extensions would run as follows:
EpistemicMinimalism (Strong Simple Extension)

If a statute bears the "Epistemic Feature" (that is, the statute's
enactment should be taken by courts as sufficient reason

2

2

to

believe that the statute satisfies applicable criteria bearing on
constitutionality, relative to the status quo), then an otherwise
proper rule, etc., also bears the Epistemic Feature (courts
have sufficient reason to believe that the rule, etc., satisfies
the applicable criteria, relative to the status quo).
Remedial and PedagogicMinimalism (Strong Simple Extensions)

If a statute bears the "Attitudinal Feature" (invalidating the
statute would cause popular responsibility to diminish), then
an otherwise proper rule, etc., also bears the Attitudinal Feature (invalidating the rule, etc., would cause popular responsibility to diminish).
We can consider the remedial and pedagogic accounts together because, on both accounts, judicial invalidation of statutes is supposed
to have a certain causal effect, and their strong Simple Extensions
would hold true only if judicial invalidation of rules, orders and actions has the same sort of causal effect.
The Simple Extension of Epistemic Minimalism, while not true, is
at least plausible. The (epistemically capable) legislator has not, of
course, actually approved a given rule, order or action; she has simply
approved the statute. But the following premise is true, or at least
plausible: if the legislator hypothetically would approve the rule, order or action, by virtue of her decision to enact the statute, then the
rule, order or action bears the Epistemic Feature. s Thus, in the case
of our flag-burning statute, where the statute provides that "No person shall bum a flag of the United States," and an administrative
agency issues an order against a war protester, pursuant to the statute,
our reviewing court (now assumed to be epistemically imperfect)
could reason as follows: (a) the statute bears the Epistemic Feature;
This is a particularly robust kind of epistemic argument. There are weaker
ones. See infra text accompanying note 340.
253 Imagine that the legislator hypothetically would approve the rule,
order or action, by virtue of her decision to enact the statute. That is, the rule is rationally required by the considerations that prompted the legislator, exercising her epistemic
capacities, to enact the statute. So the legislator hypothetically would approve the
rule, etc., exercising her epistemic capacities. If that is true, then the rule, order or
action bears the Epistemic Feature.
22
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(b) the legislator hypothetically would approve the agency's order,
because -the order is a determinate application of the statute, and the
aspects ofjustice infringed by the war-protest order would have been
considered by the conscientious legislator, under applicable norms of
conscientious legislation; (c) thus the order bears the Epistemic Feature.
This chain of reasoning, however, would not work in a case like
Skinner, because it is not true that the legislator hypothetically would
approve the drug-testing rule by virtue of her decision to enact the
Safety Act. First, it may not be true that the legislator hypothetically
would agree that the drug-testing rule is an otherwise proper interpretation of the Safety Act-that the rule appropriately maximizes
safety.2 We can reasonably disagree about what "safety" requires and
what safety measures are appropriate. One might object that these
sorts of considerations, which undermined the Simple Extension of
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, should not be as effective here.
After all, if, at the extreme, our (epistemically imperfect) reviewing
court has reason to believe that legislators are epistemically perfect,
and if the reviewing court has reason to believe that the drug-testing
rule maximizes safety appropriately, then the court has reason to believe that the (epistemically perfect) legislators who enacted the
Safety Act would agree that the rule maximizes safety appropriately.
Perhaps so, but only if the court has reason to believe that the legislators are epistemically perfect on all matters, not just matters of constitutional law. And even if this is right, the further objections based on
incommensurability and injustice remain potent.
Objections based upon injustice are particularly important in the
case of Epistemic Minimalism. Our (epistemically imperfect) reviewing court has reason to believe that the drug-testing rule is unjust.
This judicial reason would be cancelled if our epistemically perfect
legislators had actually approved the drug-testing rule-but the legislators have not done so. Nor does the court have reason to infer the
legislators' hypothetical approval of the drug-testing rule from their
actual approval of the Safety Act, because the court has reason to believe
that the rule is unjust. Epistemically perfect legislators would not vote
for the drug-testing rule by virtue of their vote for the Safety Act since
the reasons in favor of "safety" are overridden, in the case of the drugtesting rule, by reasons of justice--or so the reviewing court should

Z4 By "appropriately," I mean within the constraints of overriding nonconstitutional values.
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believe. The only way around this is to assume that the legislators are
not just epistemically perfect or capable, but are subject to rigorous
norms of conscientious legislation so that, if the drug-testing rule
were indeed unjust, the legislators would have explicitly provided in
advance, in the Safety Act, that no such rule should be issued. What
this analysis suggests is that the Simple Extension could only follow
from variants of Epistemic Minimalism that included very strong, and
noncredible, claims about the epistemic capacities and conscientiousness of legislators.
The Simple Extensions of Remedial and Pedagogic Minimalism
are also false; and, unlike the parallel argument from Epistemic
Minimalism, these extensions may not even be plausible. This is because the initial premise that was true or plausible of Epistemic
Minimalism, and true of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, may be
lacking here. This initial premise was that we could draw a connection of the kind that statutory pedigree might constitute between the relevant feature of the statute and the desired feature of the rule, order
or action. In the case of Epistemic Minimalism, we were able to say
that if the epistemically capable legislator votes for the statute (it
bears the Epistemic Feature), and if she hypothetically would approve
the rule, order or action, then the rule, order or action also bears the
Epistemic Feature. Similarly, in the case of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, we were able to say that if the Median Voter would approve
the statute (it bears the Plebiscitary Feature) and if she hypothetically
would approve the rule, order or action, then the rule, order or action bears the Plebiscitary Feature. In each case, the fact that the
rule, order or action would hypothetically be approved by the legislator or Median Voter both "transmits" the relevant feature (Epistemic
or Plebiscitary) from the statute to the rule, order or action and is the
kind of connection that statutory pedigree might constitute. A rule,
order or action is hypothetically approved, or not, by virtue of the
reasons that support it. A rule, order or action is also a proper interpretation, or not, by virtue of the reasons that support it.
Can we identify a similar connection, of the kind that statutory
pedigree might constitute, for Remedial Minimalism or Pedagogic
Minimalism? The claim would need to be something like this: if invalidating a statute causes popular responsibility to diminish, then invalidating a rule, order or action that the legislature or populace hypothetically would approve also causes popular responsibility to
diminish. Is this claim, or something like it, even plausible? To answer this question, we would need to flesh out the causal mechanism
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behind Remedial or Pedagogic Minimalism, and determine whether
that mechanism also supports a causal relation between judicial override of a decision that the legislature or populace hypothetically
would approve, and a decrease in "popular responsibility." It is far
from obvious why it should; for example, a court's facial invalidation
of a statute might be a particularly salient eventY 5 which demoralizes
the public in a way that the invalidation of a particular rule, order or
action does not, regardless of the legislators' or citizens' hypothetical
approval of the rule, order or action. Why should statutory pedigree
preserve the causal regularities upon which the legislature-centered
theories of Pedagogic or Remedial Minimalism-assuming these restraintist theories hold true-rely? Thus it is not clear that any rule,
order or action, however "ordinary" and however determinate its interpretive pedigree, bears the Attitudinal Feature by virtue of being a
proper interpretation of a statute that bears the Attitudinal Featurelet alone a rule, order or action where the now-familiar problems of
indeterminacy, incommensurability, and the limits of conscientious
legislation come into play.
Finally, we cannot salvage the Simple Extensions of Epistemic,
Remedial or Pedagogic Minimalism by moving from a strong to a
weak version. The weak version, again, claims that, although a rule,
order or action that properly interprets a statute bearing the Epistemic or Attitudinal Feature need not, itself, bear the Feature, it is
still wrong (for example, unfair) for courts to invalidate the rule, order or action on the grounds of justice, because interpretation is the
best (fairest) process for elaborating statutes. The crucial point, however, is that the criteria bearing on constitutionality properly figure,
to some extent, in the interpretation of statutes. The unjust drugtesting rule is a poor interpretation of the Safety Act, because it is unjust. This point, if right, defeats the weak Simple Extensions of Epistemic, Remedial and Pedagogic Minimalism as well as all other legislature-centered arguments for restraint.
C. Arguments from Reversibility
The Simple-Extension strategy is appealing for the advocate of
judicial restraint because it purports to generate restraintist reasons
with respect to the practice of invalidating administrative rules, orders
or actions from a basic, general and legal truth about these rules, orZ3 SeeMiller, supranote 99, at 290 (noting the importance of issue salience to public involvement in politics).
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ders or actions-their statutory pedigree-quite apart from the further features that agencies, or some agencies, may possess. The basic,
general and legal truth is the following: federal administrative agencies lack constitutional authority to issue rules and orders or take actions, except pursuant to statutes that authorize them to do so, and
against which the legality of these rules, orders and actions can always
be tested.2'6
As we have seen, Simple-Extension arguments fail. The basic fact
of interpretive pedigree does not suffice to extend legislaturecentered restraintist arguments-such as the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, or the Epistemic, Remedial or Pedagogic versions of
Thayer's argument (to name the exemplars)-into the administrative
state. But there is a related, and equally basic, general and legal truth
that the advocate of restraint might try to employ. Call this the fact of
"reversibility."2 7 Not only must rules, orders and actions be proper
interpretations of existing statutes; they also are subject to reversal by
the future statutes that Congress might choose to enact. Given a restraintist feature that, one claims, statutes should be taken to bearthe Plebiscitary Feature, the Epistemic Feature, the Attitudinal Feature, or whatever-the further claim might be advanced that reviewing courts have just this kind of reason to refrain from invalidating
rules, orders and actions because of their reversibility.
Alexander Bickel makes such a claim. In The Least Dangerous
Branch, he briefly alludes to the question of extending the Countermajoritarian Difficulty into the administrative state, and tries to resolve the question this way:
It... does not follow from the complex nature of a democratic system that,
because admirals and generals and the members, say, of the Federal Reserve
Board or of this or that administrative agency are not electorally responsible,
judges who exercise the power ofjudicial review need not be responsible either, and in neither case is there a serious conflict with democratic theory.
For admirals and generals and the like are most often responsible to officials
who are themselves elected and through whom the line runs directly to a majority. What is more significant, the policies they make are or should be interstitialor
technical only and are reversible by legislative majorities.... Nor will it do to liken

judicial review to the general lawmaking function ofjudges. In the latter aspect, judges are indeed something like administrative officials, for their decisions are also reversible by any legislative majority-and not infrequently they
are reversed. Judicial review, however, is the power to apply and construe the
Cf supra note 133 (noting the possible need to qualify this statement). Again,
because I am arguing againstthe Simple Extension, I can assume the statement to be
unqualifiedly true.
7I
am indebted to Larry Alexander, Frank Goodman and Seth Kreimer for valuable discussions on this point.
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Constitution, in matters of the greatest moment, against the wishes of a lgislative majority, which is, in turn, powerless to affect the judicial decision.
On one construal, Bickel is asserting that, because administrative
rules, orders and actions are potentially reversible by truly majoritarian statutes, such rules, orders and actions are also majoritarian.
Reversibility I (The CountermajoritarianDifficulty)
Compare rules issued by two different kinds of administrative
agencies, a Reversible Agency and an Irreversible Agency.
The first is subject to reversal by Congress. But the second
has special, independent constitutional authority, such that its
rules are not subject to reversal by Congress. Because statutes,
or some statutes, should be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature, the rules, orders and actions of the Reversible Agency,
but -not the rules, orders and actions of the Irreversible
Agency, should also be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature,
or at least a weak version of it.
This "Irreversible Agency" is imaginary. I do not suggest that such
agencies could properly exist within our legal system,259 but rather I
am imagining that one could exist so as to test and sharpen how
much Bickel means to infer from the basic fact of reversibility.
Is there truly a thoroughgoing, democratic difference between
the Reversible and the (imaginary) Irreversible Agency? Imagine that
both agencies have street-level officers, who take various low-visibility
actions, or low-level adjudicators, who issue various administrative orders against individuals who may lack the resources, information or
clout to lodge an effective complaint with the Reversible Agency's legislative overseers.2r Do we really want to say that the street-level actions or low-level orders of the Reversible Agency are more plebiscitary than the counterpart actions or orders of the Irreversible Agency,
just by virtue of the fact that the former are potentially reversible by
statutes that (let us assume) would bear Plebiscitary Features? The
BICKEL, supra note 1, at 19-20 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
M Whether they could-whether the fact of reversibility holds true unqualifiedly
or not-raises the kind of issues discussed in the Youngstown case. Cf Youngstown
2M

Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.").
Because I am arguing against Bickel's reversibility strategy, I may assume arguendothat
the fact of reversibility holds true unqualifiedly.
260See Kreimer,

supranote 132, at 5-6 (noting that the largest category of constitutional challenges raised in federal district court concern actions by street-level bureaucrats).
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plausible claim that some decisions of the Reversible Agency (e.g., the
published rules) are, indeed, more majoritarian than the counterpart
decisions by the Irreversible Agency is no help because what makes
that claim plausible is no longer merely the basic fact of reversibility.
Rather, it is the further premises that (a) some of the decisionmakers
within the Reversible Agency are motivated to avoid decisions that
they expect to be reversed by statute;26' and (b) there are some decisions that these decisionmakers can expect to be thus reversed, where
these decisions are, inter alia, sufficiently salient, or sufficiently likely
to trigger a "fire alarm,"6 2 such that they are expected to come to the
attention of legislative overseers. In contrast with the basic facts of reversibility or interpretive pedigree, premises such as (a) and (b) are
not general, legal truths about administrative agencies. It seems wildly
implausible that every agency decisionmaker within a reversible agency
satisfies the motivational claim set out by the first premise, and that
her every decision satisfies the salience claim set out by the second
premise. In any event, these are premises whose truth and generality
will only emerge after positive theorizing and empirical testing; nothing in the basic fact of reversibility entails them. The fact of reversibility, without (much) more, does not show why agency rules, orders
or actions are plebiscitary even assuming that statutes are plebiscitary.
Bickel has a response to this line of criticism. A different interpretation of his brief passage in The Least DangerousBranch is the following:
Reversibility If (The CountermajoritarianDifficulty)

Statutes, or some statutes, should be taken to bear the Plebiscitary Feature. Courts have reason not to directly invalidate a
statute that bears the Plebiscitary Feature. Courts have the
same kind of reason not to invalidate a rule, order or actionwhether issued by a Reversible Agency or an Irreversible
Agency. By invalidating the rule, order or action, the court
thereby prevents Congress from enacting a statute with the
M Cf Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Contro4 3J.L ECON. & ORG. 243, 249-53 (1987) (arguing that bureaucrats who anticipate legislative sanctions may comply, ex ante, with legislative preferences); Hammond & Knott, supra note 136, at 140-42 (modelling agency autonomy, by deriving a
set of policies that an agency can adopt without being reversed by the President or
Congress, and assuming that the agency adopts some policy within that set).
2
See McCubbins et al., supra note 261, at 250 (suggesting that direct congressional oversight is less important than "'fire alarm' monitoring [which] consists of disappointed constituents pulling a member's fire alarm whenever an agency harms
them").
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same or similar content. These judicial decisions, therefore,
indirectly preclude the enactment of future statutes bearing
the Plebiscitary Feature and (in that sense) infringe upon the
Plebiscitary Feature.
As Bickel puts it, "Judicial review... is the power to apply and construe the Constitution [such that] a legislative majority [is] powerless
to affect the judicial decision."2 3
This claim is simply not true. Reversibility II rests upon a simple
misconception about the nature of judicial review. The misconception is that, when a reviewing court strikes down some administrative
rule, order or action as unconstitutional, and announces a piece of
constitutional doctrine describing what makes the rule, order or action unconstitutional, subsequent Congresses are obliged to refrain
from enacting statutes that fall within the announced descriptionstatutes whose content is the same or similar to that of the invalidated
rule, order or action-and subsequent reviewing courts are obliged to
invalidate such statutes. But why assume this to be true? Might not a
court legitimately invalidate a rule, order or action as violating some
constitutional criterion C (some aspect of justice), and yet subsequently uphold a statute with the same or similar content, just by virtue of the institutional differences between legislatures and agencies?
The misconception behind Reversibility II is that differential judicial
enforcement of constitutional criteria, as between rules, orders or actions on the one hand and statutes on the other, is impossible or illegitimate.
We will examine, in the next Section, exactly how this misconception is belied by existing constitutional doctrines governing judicial
review. The point here is to see how Bickel's Reversibility II is premised upon this misconception. If a court's decision striking down a
rule, etc., by virtue of constitutional criterion C, leaves open the possibility that the court might recognize democratic, plebiscitary
grounds to uphold a statute (even one with precisely the same content) challenged as violating C, then Reversibility II falls apart. For
then the judicial decision striking down the rule, etc., ought not be
taken by subsequent, plebiscitary legislators as binding them to refrain from enacting a statute (even one with precisely the same content as the voided rule, etc.) that falls within the description of C's

263 BICKEL,

supra note 1, at 20; see also ELY, supra note 6, at 4 (noting that "in nonconstitutional contexts [but not constitutional contexts] the court[s'] decisions are
subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary statute").
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contours announced by the reviewing court. Therefore that judicial
decision is not, indirectly, countermajoritarian, in the sense of indirectly precluding the enactment of statutes that would bear Plebiscitary Features.
Indeed, the same misconception about the nature of judicial review also lies behind Reversibility I. The claim there is that the basic
fact of reversibility, without more, confers (some kind of) the Plebiscitary Feature upon reversible rules, orders or actions. But, in this basic
sense, judicial decisions that leave open the possibility of a subsequent legislative override are also reversible. Assume it to be the case
that, when the FRA issues the drug-testing rule, the rule is weakly
plebiscitary just because Congress, if it wanted, could subsequently
abrogate the rule by amendment to the Railroad Safety Act. The FRA
enacts this weakly plebiscitary nile, and the court strikes it down. If it
is true that Congress could, in turn, override the judicial decision by
enacting a drug-testing statute that reviewing courts would uphold on
restraintist grounds, then the judicial decision striking down the FRA's
rule is weakly plebiscitary in just the same way as the initial rule. The bare

truth of reversibility, which is equally and symmetrically true of both
the agency's rule and the judicial decision invalidating it, constitutes
no kind of direct distinction between the two.Y

If there is a distinc-

tion (and there may well be), it arises from further features of administrative agencies. Perhaps administrators, as compared with judges,
are differentially motivated to avoid decisions that they expect to be
reversed by statute;26 or perhaps administrative decisions, as compared with judicial decisions, are differentially salient to the legislature. Nothing said here is meant to preclude the possibility of a
democratic, epistemic or other kind of difference, bearing on judicial
review, between unelected administrators and unelected judges. But
that difference, whatever it may be, is not entailed by, or in any way a
direct consequence of, bare reversibility. For if it is true that administrative rules, orders and actions are potentially reversible by statute, it
also turns out to be equally and symmetrically true that the decisions
of constitutional reviewing courts invalidating administrative rules,

264

1 say "direct distinction" to leave open the possibility that, because there are

some legally irreversible decisions the judge has the power to make (invalidating a
statute), this power affects his general motivational structure, which in turn makes him

more insouciant about the prospect of reversal in the area of agency review.

See supra note 264. But see Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive PoliticalDimensionsof
Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 96-98 (1994) (defending claim thatjudges seek
to avoid reversal by Congress and the President).
2
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orders or actions are potentially reversible by statute. Let us now see
how.
D. JudicialDoctrine: The PossibilityofDfferentialRestraint
The central claim defended in this Part is that the statutory pedigree of administrative rules, orders or actions does not, without more,
require constitutional courts to exercise restraint in reviewing rules,
orders or actions, whatever restraintist reason courts might have in
reviewing statutes. In short, the statutory pedigree of rules, orders
and actions does not, without more, rule out a practice of differential
restraint. By differential restraint, I mean a practice whereby reviewing courts refrain from invalidating statutes that violate (the courts'
best understanding of) some criteria bearing on constitutionality
(some aspects of justice) but do not refrain from invalidating rules,
orders or actions that violate the same criteria. In theory, at least, differential restraint should be a possible practice for us, one whose
scope would depend upon the democratic, epistemic or other features, bearing upon judicial review, of agencies and legislatures.
I now want to show how this theoretical claim is supported by legal doctrine. The legal doctrines goveringjudicial review license and anticipate differential restraint. The idea that courts might have broader
constitutional grounds to invalidate rules, orders and actions, as opposed to statutes, is not just this Article's theoretical construct.
Rather, it is a construct that turns out to be black letter law.
The doctrinal touchstone for differential restraint is the eminent
and longstanding canon of statutory construction that I have termed
the Avoidance Canon: "[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."2 "" Notably,
the Avoidance Canon does not merely stipulate that a rule, order or
action should be counted as a poor interpretation of the underlying
statute if the rule, order or action would be unconstitutional. It goes
further than that: "Serious doubt" 267 as to constitutionality suffices to
invalidate an otherwise proper rule, order or action, where the Avoidance Canon applies. Again, the CatholicBishop case mentioned above

26

EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-

cil, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
2

International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961).
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In Catholic Bishop, the Court held that the NLRB
is illustrative.
lacked jurisdiction over parochial schools, not because such jurisdiction would in fact violate the Religion Clauses, but merely because it
would risk a violation.
The Board argues that it can avoid excessive entanglement [with the parochial schools].... But at this stage of our consideration we are not compelled
to determine whether the entanglement is excessive as we would were we considering the constitutional issue. Rather, we make a narrow inquiry whether
the exercise of the Board'sjurisdiction presents a significant risk that the First
Amendment will be infringed.

This aspect of Catholic Bishop is conventional doctrine, announced by
the Court in DeBartolo and many other cases. 2' ° Rust v. Sullivan states
the doctrine nicely (although, as we shall see, fails to follow it): "'[A]
statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the
conclusion
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that
271
score."'
Think of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine as identifying one point on a spectrum of deference. That spectrum ranges
from the extreme of minimalism, to a midpoint of no-deference, to
an extreme of "maximalism." "Minimalism" is the standard name for
the posture of deference advocated by Thayer in his famous 1893 article, as discussed above. 27r Under minimalism, let us say, a judge invalidates X (a statute, rule, order or action) if and only if every reasonable person should believe that X is unconstitutional. Under nodeference, a judge invalidates X if and only if she believes that X is
unconstitutional. Under maximalism, a judge invalidates X if and
only if some reasonableperson could believe that X is unconstitutional.
Official doctrine, governing review of statutes, ranges somewhere between minimalism and no-deference. Sometimes, the Court accords
statutes a "presumption of constitutionality," which points towards
minimalism; sometimes, the Court does not apply the presumption
(no-deference). 273 This point is well known. Indeed, there is a sig274
I am
nificant scholarly literature on minimalism, as we have seen.
See supra text accompanying notes 201-10.
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
270 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2491
(1995) ("We have rejected
agency interpretations to which we would otherwise defer where they raise serious
constitutional questions"); cases cited infra note 282 (employing "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine with respect to agency action).
271 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (internal quotation
omitted).
27_ SeeThayer, supra note 233 and accompanying
text.
M See supra note 238 (discussing presumption of constitutionality).
274 See supra note 240.
268
269
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suggesting, however, that official doctrine governing the review of
rules, orders and actions (the "Avoidance Canon") points to a different

portion of the deference spectrum entirely: the portion between nodeference and maximalism. The Avoidance Canon, by requiring courts
to invalidate rules, orders or actions raising "serious constitutional

doubts," establishes a posture of deference (or rather, vigilance) that
is not minimalism, or even no-deference, but rather approaches

maximalism. 2 5 This is a remarkable and highly significant feature of
constitutional doctrine, largely overlooked by constitutional scholars-with a few important exceptions, notably William Eskridge and
Cass Sunstein.76
Maximalism, as such, is nonsense.7 Why should a judge (if she is
27.Notably, the Court does not standardly invoke the "presumption
of constitutionality" doctrine with respect to agency decisions. But see United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1990) (noting the "heavy presumption of constitutionality" regarding a fee-limitation regime established by statute and agency rules).
276 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 285-97 (discussing constitutionally
grounded
canons of statutory construction, including "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATOkY
STATE 163-68 (1990) (same); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 199, at 593 (same); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007
(1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values] (same); Cass R_ Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 468-69 (1989) (same). For earlier,
critical treatments of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine, see HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211-12 (1967); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 284-85 (1985); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v.
Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of ConstitutionalIssues, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 49; see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme
Court's Constructionof Statutes RaisingFreeSpeech Concerns,30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1996)
(discussing "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine, specifically with reference to free
speech cases); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV.
1003, 1011-27 (1994) (summarizing various doctrines by which the Court purports to
avoid constitutional questions, including "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine);
Brian C. Murchison, Interpretationand Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon
in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 85, 91 (1995) (discussing the Avoidance
Canon in separation of powers context).
27 Perhaps this is too strong. Maximalism vis-A-vis agencies might in theory
be defended on the grounds that it forces political institutions to deliberate about constitutional issues, and thus that constitutional courts properly invalidate, under the rubric
of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine, even those agency decisions that the
courts take to satisfy the criteria bearing on constitutionality. Cf Sunstein, supra note
191, at 48 (suggesting that Kent v. Dulles as well as Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong can be
understood as "founded on the idea that publicly accountable bodies should make the
contested decision that was challenged in the case"). But would such an idea, standing alone, trulyjustify judicial invalidation of an otherwise proper agency decision that
the court also believes to be constitutionally proper? Note that Professor Sunstein, in
other writings, has adverted to the role of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine
as a placeholder for underenforced constitutional criteria. See infra text accompanying
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authoritative on matters of constitutional law, or even if she is not)
invalidate a rule, order or action that she takes to be constitutional,
merely because someone else who is reasonable but wrong could
think otherwise? Rather, as Eskridge and Sunstein rightly suggest, the
"serious constitutional doubts" doctrine is best reconstructed as a
placeholder for differentially enforced constitutional criteria: criteria
that courts properly enforce against rules, orders and actions, but not
against statutes. To quote Sunstein:
[The principle] that courts should construe statutes so as to avoid
constitutional doubts... allow[s] judicial 'bending' of [statutes]. Judge
Richard Posner has criticized that principle on the ground that it creates a kind of 'penumbral Constitution,' one that allows courts to press
statutes in particular directions even though-and this is his central
point-they would ultimately be found not to offend the Constitution.
But Judge Posner's objection becomes less forceful in light of the
fact that constitutional norms are quite generally underenforced. The
aggressive construction of questionable statutes, removing them from
the terrain of constitutional doubt, can be understood as a less intrusive
way of vindicating norms that do in fact have constitutional status; and
this point applies even if courts would not invalidate those statutes if
278
they were forced to decide the question.

Eskridge says very much the same. He suggests that an underenforcement theory provides the "best account" of the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine:
While a Court that seeks to avoid constitutional activism will be reluctant to invalidate federal statutes in close cases, it might seek other
ways to protect constitutional norms. One way is through canons of
statutory construction. A traditional example is the rule that ambiguous
statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties ....
Protecting underenforced constitutional norms through such clear
statement rules is normatively attractive under republican theory (and
under the critical pragmatism that I follow). It is not seriously undemocratic, since Congress can override the norm through a statutory clear
279
statement.

In short, the "serious constitutional
doubts" doctrine is just a doctrine
2 °
of differential judicial restraint. 1
note 278.
278

SUNSTEIN, supra note 276, at 165 (footnotes omitted).

27 ESKRIDGE, supra note

140, at 286.

2I01 should stress that my use of the term "underenforcement"
here does not

commit me to the Revisionist Construal of "constitutionality." On the Traditional
Construal of "constitutionality," where criteria bearing on constitutionality are under-
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The "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine has played, and con281
Spetinues to play, a significant role in the Court's jurisprudence.

cifically, from the jurisprudential inception of the modern, federal
administrative state in the New Deal, the doctrine has served as a
mechanism by which the Court invalidates agency rules, orders or actions on constitutional grounds, while leaving open the possibility
that statutes with the same or similar content might be upheld. 2 An
enforced so that some statutes, rules, orders or actions are not invalidated by reviewing
courts in virtue of those criteria, then such statutes, etc., are simply not, all things considered, "unconstitutional." See supra note 53 (explaining that a less robust sense of
"underenforcement" is consistent with Traditional Construal); supra note 58
(explaining that, on Traditional Construal, it is a necessary if not sufficient condition
for a rule, order or action to be "unconstitutional" that it be properly invalidated by
reviewing courts).
281 See Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 276, at 1020-23 (describing
the Court's
use of the Avoidance Canon and citing cases); see also Zeppos, supra note 132
(discussing and documenting wide use of the Avoidance Canon by the Court).
282Cases in which the Court has explicitly invoked some version of the "serious
constitutional doubts" formulation, in limiting federal agency action of some kind,
where the constitutional provision at stake involved some part of the Bill of Rights,
include: Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 205 n.50 (1985); St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780, 788 (1981);
United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1980); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,
693 (1979); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1979); United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17,
26-27 (1968); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 234-35
(1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S.
194, 201-02 (1957); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598-600 (1953); Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S.
146, 155-56 (1946); and ExparteEndo, 323 U.S. 283, 299 (1944). See also infra text accompanying notes 295-98 (discussing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88
(1976)).
The Court has also invoked the doctrine to cabin the authority of administrative
agencies in other ways. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603-04 (1988) (finding
the availability of judicial review for constitutional challenges to agency action); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1974) (finding no
agency power to tax); Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 579 (1989)
(finding no agency authority to adjudicate creditors' claims against savings and loan
associations under agency receivership); Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614, 632
(1976) (delineating the availability of exception to Internal Revenue Code's AntiInjunction provision).
It might be argued that the practice of constitutional review under the rubric of
statutory interpretation is even more extensive than this. For example, various of the
"clear statement" rules that the Court invokes, see, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988) (setting out a clear statement rule against retroactive agency regulations), are surely mechanisms for enforcing criteria bearing on constitutionality. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 199, at 631 ("One way to articulate
and protect underenforced constitutional norms is through interpretive presump-
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early and dramatic illustration is Ex parte Endom in which the Court
held that a writ of habeas corpus should be granted to a concededly
loyal Japanese citizen, releasing her from the relocation camps administered by the War Relocation Authority. 2 4 Hesitant to issue a
holding that Congress would lack the constitutional power to require
the claimant's detention, the Court instead interpreted the relevant
authorizing statutes and Executive Orders not to authorize such detention, explaining, "[w]e have.., favored that interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality." 1 Soon thereafter, as the Second World War gave way
to the Cold War against communism in the 1950s, the Warren Court
repeatedly employed the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine to
curtail constitutional abuses of the new war.86 In Kent v. Dulles, a
leading case of this type and one that Charles Black specifically discussed in his seminal critique of legislature-centered theories ofjudicial restraint,28 the Court invalidated on statutory grounds a State

tions, clear statement rules, and super-strong clear statement rules--canons of statutory construction."); see generally id. at 598-629 (listing and describing various clear
statement rules); ESKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 326-27 (comprehensively listing the
Rehnquist Court's clear statement rules grounded in individual rights). Whether the
application of a constitutionally grounded clear statement rule counts as an instance
of judicial review depends upon whether judicial utterance of the term
.constitutional," in some way (e.g., through the utterance of "serious constitutional
doubts") is conceptually or semantically a necessary part ofjudicial review. I leave the
question open.
283 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
24 See id. at 297 (concluding that the War Relocation Authority
"has no authority
to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave procedure").
28. Id. at 299. Cf BLACK, supra note 20, at 79-82 (criticizing Court's failure to follow
this approach in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
See Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.

1044, 1053-60 (1984) (discussing this and related techniques).
287 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
288 Black wrote:
[Tihere is [also] the case where Congress, by very broad and vague delegation, puts it within the power of some official to behave in a manner of questionable constitutionality ....
... The Court's typical-and seemingly harmless-solution has been to
read the delegation itself as not including the power to tamper with important constitutional rights, so that--on this purportedly statutory ground-the
official is held without power to do what he has done. This was the holding
in ...Kent v. Dulles.... I have called this method of solution harmless, and it
is that, as long as the Court keepsfirmly in mind that in such a case it is not confronting Congress at all, and remains institutionallyfree, and indeed bound, to make its
own judgment unembarrassedby presumptions.

BLACK, supra note 20, at 78-79 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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Department regulation denying passports to citizens who were Communists, despite the Department's broad statutory authority to "grant
and issue passports" at its discretion. 2 9 The Court stated:
[T]he right of exit is a personal right included within the word "liberty"
as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to be regulated, it
must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress....
Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary to the wellbeing of an American citizen, such as travel, are involved, we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. We hesitate to find in this broad generalized power an authority to trench so
heavily on the rights of the citizen.2
The Court was careful to leave open the question whether Congress
could constitutionally enact the same no-passport policy by statute.29

Similarly, in Greene v. McElroy,22 the Court held that the Department of Defense lacked statutory authority to deny security clearances
to defense contractor employees without affording the employees an
opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination, given the due
process values at stake.9 3 The Court, however, distinctly refrained
from deciding whether such a procedural scheme, if expressly authorized by Congress or the President, would be equally subject to judicial
invalidation:
In the instant case, petitioner's work opportunities have been severely limited on the basis of a fact determination rendered after a hearing which failed to comport with our traditional ideas of fair procedure.
The type of hearing was the product of administrative decision not explicitly authorized by either Congress or the President. Whether those
procedures under the circumstances comport with the Constitution we
do not decide. Nor do we decide whether the President has inherent
authority to create such a program, whether congressional action is necessary, or what the limits on executive or legislative authority may be.
We decide only that in the absence of explicit authorization from either
the President or Congress the respondents were not empowered to deprive petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded

WJ See Kent, 357 U.S. at 129-30 (holding that the Secretary of State had no statutory
authority to "withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations").
-0 Id. at 129 (citations omitted); see also id. at 125-27 (elaborating
upon constitutional criteria at stake).
29

See idat 130.

"9 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
c3 See id. at 506-08 (emphasizing that "traditional forms of fair
procedure [should]
not be restricted... without the most explicit action by the Nation's lawmakers"); see
also id. at 496-99 (elaborating upon constitutional criteria at stake).
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the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination.

This distinction in Greene between agencies and elected bodies (the
President and Congress) is particularly significant for a theory of restraint in the administrative state, both because it properly views the

administrative state as potentially directed by, but not equivalent to,
the Presidency, and, reciprocally, because it raises the possibility that
presidential, like congressional, direction might give reviewing courts
proper grounds for restraint.
During the tenure of Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court
continued to rely on the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine as a
technique for invalidating administrative rules, orders and actions
without prejudging the validity of statutes.2 5 In its striking decision in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the Court went even further. Hampton
invalidated a Civil Service Commission rule barring aliens from employment in the federal civil service as unconstitutional under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, while carefully eschewing any suggestion that a statute, or a no-alien rule explicitly authorized by the President, would likewise be properly invalidated by constitutional reviewing courts. The Court explained:
When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the
Equal Protection Clause if adopted by a State, due process requires that
there be a legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest. If the agency which promulgates the rule
has direct responsibility for fostering or protecting that interest, it may
reasonably be presumed that the asserted interest was the actual predicate for the rule.... Alternatively, ifthe rule were expressly mandated by the
Congress or the President, we might presume that any interest which might ra297
tionally be served by the rule did infact give rise to its adoption.

4

Id. at 508.

Besides Catholic Bishop itself, other significant Burger Court cases of this genre
include: Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 205 n.50 (1985) (the SEC and free speech); St.
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780, 788 (1981)
(the Department of Labor and the Religion Clauses); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S.
23, 33-34 (1980) (the Civil Service Commission and equal protection); and Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979) (the Social Security Administration and procedural
due process); see also supra note 282 (citing these cases); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note
199, at 598-611 (discussing the Burger Court's use of the "serious constitutional
doubts" test and related clear statement rules).
426 U.S. 88 (1976).
2J7 Id. at 103 (emphasis added). The Court further
explained:
We may assume with the petitioners that if the Congress or the President had
expressly imposed the citizenship requirement, it would be justified by the na-
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Hampton is an unusual case because the Court did not employ the
standard technique of bringing constitutional criteria to bear under
the rubric of statutory interpretation and the "serious constitutional
doubts" doctrine. Instead, the Court squarely stated that although
the agency rule was unconstitutional, a statute or an executive order
might not be.!
It must be stressed that, alongside cases such as Greene, Kent,
CatholicBishop and Hampton, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
agency rules, orders or actions in the face of plausible claims that
these rules, orders or actions raised "serious constitutional doubts."
As Professor Eskridge crisply comments: "For every case like Catholic
Bishop, which interprets statutes to avoid constitutional doubts, there
are other cases where a statute is construed boldly, to face substantial
constitutional troubles."2" It is important, however, to remember that
the doctrine must not be taken at face value: bestjustified, it is simply
a placeholder for constitutional criteria that should, or might plausibly be, differentially enforced. The Court's uneven application of the
doctrine can be understood, or at least rationalized, as reflecting the
Justices' varying estimates of the varying considerations that weigh in
favor of, or against, differential restraint. Given some criterion C
bearing on constitutionality, differential restraint is only warranted
where courts have reason to refrain from enforcing C against statutes,
but not against rules, orders or actions. Differential restraint is unwarranted where courts lack a reason even to refrain from enforcing
C against statutes. Reciprocally, differential restraint is unwarranted
where courts have a reason to refrain from enforcing C against rules,
orders or actions as well as statutes-say, by virtue of a President's intional interest in providing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or
possibly even as providing the President with an expendable token for treaty
negotiating purposes ....

We think the petitioners accurately stated the question presented in their
certiorari petition. The question is whether the regulation of the United
States Civil Service Commission is valid. We proceed to a consideration of
that question, assuming, without deciding, that the Congress and the President have the constitutional power to impose the requirement that the
Commission has adopted.
Id. at 105, 114.
M Indeed, the President responded to Hampton
by promulgating an Executive
Order that barred aliens from the civil service, which a federal appellate court upheld.
See Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281, 1287 (7th Cir. 1978). This interesting fact is
pointed out by Sunstein, supra note 191, at 48 n.220.
M Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 276, at 1073 n.302 (citing cases contemporaneous with CatholicBishop).
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tervention.
This last possibility, raised by Greene and Hampton,s0 came to full
prominence during the 1980s, with the presidency of that strong
President, Ronald Reagan. The problems and promise of presidentialism became a central theme for ordinary administrative law, as exemplified by two of the foremost cases in the administrative law
canon: Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.30' and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense
Council,Inc. 2 State Farm involved the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), while Chevron involved the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). In each case, the agency, following Reagan's election, had changed its regulatory course and substituted a less stringent regulatory regime for an earlier, more stringent
one. NHTSA in 1981 rescinded a rule (promulgated under Carter in
1977) requiring cars to have air bags or other passive restraints; EPA
in 1981 broadened the applicability of the so-called "bubble" concept
(reversing a rule promulgated at the end of the Carter administration, in August 1980) so that an entire plant, rather than a single
smokestack, could be counted as a "stationary source" under the
Clean Air Act.
State Farm held that NHTSA's change of course was illegal. Although the underlying statute was a wide-open values-statute, which
simply instructed NHTSA to pursue the value of "motor vehicle
safety," the Court held that the change of course was insufficientlyjustified in terms of this statutory value and therefore "arbitrary and capricious" under the Administrative Procedure Act.3 3 State Farm made
clear that "arbitrary and capricious" review was deferential, but only
moderately so; it lay somewhere between de novo review and automatic affirmance.0 4 The Court rejected NHTSA's proposal "that the
arbitrary and capricious standard requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause." 315 It also ignored the suggestion of Jus30

But see Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1968) (invoking "serious consti-

tutional doubts" doctrine to strike down national security regulation promulgated by
President).
3 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
W- 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
See id. at 43 (clarifying the appropriate standard of review).
3 Id. at 43 n.9. The Court continued (significantly, for our purposes): "We do
not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation drafted
by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its
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tice Rehnquist, in dissent, that Reagan's election amounted to a sufficientjustification for the change of course. SaidJustice Rehnquist:
The agency's changed view of the [passive restraint] standard seems
to be related to the election of a new President of a different political
party.... A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.,
By contrast, only a year later in Chevron, the Court upheld the
EPA's change of course. Chevron announced the seminal doctrine
that courts would defer to "reasonable" agency interpretations of statutes, except where the statutes were "clear.",0 7 This doctrine, standing
alone, might be perfectly consistent with State Farm. Specifically, it
might mean that, where statutes are unclear, courts should defer to
agencies, but employ the moderately deferential approach set forward
in State Farm. On this reading of Chevron, the EPA won the case simply because it had good reasons for its change of course, while
NHTSA in State Farmdid not.
On the other hand, Chevron might mean something else. The
language of presidentialism is rampant in that decision, both tojustify
the general doctrine of deference and to explain why the EPA's new
rule was reasonable. The Court stated:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly acss
countable to the people, the Chief Executive is ....
On another reading, then, Chevron overrules State Farm and embraces
the position that Justice Rehnquist set forward in his State Farm dissent. That position seems to be the following: the President's policy
functions as a fresh reason to warrant courts in upholding agency
rules, orders or actions. An otherwise illegal agency decision will be
rescued, if it is connected (in the right way) to the policy of the President'w Whether Chevron really means this remains unclear. The
statutory mandate." Id.
306 Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
307 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43.

308 Id. at 865.
M9 Contrast this with the view that, although the President rightly
oversees the
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proper reading of Chevron, and more generally the proper role of the
President in overseeing agencies, have been intense subjects of debate by legal scholars, the lower courts, and the Court itself for the
last decade.1 0
Chevron and State Farm, again, concern ordinary administrative
law: how strongly an agency's rules, orders or actions, where these do
not implicate constitutional rights, must be justified to a reviewing
court. But the prospect of presidentialism that excites these decisions
also bears, quite directly, upon constitutional review. Indeed, Chevron
prompted, and continues to prompt, scholarly discussion about the
vitality of cases such as Kent v. Dulles or Catholic Bishop. Might not

Chevron's broad rule of deference displace the "serious constitutional
doubts" test, and require courts to defer to an agency's judgment that
an otherwise valid rule, order or action also satisfies the Constitution?" The Court in DeBartolo tried hard to lay these doubts to rest.
It noted that the agency's order under review in that case "would
normally be entitled to deference" 312 under Chevron, but then stated
explicitly that the Avoidance Canon worked as an exception to Chevron deference, and held the order to be improper. Yet, soon after DeBartolo, the "serious constitutional doubts" test was called into question by one of the most visible and contested decisions of the
Rehnquist Court, Rust v. Sullivan.1 3
Rust, like Chevron and State Farm, involved an administrative

administrative state, so as to ensure that agency decisions are justified on the balance
of relevant reasons, his intervention does not give courts an additional reason to uphold these decisions.
310 Leading scholarly works in the debate about the Chevron
case, and the broader
questions it raises, include: ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL
ERA (1992); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutoy Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the AdministrativeState 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Thomas W. Merrill,JudicialDeference to

Executive Precedent, 101 YAlE LJ. 969 (1992); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV.
301 (1988); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study ofFederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DUKE LJ. 984; Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law,
1988 DUKE LJ. 819; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fiy Cases Per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited ResourcesforJudicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.

REV. 1093 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071 (1990).
311 See Sunstein, supra note 310, at 2110-14 (discussing whether
Chevron trumps
constitutionally inspired interpretive norms and concluding in the negative).
312 EdwardJ. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988).
313

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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change of course that was linked, in turn, to a change in the policy of
the Presidency. Title X of the Public Health Service Act, enacted in
1970, authorized the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") to grant funds for family planning services, but stipulated
that "[n] one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be
used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning."s '4
In 1988, after nearly two decades of a different interpretation, HHS
issued regulations (the so-called "gag rule") that prohibited grantees
(in their Title X projects) from counselling pregnant mothers about
abortion, or even advocating abortion. This volte-face by HHS was
linked to the strong anti-abortion platform that the Reagan and then
Bush administrations had adopted.
And indeed, in upholding the
gag rule, the Court in Rust seemed to acknowledge this link. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, first determined that the rule was an
otherwise valid interpretation of Title X. In his analysis, he seemed to
suggest that the change in presidential policy helped to justify HHS's
change in course:
We find that the Secretary amply justified his change of interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis.' [(citing State Farm)] .... He [among
other things] also determined that the new regulations are more in

keeping with the original intent of the statute, are justified by client experience under the prior policy, and are supported by a shift in attitude
rs
againstthe 'eliminationof unborn children by abortion.'
Citing DeBartolo and conceding that the gag rule ought to be invalidated under the Avoidance Canon doctrine if it raised sufficiently serious constitutional doubts,311 the Court then determined that no
such doubts were raised. Finally, the Court considered and dismissed
the First and Fifth Amendment challenges to the gag rule, on their
merits. Fourjustices dissented, with all four arguing that the gag rule
was invalid under the Avoidance Canon even if it did not, in fact, violate the Constitution. As Justice O'Connor put the point: "It is
enough in this litigation to conclude that neither the language nor
the history of [Title X] compels the Secretary's interpretation, and
that the interpretation raises serious First Amendment concerns....
Indeed, Justice O'Connor's dissent in Rust is one of the most elo§ 300a-6 (1994).
s15 See DEVINS, supra note 211, at 114-16 (discussing the gag rule in context of Rea-

314 42 U.S.C.

gan and Bush administration activism on abortion).
316 Rust, 500 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
si1 See id. at 190-91.
318

Id. at 224-25 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
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quent defenses of the "serious constitutional doubts" test extant in
the case law.
If by his approving reference in Rust to a "shift in attitude against
the 'elimination of unborn children by abortion,""'31 Justice
Rehnquist intended to invoke and incorporate the position that he
took in his State Farm dissent or the presidentialist language of the
Chevron majority opinion that he joined, then Rust starkly raises the
possibility that presidential direction might justify judicial restraint
with respect to rules, orders or actions that violate the best analytic
understanding of the criteria bearing on constitutionality. Consider
the following to be the best defense of the dissenters' position in
Rust:
"The gag rule in fact violates constitutional criteria.
But
because there plausibly exist good restraintist grounds to uphold a statutory gag rule, we should say merely that the
agency's gag rule raises serious constitutional doubts."
The following would be the majority's response, per Justice
Rehnquist:
"Good restraintist grounds to refrain from invalidating the
agency's gag rule also exist. In particular, the gag rule rests
upon the anti-abortion policy that this Presidency has very
publicly espoused, which, we must assume, has the support of
the majority of the citizenry. So, whatever the applicability of
the 'serious constitutional doubts' test in some other case, it is
inapplicable here. The agency's gag rule should only be invalidated if it violates some criterion sufficient for this Court
to strike down a statutory gag rule."
On this reading, the debate between majority and dissent in Rust replicates, in the domain of constitutional law, the debate about the role
of the Presidency that has been
conducted, with great vigor, within
3 21
ordinary administrative law.
Neither of these debates has yet been resolved by the Court. Until these debates are resolved, the scope of the "serious constitutional
doubts" doctrine will remain unclear. Rather than resolve the uncerId. at 186.
31.,
See Sager, supra note 37, at 1227 n.48 (pointing to Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), which denied a constitutional claim for Medicaid funding of abortions, as a
possible "underenforcement" decision).
321 See supra note 310 (citing sources discussing Cheuron and the proper
role of the
President in overseeing agencies); infra note 327 (listing political science sources discussing the emergence of a "Plebiscitary Presidency").
319
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tainty, Rust only deepens it. What, precisely, are the conditions under
which a reviewing court should invalidate an agency rule, order or action by virtue of some constitutional criteria, but should refrain, or
plausibly might refrain, from enforcing the very same criteria against
statutes? What, in short, are the conditions under which differential
restraint is, or might plausibly be, warranted? This is the question of
scope that divided majority and dissent in Rust, and to which existing
case law provides no clear, or even half-clear answer.32 2
This doctrinal uncertainty, however, is quite illuminating for our
purposes. What could the source of uncertainty be, if Simple Extension arguments hold true? Why would we need a doctrine that enabled differential enforcement of constitutional criteria, if-whenever
courts had an epistemic, democratic or some other kind of reason to
refrain from enforcing C against statutes-courts also had an equally
powerful reason to refrain from enforcing C against proper rules, orders or actions by virtue of their statutory pedigree? The statutory
pedigree of proper rules, orders and actions is a basic, general and
legal feature of theirs. If this feature were, indeed, sufficient to extend legislature-centered arguments into the administrative state,
then the "serious constitutional doubts" doctrine would properly have
zero scope. The very point of Simple Extension arguments is to show
why a doctrine of this kind, and the practice of differential restraint
that it enables, are misplaced.
As for the arguments from reversibility, 3 the case law simply eviscerates them. Reversibility arguments presume that it is impossible or
illegal for a court to reverse an agency decision on constitutional
grounds, and in turn be reversed by Congress. 24 The very point of the
cases I have summarized, from Kent and Greene to Catholic Bishop and
DeBartolo, is to make that sequence both possible and legal. Nor does
it do to claim that a decision like this is not really an instance ofjudicial review-that judicial review really means invalidating statutes,
rules, orders or actions as "unconstitutional," period. Let us imagine
that the optimal technique for invalidating rules, orders and actions
that violate the criteria bearing on constitutionality, yet also leaving

32.-The same uncertainty is true of the Court's clear statement jurisprudence. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 199, at 598 ("[T]he Court was... more than ready to

acknowledge exceptions and caveats to those clear statement rules ... , or to ignore
them altogether in cases where they were arguably relevant.").
32 See discussion supra
Part II.C.
324 "Impossible" in the sense of being precluded by the very concept of ajudicial
reversal on constitutional grounds.
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Congress appropriately free to enact statutes with the same or similar
content (the mechanism that appropriately constrains Congress, and
best facilitates the reasoned development of substantive doctrines for
the review of rules, orders and actions) is simply (a) enforcing some
constitutional criteria under the rubric of statutory interpretation and
(b) applying the predicate "constitutional doubts" rather than
"unconstitutional" to some rules, orders and actions that are invalidated. To insist, nonetheless, that this practice is not 'judicial review"
because it does not fall within the existing semantics of that term
would be to rule out, by definitional fiat, an optimally structured
practice of judicial restraint. Perhaps the "serious constitutional
doubts" practice is not optimally structured; nothing I say here is
meant to suggest that it is.32 5 But the semantics of the term 'Judicial
review" should be broad enough to include this kind of doctrine.
The problem ofjudicial restraint in the administrative state is not one
that should be settled on semantic grounds.
III. BEYOND THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFIcULTY

Constitutional scholars will need to become students once
more-students of the administrative state. In a legal world where reviewing courts are concerned with the constitutional validity of administrative rules, orders and actions in addition to statutes, the
proper contours of judicial restraint cannot be specified independently of the particular democratic, epistemic or other features of administrative agencies, bearing on restraint, that arise from an agency's
structure, its culture, its members' preferences, its decisional processes, and its political and institutional environment.32 6 Part II sought
to demonstrate this proposition. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty,
and more generally legislature-centered restraintist arguments of any
sort, lack what I have called "Simple Extensions." Statutory pedigree
fails to transmit the (supposed) Plebiscitary Feature of statutes, and

If, for example, the "departmentalists" were to be heeded, and the doctrine of
judicial supremacy announced in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), were to be rejected by the Court, the predicate "unconstitutional" could be freely applied to a rule,
order or action, without constraining Congress. See infra note 330 and accompanying
text (discussing "departmentalism").
326 See sources cited supra note 28.
Other useful surveys include Hammond &
Knott, supra note 136; Rodriguez, supra note 265, at 43-110; Jonathan Bendor, Review
Article: Formal Models of Bureaucracy, 18 BRIT. J. POL SCI. 353 (1988); and Roger G.
32

Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior. A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (Roger Noll ed., 1985).
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more generally whatever Restraintist Feature a legislature-centered
argument might posit, from statutes to the rules, orders or actions
that statutes authorize. The failure follows, in important part, from
the fact that administrative agencies exercise broadly delegated
power; but that is not the entire story. Really, this failure is overdetermined, for, as we have seen, no plausible nondelegation doctrine
could salvage the Simple Extensions. It is a failure built into the very
structure of constitutional doctrine, in the deep notion of construing
statutes to avoid constitutional questions.
Can a general defense ofjudicial restraint be developed, notwithstanding the failure of Simple Extensions? Do the epistemic, democratic or other features of the administrative state, rather than the
too-weak interpretive link of rules, orders and actions to statutes, furnish courts with some kind of grounds for restraint? That remains to
be seen. Clearly, scholars must now consider whether rules, orders or
actions bear Plebiscitary Features by virtue of agencies' connection to
a Plebiscitary President, who possesses the authority and capacity to
oversee the administrative state. Nothing I have said thus far about
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty precludes this possibility; indeed,
my critique of the Simple Extensions is intended, in part, to initiate
scholarly debate about the significance that the President's plebiscitary cast has, or might have, for judicial restraint in reviewing rules,
orders and actions.
In recent years, the Plebiscitary President-by which I mean a
President who is, in some way, responsive to the judgments, preferences, beliefs or other attitudes of a majority of the citizenry-has
loomed increasingly large in both the political science literature on
American government, and the legal literature on the separation of
powers and administrative law. There is now a substantial body of
writing in descriptive political science that points specifically to the
emergence of a "Plebiscitary Presidency" (also called the "rhetorical
Presidency" or the "modern Presidency"), characterized by various
practices whereby the President seeks and claims the support of the
national electorate. 327 In turn, political scientists working in the rational-choice tradition have begun to theorize about why the President should indeed have a special link to the Median National
327

The descriptive political science literature on the rise of the "Plebiscitary Presi-

dency" includes: SAMUEL KERNELL, GOING PUBLIC (2d ed. 1993); THEODORE LOWI,
THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985); CRAIG
RIMMERMAN, PRESIDENCY BY PLEBISCITE: THE REAGAN-BUSH ERA IN INSTITUTIONAL

PERSPECTIVE (1993); andJEFFREY I TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
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Voter;32s and a fair number of legal scholars, building upon the work
of the political scientists, have argued that the President's majoritarian properties provide a good justifying reason (among others) for
augmenting his control over administrative agencies, through meass
ures such as intensified regulatory review.3
The Plebiscitary President has also figured increasingly in scholarship about a constitutional problem closely related to that of judicial restraint: the socalled problem of "departmentalism," which concerns whether the
constitutional doctrine announced by the Supreme Court is binding
on other institutions and actors.3 3 0 Departmentalists have traditionally
31.,See Miller, supra note 99. Miller's claim, in brief, is that:
The president has a special ability to overcome rational ignorance in the general public, creating the potential for mass mobilization on an issue that
sparks the great changes in American politics. The president also has the
ability to solve coordination problems, serving as a focal point and controlling
the pace and timing of social movements. In addition, the president is the
primary hope of representation for the large, latent interests that are not organized by means of selective incentives.
Id. at 322.
s.9 These scholars argue for a more or less "unitary Presidency"-a Presidency that
exercises serious, unifying control over the administrative state. See generally Michael
A. Fitts, The ParadoxofPower in the Modern State: Why a Unitary, CentralizedPresidencyMay
Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 833-34 (1996)

(analyzing and summarizing unitary President literature). Prominent scholarly works
that advocate a "unitary Presidency," in one way or another, include: Harold H. Bruff,
PresidentialManagement ofAgency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989); Steven
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23
(1995); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The StructuralConstitution: Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Christopher C. DeMuth &
Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075
(1986); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94

COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
41; and Pierce, Constitutionaland PoliticalTheory, supra note 140, at 469. Claims about

the majoritarian cast of the Presidency are standard in this literature.
The literature on "departmentalism" is very large. It has been nourished by a
controversial and well-publicized speech, by then-Attorney General Edwin Meese,
criticizing the doctrine ofjudicial supremacy. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). Leading scholarly defenders of Congress's
authority to disagree with the Court about the Constitution include: JOHN AGRESTO,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); ROBERTA. BURT, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); PAUL R. DIMOND, THE SUPREME COURT AND
JUDICIAL CHOICE: THE ROLE OF PROVISIONAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1989); and
Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS

(1988). An important overview of the "departmentalism" problem is Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate ConstitutionalInterpreter,48 REV. POL

401 (1986). A recent empirical study is DEVINS, supra note 211. Useful symposia include Symposium, Elected Branch Influences in ConstitutionalDecisionmaking, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993) and Symposium, The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival of

ClassicalJurisprudence, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 371 (1988) (including panel on "The
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pointed to Congress, above all, as the institution that may legitimately
disagree with the Court about the Constitution. There is, however, a
growing presidentialist school within departmentalism, which stresses
the President's own power to depart from Supreme Court doctrine,
quite independent of Congress's decision to do so-for example,
when the President grants pardons or vetoes proposed statutes, and
33
perhaps even when he issues directives to administrative agencies.
Yet another place that the Plebiscitary President has emerged is in
Bruce Ackerman's seminal work of normative political theory and
In We the People, the
constitutional theory, We the People.
"Plebiscitarian Presidency" (Ackerman's own words) plays a crucial
role in the process of enacting the "transformative statutes" that function as informal constitutional amendments.312 Finally, the Plebiscitary President may already have entered official (nonconstitutional)
doctrine through the Chevron case, which clearly invokes the President's majoritarian cast in justifying its doctrine ofjudicial deference
to agencies on matters of statutory interpretation. Chevron's idea, in
turn, may have resonances within the constitutional case law on differential restraint, most recently in Rust v. Sullivan. As we have seen,
one way to understand decisions such as Greene v. McElroy, Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, or Rust is as saying that courts should uphold otherwise invalid administrative rules, orders or actions if they are sufficiently connected, in the right sort of way, to a presidential judgment

Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution").
33 SeeFrank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905 (19891990) (arguing for presidential autonomy in interpreting the Constitution); Thomas
W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanationsfor Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43 (1993) (same); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (same); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch
Interpretation,15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993) (same); see also David A. Strauss, PresidentialInterpretationof the Constitution, 15 CARDoZO L. REV. 113 (1993) (questioning presidential autonomy in interpreting the Constitution). Here, as in the "unitary Presi-

den

y"

literature, references to a majoritarian Presidency are standard.

SeeACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 268 ("The modern system [of higher lawmaking]
has historical roots stretching back to Thomas Jefferson's 'Revolution of 1800,' but it
came into its own in the modem regime inaugurated by the Democratic Party of

Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Here the decisive constitutional signal is issued by a President claiming a mandate from the People. If Congress supports this claim by enacting
transformative statutes that challenge the fundamentals of the preexisting regime,

these statutes are treated as the functional equivalent of a proposal for constitutional
Amendment."). In describing the rise of this so-called "modem" system of higher
lawmaking, Ackerman explicitly and repeatedly describes the modem President as

"plebiscitarian." See, e.g., id. at 67, 83, 106.
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or policy. 33

Given the longstanding importance of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty for constitutional scholarship since Bickel, and the increasing salience of the Plebiscitary President in the various literatures and
doctrines I have just described, we cannot ignore the possibility that
presidential oversight suffices to render "countermajoritarian" and
thus, in some instances, improper, the judicial practice of invalidating
rules, orders and actions. But there are many hurdles that a Countermajoritarian Difficulty for the administrative state constructed
along these lines would need to overcome. This Article has tried to
show just how demanding the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is-a
point often ignored or obscured in the existing literature. It demands a Plebiscitary Feature sufficiently strong to justify courts in upholding a statute, rule, order or action that violates the criteria bearing on constitutionality. The Plebiscitary Feature, again, does not
furnish courts analytic grounds to limit review (statutes, etc. are not
constituted as just, by virtue of bearing Plebiscitary Features), nor are
the grounds that it furnishes epistemic (for these Features do not, in
fact, evidence what constitutional criteria require). Rather, as I have
tried to demonstrate, the Countermajoritarian Difficulty is a democratic
argument to limit review-truly an argument forjudicial restraint, but
one that points to a special and democratic wrong supposedly constituted by the act of judicial review, a wrong sufficiently grave to override constitutional values. This democratic construal has real consequences for the argument's likely importance in the administrative
state. The theorist of restraint who predicates a democratic argument
upon the Plebiscitary Presidency would need to show us: (1) that the
President should be taken to be a plebiscitary actor of the right kind
(one whose decisions warrant claims about the outcomes of the
proper hypothetical plebiscites); (2) that some or all rules, orders or
actions should be taken to bear a sufficient presidential pedigree
(one sufficient to confer upon them the right kind of Plebiscitary Feature); and (3) that, therefore, even epistemically reliable courts
should uphold these rules, orders or actions, although they violate
constitutional criteria that these courts would otherwise have sufficient grounds to enforce.33 4 And if the theorist wishes to short-circuit
See supra Part II.D.
The work of Terry Moe, one of the leading students of the Presidency and, in
many ways, quite a "presidentialist," is revealing as to the likely truth (or the lack
thereof) of the first two propositions. See Moe & Wilson, supra note 34.
As to the first proposition, Moe notes that Presidents, unlike legislators, have a
33
33
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the presidential connection, and rely instead upon the agency's own
processes, culture and incentives, its link to legislative committees, or
whatever, she must demonstrate that these features are sufficiently

powerful to give rise to the strong, overriding value (whether plebiscitary fairness, or some other democratic value) that a democratic argument for restraint demands.
This is a tall order indeed. I do not claim that the order cannot
be filled. This Article has not done the institutional or ethical work to
show that it cannot; such work remains to be done. It will be crucial,
however, for constitutional scholars to understand just what the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, or other democratic arguments for
restraint, demand, and just what would need to be true of agencies
for such arguments to hold true.
Relatedly, I suggest, it will be crucial for scholars to see that
democratic arguments such as the Countermajoritarian Difficulty do
not exhaust the universe of arguments for judicial restraint. For
much too long, the central focus of scholarship on judicial restraint
"heterogeneous national constituency," but also claims that "[r]eelection ... does not
loom as large in their calculations (and in the second term, of course, it is not a factor
at all)." Id. at 11. Rather, Moe stresses the President's "autonomy," id. at 12, and drive
for "leadership": "If there is a single driving force that motivates all presidents, it is
not popularity with the constituency nor even governance per se. It is leadership." Id.
at 11; see also STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE PoLmcs PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP
FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993) (emphasizing the President's leadership
project). The proponent of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty might respond that
the President, qua leader, just embodies what a properly idealized plebiscite would
choose. This response might work, but, in any event, there is real tension between the
notion of the President as leader and the President as agent for the majority, which
recapitulates the more general tension in democratic theory between "trustee" and
"delegate" notions of representation, and which would need to be overcome.
As to the truth (or the lack thereof) of the second proposition, see Moe & Wilson,
supra note 34, at 3-15 (describing chronic struggle for control of bureaucracy, between
Presidents on the one side, and legislators, interest groups and agencies on the other).
Moe also describes the various advantages that Presidents have in this struggle, see id.
at 15-28, but concludes:
[I n the ongoing politics of structural choice, the growth of presidential control represents an increasing threat to parochial interests and gives them
stronger incentives to invest in political opposition. The most reasonable expectation is for some sort of equilibrium to be reached in future years, an
equilibrium more presidential than we have now, but still a far cry from what
presidents might like.
Id. at 28. See generally B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BuREAucRATIc
DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BuREAUcRAcY IN A DEMOcRACY 27-127 (1994) (describing
statistical studies showing bureaucratic responsiveness to multiple "principals," including but not limited to the President); Hammond & Knott, supra note 136 (presenting
a formal analysis of agency autonomy, as dependent on preferences and powers of
multiple principals).
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has been democratic, and not epistemic. "Is judicial review of statutes
'countermajoritarian' or otherwise undemocratic?" has been seen as
the question for restraintist theorists, and their critics, to debate. This
is not surprising, given the scholarly preoccupation with legislatures;
for indeed it seems quite unlikely that legislators, qua elected, have
any epistemic advantage, relative to courts, on matters of constitutional law. If the legislature's electoral feature constitutes grounds, of
any sort, for judicial restraint, then such grounds will indeed be
democratic, not epistemic. As Michael Perry states the point:
[I]ncumbency is undeniably a fundamental value for most members of
the Congress. Members of the Congress are therefore more likely to cater to the interests and views of their constituents-and of their contributors-than they otherwise would.... [But a] regime in which incumbency is (inevitably?) a fundamental value seems often ill suited, in
a politically heterogeneous society like the United States, to a truly deliberative, truly dialogic specification of indeterminate constitutional
335
norms.

But this truth-and it is a truth, I think-is an incomplete one.s3r The
truth is incomplete because the legislature's electoral feature is not
the only feature it has. Legislators are not merely elected; they are, additionally, lawmakers rather than adjudicators; 7 they are supposed to
enact laws in virtue of the public values that laws are supposed to
serve;ss they have (or may have) an epistemic capacity in determining
335PERRY, supra

note 70, at 107. See generally id. at 96-101, 106-10 (arguing that
courts have epistemic advantage over legislators, on matters of constitutional law, by
virtue of legislators' elected status). But seeJOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 27, 31-32, 104-05 & n.* (1984) (mounting an epistemic
argument for departmentalism grounded in the elected cast of the legislature); ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 296-300 (1994) (mounting an epistemic argument for Thayer's rule
grounded in part in the elected cast of the legislature); Nino, supra note 124, at 822-31
(mounting an epistemic argument for judicial restraint grounded in the majoritarian
cast of the legislature).
s3 Note that Perry's claim is perfectly consistent with the admission that
the epistemic reliability of non-elected reviewing courts is secured, in part, by their impeachability. Minimal removability by an elected institution is not the same feature, and
need not have the same epistemic significance, as being elected; after all, it is not
thouht to have the same democratic significance.
See WEST, supra note 335, at 282 ("The idea of 'adjudicative law' may be antithetical to the progressive understanding of the Constitution" because of the authoritarian, corrective, conventionalist, and elitist cast of adjudication.).
W See SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 17 ("[G]overnment must always have a reason
for what it does. If it is distributing something to one group rather than to another, or
depriving someone of some good or benefit, it must explain itself. The required reason must count as a public-regarding one. Government cannot appeal to private in-
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the link between laws and these justifying values, which courts may
lack;-"' legislators are relatively unconstrained, in their lawmaking, by
a system of precedent; and so forth. These features are conceptually
distinct from the electoral feature, as the case of agencies exemplifies.
Agencies are unelected lawmaking bodies that possess, or could possess, these other features. So the epistemic irrelevance of elections
does not show that courts lack epistemic grounds for restraint in reviewing statutes. What remains a possibility, and one that students of
judicial review must consider much more intensively than they have
done thus far, is that courts may have epistemic grounds for restraint
with respect to agencies, or legislatures, or both, by virtue of the nonelectoral, epistemically significant features that agencies, or legislatures, or both, may possess.
Such an epistemic argument says something like this:
EpistemicArgumentsfor Restraint
A statute, rule, order or action is challenged as violating some
criterion C bearing on constitutionality. Because the reviewing court is not epistemically perfect in determining what C
requires, it should give more weight to the legislature's or
agency's decisions or utterances than an epistemically perfect
reviewing court would. Most strongly: the court should take
the enactment of the statute, etc., as sufficient reason to believe that it satisfies C. More modestly: the court should take
the enactment of the statute, etc., as sufficient reason to believe that it satisfies C, if the statute, etc., does not "clearly"
violate C. More modestly yet: in deciding whether the statute, etc., violates C, the court should take as true some of the
legislature's or agency's utterances, or some of its
"reasonable" utterances, bearing on that question.4
In particular, I want to suggest that a recurrent epistemic concern has
characterized constitutional scholarship since the New Deal. This
concern has been articulated, not in the literature about judicial review and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty that Bickel spawned, but

terest alone.").

See infra text accompanying notes 341-89.
W I use "satisfies" here to mean "does not violate, all things considered" rather
than "does not infringe." A statute, rule, order or action that infringes upon moral
rights embodied in the Bill of Rights, or other constitutional criteria, may "satisfy"
constitutional criteria by virtue of some overriding value that the statute, rule, order or
action secures, even if that value is not itself a constitutional value. See infra text accompanying notes 386-89.
339

UNIVERSITY OFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

882

[Vol. 145:759

rather-piece by piece-in the various substantive literatures covering
the various components of the Bill of Rights. Scholars, writing independently about one or another aspect ofjustice embodied in one or
another amendment to the Constitution, have independently voiced
the same worry: that courts might have an epistemic weakness in requestions that are, in some way, "global" or
solving constitutional
"synoptic."3 41 Let us call this the problem of synoptic review. This problem has been a persistent theme in post-New Deal constitutional
scholarship, albeit a quieter theme than the loud strains of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, and one that is of major importance for judicial review in the administrative state. In the remainder of this Part,
I will briefly describe this epistemic problem.

The problem of synoptic review has a long scholarly history. Its
discussion dates back, at least, to the series of law review articles written in the 1920s and 1930s, in reaction to the Court's Lochnerjurisprudence, that criticized the Court for failing to give adequate deference to legislative findings that public health, safety or some other
proper public goal justified a statutory scheme limiting liberty of contract.342 This literature was synthesized, and made more general, by
Kenneth Culp Davis in one of his earliest and most influential arti3
cles: An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process.

In this article, Professor Davis drew his famous distinction between
"adjudicative" and "legislative" facts and identified the role that
"legislative facts" played in constitutional review:
When an agency finds facts concerning immediate parties-what the
parties did, what the circumstances were, what the background conditions were-the agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the
facts may conveniently be called adjudicative facts. When an agency
wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively, just as
judges have created the common law through judicial legislation, and
the facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts....

541 See Colin

S. Diver, PolicymakingParadigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393, 396-99 (1981) (describing the "synoptic model" of agency decisionmaking, i.e.,
one that aspires to "comprehensive rationality").

See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 403 n.78 (1942) (citing earlier law review articles from
342

the 1920s and 1930s about "constitutional facts").
343
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The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts apparently has been clearly recognized only in constitutional cases, in which a
category of 'constitutional facts' has emerged. Often referred to as
'social and economic data,' constitutional facts are those which assist a
court in forming ajudgment on a question of constitutional law.
Legislative facts are facts about the overall improvement in the world,
with respect to some public value, that a statute or agency rule
achieves. Davis was advancing both an analytic and an institutional
claim about legislative facts: the analytic claim was that legislative
facts could be relevant to whether a statute, rule, etc., satisfied the criteria bearing on constitutionality, while the institutional claim was
that constitutional courts were poorly placed, epistemically, to determine the truth about relevant legislative facts. These claims were prescient, for Davis wrote his article in 1942, at the very dawn of the
modem age of constitutional law, when it might have seemed that the
Court's abandonment of Lochner would dissolve the problem Davis
raised. But the problem did not dissolve: instead, Davis's theme was
taken up and developed, for a post-New Deal world, in subsequent,
and seminal, works of constitutional scholarship.
It was first taken up in Sanford H. Kadish's 1957 article, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism3 "
This article laid the foundation for modem procedural due process
doctrine and scholarship. Kadish set out and defended the kind of
balancing test that the Court ultimately adopted in Mathews v. Eldridge3' Under such a test, a procedural scheme satisfies due process
if and only if it properly balances the intrinsic and instrumental bene347
fits of according fuller process to affected persons, against the costs.
Kadish's contribution on this score is well known. Less well known,
perhaps, is that Methodology and Criteriaalso constituted a significant
contribution to the literature on judicial restraint. Kadish believed
that his balancing test was objective, in some measure-some proce-

Id. at 402-03 (footnote omitted).
3 66YALELJ. 319 (1957).
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.").
M See Kadish, supra note 345, at 334-49 (defending
the Court's "flexible due process" approach).
344
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dural schemes would truly fail the test, and would be properly invalidated by epistemically perfect reviewing courts38 --but he further recognized that the test did not automatically translate into enforceable
doctrine. That would be true only if courts were, indeed, epistemically perfect.
In the first part of this section, the attempt was made to examine the
extent to which the methods of rationality could be effectively utilized in
the task of giving meaning to a flexible due process. In a sense, the issue there discussed was a false one, since the analysis proceeded in disregard of the realities of judicial review in operation. The discussion
was premised upon the existence of a decision-making institution unrestricted in its access to and use of relevant data. The central question
was: how could an ideal decision-maker confronted with the problem of
signifying meanings for a flexible due process maximize the uses of reason and intelligence? But the Supreme Court exercising the function
of
3 49
judicial review is plainly not that ideal decision-making institution.

In the concluding portion of his article, Kadish considered the possibility that courts might have epistemic grounds for restraint, insofar
as the balancing test entailed predicting just what the overall costs
and benefits of a given procedural scheme would be. 35 Kadish's
grounds for concern, here, were clearly epistemic rather than democratic: he explicitly rejected "the alleged nondemocratic character of
judicial review" 3s ' and focused instead upon whether "the Supreme

Court is institutionally equipped to ascertain and evaluate the complex factual data necessary for rational decision-making. " 152 He surveyed, with some skepticism, the Supreme Court's intermittent reliance upon "legislative facts" in its decisions (including, most recently,
the finding in Brown v. Board of Education that segregation caused psychological and pedagogical harm to black children), 3 and spectulated about the possibility of new institutions, such as "a research54
body which would make determination of constitutional facts."1
Kadish's article concluded on a note of uncertainty: "[the] impasse
348See id. at 345 (questioning a view of due process adjudication premised upon
"the complete subjectivity of all moral judgments"); id. at 348-49 (affirming the significant role of "reason and knowledge" in due process balancing).
49 Id. at 358 (footnote
omitted).
35o See id. at 353 ("Ultimately the judgment, which will be phrased
in terms of
whether given procedures are consistent with due process, entails a prediction of consequences.").
351Id. at 359.
3yiId.

347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.1l (1954).
Kadish, supra note 345, at 363 n.198.
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between what is theoretically desirable and practically possible makes
the future progress of constitutional law in this area reasonably debatable."5 5 In recognizing this epistemic "impasse," Kadish anticipated the restraintist posture that was adopted in Mathews itself
(where the Court announced its balancing formula, only to defer to
the "good faith judgment"3 5 of the Social Security Administration),
and would later be advocated by Jerry Mashaw (the scholar who has
written most extensively and influentially about Mathews) in Mashaw's
aptly-named Due Process in the AdministrativeState.ss"
Ten years after Methodology and Criteria, another hithertounknown scholar wrote his own foundational article about an aspect
of the Constitution that, like procedural due process, would be significant for post-New Deal jurisprudence but until then had been left
neglected and confused. This was Frank Michelman with his tour-deforce on the Takings Clause, Property, Utility, andFairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation' Law.'s Like Kadish's,
Michelman's article had two portions-analytic and epistemic. Every
well-socialized constitutional lawyer knows Michelman's analytic
treatment of the Takings Clause as requiring a "fair" practice of compensation, with fairness construed either in utilitarian terms35 ' or in
the Rawlsian terms ° that Michelman preferred. But this celebrated
analysis was paired with, indeed nested within, a less well-known discussion of the epistemic weaknesses of courts. Michelman began
Property, Utility, and Fairness by saying this: "It is debatable whether
what follows is an essay in constitutional law.... [Florwhat is counselled
here is, more than anythingelse, a deemphasis of relianceon judicial action as
a method of dealing with the problem of compensation."s ' And he returned
to this point in the last section of the article, entitled "Institutional
Arrangements for Securing Just Compensation."' 2 In that section,
35s
Id. at 362.
s5 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).
357 JERRYL. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THEADMINISTRATIVE STATE

80 HARV.L. REV. 1165 (1967).

(1985).

M See id. at 1215 ("[1]f, for any measure, both demoralization costs and settlement
costs ... would exceed efficiency gains, the measure is to be rejected;
but... otherwise, since either demoralization costs or settlement costs must be paid, it
is the lower of these two costs which should be paid.").
sr See id. at 1223 ("[A] decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as
the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a
consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk to people like him than
would any consistent practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision.").
s61Id. at 1166-67 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 1245.
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Michelman (more decisively than Kadish) urged judicial restraint: "One can nonetheless challenge the attribution of preeminent responsibility to the judiciary, identify institutional impediments
to adequate control of fairness by courts, and explore the possible advantages of se/fdiscipline by legislatures and public administrators."' 3
Those "institutional impediments" arose, in large part, because of
what Michelman called the "overarching generality, the global quality,"s ' of utilitarian or Rawlsian fairness.
In particular, restriction to the occasional foothold which litigation furnishes may disable courts from making competent judgments about
fairness, or from prescribing adequate cures for its absence, since fairness is a quality of courses or networks of decisions rather than of any
particular decision which may generate a case or controversy.

Michelman, anticipating the "underenforcement" literature by a decade, proposed that the criteria ofjust compensation embodied in the
takings clause be underenforced6s (courts should "atten[d] only to
'hard core' or 'automatic' cases")36 7 and that conscientious legislators
and administrators should enforce upon themselves their duty to
compensate, or avoid, nonjusticiably unfair takings. 33 Like Kadish,
Michelman made clear that he was not arguing for limiting review on
analytic grounds. Nor were the grounds democratic; there is no hint
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty in Property, Utility and Fairness.""'

Rather, the restraintist claim Michelman was advancing in his famous
article was that both legislatures and administrative agenes 70 might

have an epistemic advantage over courts because of the "global quality" of a properly analyzed Takings Clause.
A third example of a scholar who coupled analytic claims about
the "global quality" of one of the prohibitions of the Bill of Rights
30

M

Id.
Id. at 1247 (emphasis added).

Id.

See id. ("It is of course true of other constitutional limitations [including particularly the Takings Clause] ... that courts cannot by themselves enforce to the limits of social desirability the values or principles embodied in the limitations.").
367 Id. at 1250.
3
See id. at 1245-58.
30 Michelman considered, but rejected, the possibility
that a political mechanism
might constitute fairness. See id. at 1246 ("The truth is that fairness continues to enter
into political action in the form of a discipline; and it continues to be important to ask
who should administer that discipline or, more particularly, whether we are right in
relying as heavily as we do on the courts.").
370 See id. at 1245, 124748, 1251, 1257 (discussing administrators as well as legislators).
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with epistemic doubts about the capacity of courts is the alreadymentioned Kenneth Davis. In his appraisal of the Fourth Amend37
ment in his AdministrativeLaw Treatise,
' Davis summarized the striking changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine that had taken place
since the New Deal: the complete dismantling of Fourth Amendment
constraints upon the power of agencies to compel persons to produce
information, as well as the partial dismantling of Fourth Amendment
constraints upon agency inspections.3 7 ' Davis offered a general theory
of these changes that connected the rise of the administrative state
with a balancing methodology for constitutional law that, in turn,
rendered Fourth Amendment (and other enumerated) constitutional
rights defeasible by the values that the administrative state legitimately pursued:
The main item that has changed during the past century is the governmental need for information. A government that does little has less
need for information than a government that does much, and the government today has taken on vast tasks that were unimagined in 1886, or
even in 1924. As the government's need for information increases, the
balancing of that need against the reasons for privacy and nondisclosure, which remain essentially constant, necessarily shifts in the direction of restricting the scope of the privilege.37
He argued that the Court should acknowledge this appropriate
methodology: it should "bring its balancing out into the open.3 7 4
Davis wrote that "the basic system of impressionistic balancing, unexplained and unsupported by the kind of factual studies that can usefully be brought to bear on policy problems, is deeply unsound";37'
noted that "agency rulemaking procedures of the 1970s are ... far
more scientific than the procedures of the Supreme Court for major
policymaking";36 and invited the reader to consider a later section of
the Treatise, on rulemaking, which elaborated upon the idea that this
mechanism was superior to traditional adjudication for resolving

s7 See 1 DAVIS, supra note 86, at 224-306.
37, See id. at 228-32, 241-59.
37 Id. at 299; see also KENNETH CULP DAVIS, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW

136 (1951) (same theory).
374 1 DAVIS, supra note 86, at 306. Indeed, in more recent
years, the Court has
done just that, and has made balancing the touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Prindplesin Fourth Amendment

Theoy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 233-47 (1993) (describing pervasiveness of balancing in
Fourth Amendment doctrine since 1980).
X1
DAVIS, supra note 86, at 301.
376 Id.
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questions of legislative fact.3 7 7 All this seemed to point to an epistemic

argument for judicial restraint in reviewing agency decisions, or at
least agency rules-such as the drug-testing rule in Skinne 8-that
implicated the Fourth Amendment. But Davis did not go so far; indeed he offered no clear institutional solution at all, whether because
of doubts about the Court's willingness to abandon Fourth Amendment factfinding to the agencies, or about the epistemic capacity of
agencies on questions of constitutional law. 9
Most recently, the theme articulated by Davis, Kadish and
Michelman, each working on a different amendment to the Constitution, has been voiced yet again by constitutional scholars in yet another area of constitutional law: welfare rights. A significant group of
scholars, beginning with Michelman himself in a 1969 HarvardLaw
Review foreword entitled On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth

Amendment,3s0 have claimed that the Constitution entitles persons, in
some way, to resources or services sufficient to ensure their minimum
welfare.38' Sunstein advances the claim vigorously in The PartialConstitution,where he argues for a principle of "freedom from desperate
conditions" ("No one should be deprived of adequate police protection, food, shelter, or medical care."), and links this principle to Roosevelt's second Bill of Rights-which, Sunstein suggests, epitomizes
the historical and jurisprudential changes of the New Deal.2 But
even those scholars who advocate welfare rights most strongly seem to
doubt whether such rights should be fully justiciable. As Sunstein
states, "the second Bill of Rights was designed for legislative rather
than judicial enforcement. Here the role of the judiciary is necessar-

See id. at 306 (referring to id. at 617-26).
See supra text accompanying notes 153-58.
379 See 1 DAvis, supra note 86, at 306 (concluding simply that
the Court should acknowledge balancing and "encourage counsel to present factual materials that will be
needed to guide the balancing").
380 Frank Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through
the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
ss1 See Chemerinsky, supra note 78, at 526-27 (arguing for constitutional status
of
welfare rights); Frank Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 659, 659-66 (same); Frank Michelman, In Pursuitof ConstitutionalWelfare
Rights: One Viev of Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 966-67 (1973) (same);
Michelman, supra note 380, at 9-13 (same); SagerJusticein Plain Clothes, supra note 53,
at 429-33 (same); SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 133-41 (same). See generally William E.
Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Differentfrom All Other Rights Talk? Demoting the Court
and Reimaginingthe Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1771 n.1 (1994) (citing literature on constitutional welfare rights).
382 SUNSTEIN, supra note 50,
at 138-39.
377
378
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ily limited, for courts lack the electoral legitimacy and the basic tools
to introduce and manage a social welfare state on their own. " 83
Sunstein's apparent endorsement, here, of a democratic argument for judicial restraint with respect to welfare rights is puzzling,
given his support for a constitutional right to abortion: s4 why would
there be any democratic difference between judicial enforcement of
rights to welfare versus abortion? The best account of the difference
concerns the epistemic or remedial deficits of courts, and not their
democratic deficits. Sunstein goes on to articulate the epistemic argument quite strongly:
Adjudication is an exceptionally poor system for achieving large-scale
social reform. Courts are rarely experts in the area at hand. Moreover,
the focus on the litigated case makes it hard for judges to understand
the complex, often unpredictable effects of legal intervention. Knowledge of these effects is crucial but sometimes inaccessible. A decision to
require expenditures on school busing might, for example, divert resources from an area with an equal or greater claim to public resources-including medical and welfare programs for the poor....
Ideas of this sort provide some support for the Court's aversion to
the recognition of so-called positive rights. Judicial enforcement of such
rights would have harmful effects on other programs, many of them
quite important. Such effects can be taken into account by legislators
and administrators, but rarely byjudges.385
Here, again, in updated form, is the notion of a synoptic, constitutional inquiry dependent on "legislative facts," that as we have seen

goes back (at least) to the scholarly criticism of Lochner from the
1920s and 1930s.
To summarize: Kadish's seminal article on procedural due process, Michelman's renowned article on takings, Davis's less-famous but
parallel work on the Fourth Amendment, and the more recent literature on welfare rights, all articulate the same kind of argument for re-

3Id.at 139.
Id. at 270-85 (arguing for a right to abortion, albeit on equal protection
grounds).
3s5 Id. at 14748. Sunstein
continues:
[T]he creation of a legal right to subsistence would create a range of problems.... Courts do not have the tools to choose among the various possible
ways of satisfying a subsistence right. They are in a poor position to assess the
relationship between that right and other desirable social goals, including the
provision of training and employment programs, not to mention incentives
for productive work.
Id. at 148-49.
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straint8 ' This argument is epistemic, not democratic. It points to
the problem of synoptic review-the problem of determining the overall improvement, with respect to ajustifying value, that a statute, rule
or administrative practice infringing upon constitutional criteria secures, and of weighing that overall improvement against the overall
infringement3 7 The problem of synoptic review will, at a minimum,
arise on a thin-consequentialist view of ethics, as on Michelman's
utilitarian construal of the Takings Clause-where the ultimate ethical question is whether invalidating a statute, rule, etc., increases
overall utility, efficiency or some other general, background standard
of good consequences. But, more importantly, the problem of synoptic review can arise even where the litigant is understood to have a
moral right in Dworkin's sense (an aspect of her well-being that
trumps the general, background standards)5 8 if that right can nonetheless be overridden by a sufficiently large improvement in a sufficiently important value. For example, a person has a moral right to
participate in a governmental decision affecting her, but (as Kadish
tells us) this right can be overridden if the overall resources needed
to permit her and similarly situated persons to participate are too
great. After all, these resources could be used instead to increase the
level of payments to government beneficiaries. A person has a moral
right against a warrantless administrative search, but (as Davis tells us)
this right can (sometimes) be overridden if a practice of warrantless
searches sufficiently increases public safety, health or environmental
protection. A person may have a moral right to resources adequate
for some basic need of hers, but (as Sunstein tells us) a welfare
scheme may legitimately compromise the satisfaction of her kind of
need, in order to satisfy equal or higher-priority needs of some other
386Lon L. Fuller famously developed a similar theme,
outside of constitutional
scholarship, in his article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
394-404 (1978) (arguing that "polycentric" tasks were inherently unsuited to adjudication).
87 There is an issue of incommensurability lurking here.
If constitutional values
and the values that justify statutes, rules, etc., can be incommensurable, in context, see
supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text, then there are two possible views about
what the unconstitutionality of a statute, rule, etc., consists of: (a) the statute, etc., is
unconstitutional if, in context (relative to the status quo) it infringes upon some constitutional value and is not supported by any overriding value; or (b) the statute, etc., is
unconstitutional if, in context it infringes upon some overiding constitutional value.
Whether your view is (a) or (b), it remains an objective question whether (a) or (b)
obtains; further, the overall improvement in the justifying value that the statute secures will figure in either question.
388 See DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 81-130 (rights as "trumps").
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kind. We might say the same about the doctrines permitting "time,
place or manner" restrictions on speech: a person has a moral right
to speak, but that right can be overridden if a content-neutral restriction on speech of that kind serves some "substantial governmental interest. - 389

These are compelling ethical claims. It is ethically compelling
that the aspects of well-being protected by the Bill of Rights do not
take lexical priority over the justifying values that statutes, rules, orders or actions infringing upon these rights might secure. 90 Above
all, the claims are compelling in the post-New Deal world, given the
range of justifying values that lawmakers are now constitutionally
authorized to pursue.9 Less compelling is a conclusion, drawn from
these ethical premises, that reviewing courts should exercise restraint
in enforcing moral rights to speech, due process, security, property
and basic welfare. Nothing I have said here is meant to endorse that

conclusion. For, whatever the epistemic deficits of courts in determining the overall world-improvement worked by a challenged stat-

ute, rule, etc., with respect to some important justifying value, it is
equally plausible that administrative agencies might be epistemically
ill-placed to balance that improvement against moral rights. 9 2 Yet

See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984)
(upholding Park Service regulation limiting expression as satisfying the time, place or
manner doctrine).

s9 Cf. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987) (describing, but criticizing, development of balancing tests in post-New
Deal constitutional doctrine).
sI
have already observed one irony about the post-New Deal timing of our
debates about the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: that these debates have been conducted with such heat and vigor in just that period of U.S. history when the rise and
then the jurisprudential recognition of the administrative state have rendered obsolete the legislature-centered model of governance upon which the debate has been
premised. Note, now, a second irony: that this debate has overshadowed, and continues to overshadow, scholarly writings roughly contemporaneous with Bickel's, such as
Kadish's (1957), Michelman's (1967), or Davis's (1978), that ought to have, but did
not, combine into an equally self-conscious and visible restraintist literature. Ought to
have, because the problem of synoptic review that Kadish, Michelman and Davis identified was truly au courantwith the constitutional revolution of the New Deal. What the
New Deal revolution involved, among other things, was a decisive acceptance by the
Court of the state's role in securing minimum incomes, safe workplaces, economic
security, basic medical care and education, decent health, and other high-priority aspects of well-being, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 50, at 139, that can hardly be lexically
subordinate to the aspects of well-being set out in the Bill of Rights.
3Y2 See Diver, supra note 341, at 428-34 (arguing for selective, not
general use of the
synoptic model by agencies); Fiss, supra note 69, at 34-35 (doubting constitutional
competence of administrative agencies).

892

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREViEW

[Vol. 145: 759

one can, I think, say at least this about epistemic claims for restraint
grounded upon the synoptic cast of judicial review: such claims deserve at least as much attention and inquiry as their more famous,
democratic cousins. Understand again that a democratic argument
such as the Countermajoritarian Difficulty involves both the ethical
claim that some democratic value overrides constitutional criteria and
the institutional claim that the democratic cast of the relevant institution is sufficiently powerful to embody that value. Neither of these
claims is, in the least, intuitively compelling, particularly when one
turns from legislatures to administrative agencies. Epistemic arguments for restraint, modest or robust, 3 3 are easily as plausible as this
one.
Ultimately, there may prove to be no grounds whatsoeverneither democratic grounds nor epistemic grounds-that require
courts to exercise restraint in reviewing administrative rules, orders
and actions. But if there is a way clear to a different conclusion, the
epistemic path would seem less difficult, and certainly no more so,
than the arduous path mapped by the Countermajoritarian Difficulty.
It is the epistemic path, I suggest, that we now ought to try.

39s

See supra text accompanying note 340.

